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Ar~ersinger v . Hamlin - --- -Cert to Fla SC: Roberts , Drew , Thorna1 , Carlton ; dissenting : 
~QYQ , Ervin , Adkins 
Petr was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor punishable~ 
under Fla law by not less thanlt three and not more than 6 
l· 
months or by a fine not less than $500 and not more than $1000 . 
Petr pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 , and 
in default of payment to be imprisoned for 3 months . lJe was 
indigent , and therefore was ordered to prison . 
With the assistance of an attorney , he filed for state 
habeas corpus the day after his sentence began . He was released 
on bail where he remains . His claim was that when he pled --- / 
guilty he was unrepresented but that he had not waived his 
right to assistance of counsel . He also claimed that he had 
CCDNTROLLING CASES : GIDeon v . Wainwright , 372 U. S . 335 (1963). 
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a defense to the charges against him , The Fla SC, by a 4-3 
vote, discharged the writ , It ruled that an indigent offender 
accused of a misdemeanor is entitled to court-appointed counsel 
only where the offense Jmi: with which he has been charged 
carries a possible penalty of more than 6 months imprisonment . 
Since petr was charged with a misdemanor which was not punishable 
by more than 6 months, he was not entitled to relief , Petr 
sought cert to this Court, and the Court granted , 
This is going to be , hopefully , a brief memo , because 
I do not think I can say anything here that will improve on 
the amicus brief filed by the SG in this case , I recommend 
that you read that brief and rely on it rather than the 
petr's brief x as your source for that side of the case , 
The right KNXB~~NXNKRNXN~MXX of indigents to have appointed 
Efg!KNXXR couns
1
Jl& was recognized by this Court in ~!R Gideon v . 
Wainwright , Although neither the reasoning nor the precise 
holding of the case is limited to felonies , Gideon had been 
convicted of a felony , It is therefore argued that the Court 
has not held that indigents are entitled to appointed counsel 
in mi.s:NN misdemeanor cases , The Fla SC and most of the persons 
supporting the state ' s position , do not argue that ax in all 
RlX.S:Na:nnRNH misdemeanor cases , there is no right to counsel . 
They instead , relying on the line drawn in Duncan v . Lousiana , 
391 U. S . 145 (1968) , and baldwin v , New York , 399 U. S . 66 (1970) , 
argue that there is no such right in non- serious cases , i . e ., 
cases in which the maximum~ imprisonment that can be imposed 
does not exceed 6 months , 
-3-
In the right-to-counsel precedents, there is little 
/;t/e ~ /4f? -~ ~. I 
kXE®M~ comfort forx~!R roop'o line , K.S:XXXKHXN+XKN!RXXN In 
the right-to-counsel area the Court has never taken an historical 
approach of trying to determine wNxxxkiNx in what kinds of 
cases counsel was afforded at the time the Constituti,an was 
- ---------- If \,\ 
written. It's approach has been fundamental fairness, Very 
simply put, it has held that the right to counsel goes to the 
integrety of the fact-finding function, and that atria~ in 
which the def end ant has been denied the right to counsel_J ~ .,u,-,r. 
It has never limited this reasoning according to whether the 
offense charged is serious or not. Indeed, there is substantial 
evidence for the proposition that the fact-finding process 
in non-serious cases requires the assistance of counsel to the 
same extent as does the fact-finding process in serious cases. 
There are some interesting figures cited in the arnicus brief 
of the Legal Aid Society of New York , at 16-18, which show 
that rix:NxKN!RXN.s:.s:xx:kHN~Rx~f in non-serious cases in which the 
society represents indigents in New York, it obtains either an . 
acquital or dismissal of charges 45% of the time, whereas in 
felonies, ix.s:xx!R it is successful only 9% of the time. This 
suggests that the occurance of errors is far more frequent in 
rAra.~ ni "-1 
the non-serious cases, and it is not xu strains judicial notice 
too far, I think, to E:©NN conclude that substantially less of 
these errors would have come to light had there been no assistance 
of counsel. Other studies could be, and indeed are, cited for 
the proposition that the quality of justice handed out by the 
lower criminal courts of this country ~~MXNX!R benefits fx@ when 
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the accused is represented . Over- burdened courts , often 
presided over by judges who are poorly trained , do not aid 
a def who is wi~ without assistance . Therefore , I think it 
is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that the system 
works better if the accused is represented in non-serious 
cases . 
In addition to this due process reason in XMf~~ support 
of the indir,ent's right to N~NM counsel, there is a quasi-
equal protection ~ - (Resp argues that this argument was 
not advanced in the court below and cannot therefore be raised 




acknowledgement at p 36 of petr ' s brief . I see no such 
acknowled~ement on that page . t'oreover , due process was clearly 
raised below, ~ I think that if this arguemtn is properly 
classified as an equal protection argument rather than a due 
process argument , that it is certainly on the hazy borderline 
between those two doctrines . Ihe Court has acknowledge that 
the concept of e~Jal protection is inherent in the fundamental 
fairness N~X concept of due process.) The arguemtn is simply 
that it is fundamentally MNfaxixx~ unfair to permit persons 
who can afford attorneys to be represented while persons who 
cannot afford them are not . In support of this argument , petr 
cites the ~riffin v . Illinois , 351 U. S . 12 (1956) , line of 
cases . 
Thus, petr is able to marshal two powerful constitutional 
' po ~ --i_e_s_ i_n __ f ... a_v,..o.._r;....,.o:.,:f:_,:t :,:h:..;.e....:r:.:i:,:g~h:.:,t,:_,:o.:f....:i:n.:.:d:.1.:· g'.:e=n~t~s~ t::,:o:.._:h::,:a.:.v.:e:_:a:_!p~p::;o:.::in t e d 
counsel in non-serious cases . There arc , however , counter 
- 5-
policies . 
The strongest of these is the argument that to appoint 
counsel in every misdemaenor case in which an indigent is 
unrepresented would be to place an insurmountable burden on 
the x judicial systems. RNx~xxxgiX~XKNRx~x~~~xixi~Nxx Resp 
cites the number of traffic offenses , or charges of jaywalking 
or spiiting on the sidewalk , in which counsel would have to 
be afforded . The state asserts that it would be imposiible 
for all these persons to be represented . Since due process 
often acquires a delicate balance E~~ between the rights of 
the accused and the interest of the state , it is not inappropriate 
. . b ~ l 1 .. to consider these logistical pro lems . t,J.groevCJ:: , t 1e ogistical 
argument also serves to refute the quasi-equal protection argu-
nori-serious 
ment advanced by petr . In most/cases, the potential liability 
is only a fine . It is often not worth while for persons who can 
afford one , to NXRXRxxxxa hire a lawyer; legal fees are likely 
to be higher than the potential fineJ But if an indigent has 
a right to appointed counsel , we would face the anomalous situ~tion 
in ~1ich all indigents would be represented because they could 
most 
have free assistance while/axx non-indigents would be unrepresented 
because it would not be ~ inteJligent to NiRx hire an 
attorney . Furthermore , resp argues , if indigents have a right 
to appointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases , why would they 
not also have the same right in xi civil caseso The potential 
liability in a civil case will often exceed the maximum fine 
-6 i~posable in a misdemanor case . If assistance is provided±N in 
the latter to protect the indigent ' s iNN interests , logic 
) 
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d ictates that assistance be provided in the former where the 
same or even greater interests are involved . But here the 
logistical problem wou1d truly prove insurmountable . 
t 
There is no denying the force to ~Rkx*xxaxg resp ' s logistical. 
arguments , but much of that force is dissipated by the rule 
suggested by the SC in his brief . He suggests that the right 
to counsel exist only in cases in which a sentence is imposed . 
If at the outsetx of the process , the judge believes that 
a conviction wil1 likeJy ~ a jail sentence , he must~ 
advise the def of his right to appointed counsel . This is 
essentially the rule proposed by the ABA , RE except that this 
one has an ad&itional wrinkle . The SG says that if N the 
offense is one which would not normally bring a sentence 
and if a judge , accordingly , does not offer an indigent appointed 
counsel , he cannot then later change his mind and sentence 
the man after all . Instead some other , as ~Ra yet unspecifie1 
procedur~ would have to be devised . XNXKXXNXRXKNEKRHNkixxx~xxx 
KNRXNXXXNNXKXN®WNX@NXKNRXX®5XKKXNHXX~XNMXRm 
The SG ' s proposed rule would ~~ry reduce the 
logistical problem by eliminating crimes like jaywalking 
from tho~ in which indigents must be furnished counsel . 
~N~R There is considerable~ reason to ExR± believe that the 
' 
remaining logistical problem would not be ixNNmaNgax unmanagable . 
Several states have comparable rules at the present , including 
New York and California . While New York is not the best 
example one could cite for efficiency , there is no reason to 
think that the appointment of counsel in non-serious misdemeanor 
( 
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cases contributes substantially to the problem. If New York 
can handle the problem, it is reasonable to assume that other 
states could. Indeed , Alaska in its amicus brief, endorses 
the sr•s rule. Seconc,l, the SG says that his rule would 
Qresent no insurmountable problem for the federal system . 
~ -Thira , wh ile the SG cannot :s:10exEk speak for the a states, he 
points out that the recent cases that have expanded the right 
./4)-a.~ 
to counsel ~o R that it app_:}*s in many other stages of the 
criminal process have not presented any insurmountable logistical 
n barrier. Finally , the ABA and a federal study have concluded 
I' that s irnilar rules are feasible . 
:s:e~mXK~XNiKXRXXNXlOXXKXENXXXXXX It is reasonable to assume that 
the ABA in particular was not unaware of the magnitude of 
resulting logistica;ei problemso 
The t SG's rule is also the answer to the argument of 
resp that if indigents have a right to counsel in all misdemeanor 
cases, they must have such a right in all civil cases. 
~1 
R~x the SG's rule distinguislhes a situation where there is a 
pssibility of imprisonment from those in which the only penalty 
is f±Naprn financial . This distinguishes the ~x±ml::NiK civil cases. -
While it, like all rules, is not x~~xx10exfREK perfect--there 
may be some cases in which the financial interest at stake 
is af higher imporaance than the possibility of a few days in 
jail, although it is difficult to think of such a case involving 
indigents--it does seem both workable and effective in removing 
the inet!{l.lities. As a general rule, the thing we think unfair 
._ 8-
is the possibility of going to jail without having been 
represented . The magnitude of the unfairness is diminished 
where the only penalty is monetary . 
There is one solid workability argument advance against 
the SC's position by the state of Virginia in its amicus brief . 
\l 
It says that in cases where :i1iuiigHNKxx indigents are fined 
and cannot or will not pay the fine , they are sent to jail . 
Therefore it argues that there is a possibilty of jail in almost 
every case . That is not an easy objection to answer . It i~ 
of course:N; not before XNXXXE the Court in this case . (It is 
true that petr was sentenced to jail because he could not pay 
a fine , but the charge involved in this case , carrying a concealed 
weapon , is one that would N~xm.axjqq::xixaxx1~.nniR:. often , I a s sume , 
L 
resu1tx in a sentence , so under the SG's rule , petr would have 
- --f.evr, ~ o-/ ¼ J 
~ Aright to appointed counsel . ) Moreover , ~ ase 
presents itself , I think there is a possible avenue of distinction . 
} 
I~ that ~ jail sentences imposed in lieu of fines could 
be analagized to contempt or something 1 ike it . Then you migh_t , 
a say that he was sent to jail not beaause he violated the 
\ 
criminal statute , but because he failed to pay his fine and was 
therefore in contempt . But even if there is no distinction , 
I do not think that the problem is insurmountable . In reality 
theec are going to be very few cases in which the fine is so 
large and the defendant so poorx: that he cannot pay it . Most 
of the EHX!R kinds of misdemeanors we are talking aboltlt--jaywalking 
or traffic violations--do not involve fines of $500 such as was 
imposed in this case . Moreo~er , in its opinion of last term , 
lOl U .S. 395 (1971), the Court ruled that it 
gal to automatically send a man to jail because he 
was too poor to pay his fineo It said that alternatives, such -as installment payments, had to be tried first. Only then if 
the rnan still could not or would not pay, could he be sent 
Thus , in the future there should 
fewer of these cases.m So even if the rule 
be xi&s::s:x@fx:trnx 
lfi__ h 1.· f must r t .at 
the fine cannot be paid and the def is then sent to jail, he 
had a right to counsel, the rule :s: will still clear w away a 
lot of the minor cases in which jail sentences, as a prai.ctical 
matter, are N!RXi&xximJO@:S:!RNX not a realistic possibility. 
I 
One benefit that might result from such a rule, incidentally, 
is the elimination of a lot of criminal statutes ·that are not 
properly criminal matters. I do not know what one could call 
them, if not crimes, blta lot of traffic ©ff!RN:S:XR offensese 
E@NNX could be better handled by a process that did not invoke 
all the cumbersome mechanisms of the criminal law. A rule 
such as that suggested by the SG, might encourage states to 
redefine a lot of "crimes." 
Thus, I would concll.iAf that striking the logistical balance, 
k~.,tks-1,:t,,4 ~1--~ 
under the s---mfggested r~w~ the interest of indigents 
in obtaining a fair ttial, would result in a holding that 
indigents have a right to N@N@N counsel in all cases in which 
they are sent to jailo That is rdally th guts of this 
1/4 017-f? 
but therela.Fs a fsJ incidentai.1 :s- issues that need to be treated • 
.. fir.:,)' /.;.esp argues that~ the line for right ©K to appointed 
;'•, 
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counsel xbus1N« should be drawn at offenses punishable by not 
more than 6 months because that is the line drawn in the jury 
cases. The right to counsel like the right to a jury trial is 
a part of the 6th Amenmento If kNHXRxixxNNxxi~NKXRNxaxtNx~ 
the 6th Amen~ ent does not require a right to a jury in a case, 
/I 
it ought not require the H}slJslNXlnnnR appointment of counsel. 
This argument assumes that the Court adopted :Mr. Justice Black's 
position of total incorporation of the Bill of Rights into 
the 14th Amenment. B~t the Court did not adopt that position. 
It selectively incorporated according to what it fx felt were 
the dictates of fundamental fairness. And i:x it turns out that 
the reasons for incorporating some part of the 6th Amenmcnt 
do not apply to others. for example, the right to a jury trial 
does not, at least to the same extent, reflect the policy 
behihd the right to counsel which± is that without the assistance 
of counsel, the integrety of the fact-finding process is weakened. 
\ 
This is why the right to a jury trial was not made retroactice, 
while the right to counsel was. Thus, all the parts of the 6th' 
the f ac*'E t hat 
amendment do not have the same force, so/xNaxxwNi:x!R a jury may 
not be required in non-serious misdemeanor trials does not 
necessarily mean that counsel. is not required. It is very doubtful 
that the Court would tolerate limiting the other rights 
guaranteed by the 6th Amendment NXK~XN~NKS:i&XXNNxx«ax!R--right to 
speedy trial, right to public trial, right to know nature and 
cause of accusation, right to confront witnesses, right to 
compel favorable witnesses--to serious offenses. fN For one 
thing, the logistical problems that are claimed to exist in 
-11-
this case , and which certainly would exist if juries were 
required in non-serious offenses , do not exist if the right 
to confront witnesses , for example , is guaranteed in non-
serious cases . Thus, in the case of each right , a balance 
must be struck . In this case , as I have already argued , 
the balance should be struck in favor of the right . 
(Although I promised , j o tbe paragraph bsfor"9 last , that _.(;.:.:>....._ 
.,.t;hcrc were a"few" tncidental issues that needed treating , '<-__ 
I reverse myself ;;ind limit the di:3cussiot1 to the one in ,9______ 
th@ last paragraph , J Q 
In conc1usion , let me reiterate that ki::::s: this is really 
a balancing case--the interest of the accused in counsel 
vs . the interest of the state in efficieny . I think that the 
sr•s rule offers a proper method of striking that balance . 
REVERSE Fox 
r •. : ,. 
Conf. 2/25/72 
Court ................... . l'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
j,1tprtmc <.qcnrl cf tlrt ~ttitdt .§tat.ts 
'J]tir1-u.llrhtghm. tI}. <.q. 20~)!-~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
March 2, 1972 
/ 
Re: No. 70 -r 015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Chief: 
I have devoted further attention to this case. 
I write this note merely to let you know that my vote, 
this time around, remains just as tentative and just as 
unsure as it was in December. I am particularly con-
cerned, of course, because mine seems to be the swing 
vote, and at the moment I feel I could draw the line 
either at imprisonment or at the six-month mark. The 
latter has the obvious advantage of relating to Baldwin. 
It is possible that I shall come to rest only after some-
thing is written out. 
Facetiously, one might conclude to send this 
case back because of the Boykin error and let it go at 
that. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 






JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
j;u:µutttt QJomt af Urt 'Jlfuildi ~tctit.e-
'Jjl a:s qiugton. l'J. QJ. 2llffeJl-.;l 
March 27, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Although your draft opinion is persuasive, I am not yet 
persuaded to change my vote. Accordingly, I now plan to write 
something. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 4/3/72 1cc 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: April 3, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Your draft opinion of 4/1/72 is great - well written and well 
reascmed. 
I will, of course, do some revisions because lawyers are 
incapable of accepting something another lawyer writes without changing 
it. The result in this case will probably not be as good. 
I would appreciate your seeing whether additional facts are 
available as follows: 
The majority relies on a single study (as I understand it) to 
the effect that fewer than 2300 lawyers will be needed to accommodate 
all indigent petty crime cases. You translate this into $23, 000, 000 
assuming $10,000 per year. The minimum charge per hour .. prescribed ~ 
by any state law with which I am familiar or in any law office - is 
$15. 00. If you assume 30 hours per week - which is certainly a 
minimum in litigation - my arithmetic results in $22, 500 per lawyer. 
If public defenders were used, perhaps you would not have to pay this 
much on the average. The starting minimum wage for lawyers in 







~ . , .. 
" ; 
2. 
But I question the basis assumption that 2300 lawyers would be 
adequate or that the cost would be as low as even my figures would 
project. 
You might do the following: (i) read, if you have not done so, 
the article relied upon by the majority and see how solid it looks; (ii) 
obtain the actual figures appropriated by the Congress for the OEO 
Legal Services Program, going back to the first year 1965 and record 
the steady increase in the requests and the appropriations - which 
all of .us who worked with that program considered inadequate; (iii) 
see if there are studies by NLADA as to the increase in cost on a 
national basis of legal aid - both private and state provided - prior 
to and since Gideon; and (iv) take a look at the briefs in No. 71-11 
I 
( James v. Strange). My recollection is that these briefs will reveal -
perhaps the record does too - that Kansas spent about $600, 000 a year 
providing indigent services 1n felony cases, an amount which has been 
increasing annually. The FBI shows the number of felonies in each , 
state in its annual reports. It may show the number of misdemeanors, 
although I doubt this. If one compared the number of felonies committed 
In Kansas, and the cost per felony for this legal service, you might 
\ 
come up with a figure to be applied nationally. This would be w~ on 







not a high crime state as compared with many others. Whether this 
sort of analysis is worth the trouble is a debatable question. I 
certainly would not spend any large amount of time on it. The cost 
problem is not what concerns me most, but 1 am convinced that reliance 
upon the single study - cited in the majority opinion - presents an 
unrealistic assessment of costs. 
The consequences of the majority's position which concern me 
the most are (a) the impact on the smaller communities, with all of 
their diversity across the county; and (b) the impact on the criminal 
justice system primarily 1n terms of aggravating the already acute 
problem of "delayed justice" and intolerable cOJj-estion in court dockets 
at all levels. On this latter polbl - which 1s the single most important 
one in my thinking - I hope you can find some statistics which reflect 
the impact of Gideon in these respects.. I retlize that statistics do not 
measure any single cause of the present overburdened condition of 
the system. Decisions of this Court have certainly contributed 
singificantly. But I suspect that the real "watershed" was Gideon 
(which I firmly support), but which has created problems which the 
system has not yet managed to master. As you and I have discussed 
·.• .. 
'•· ,. 













young lawyers recieve most of the appointments ( except where public 
defenders are provided); they are fresh out of law school, full of the 
latest constitutional ''wisdom"; they are eager to make a reputation; 
they often have plenty of time; and, when paid on a hourly basis by the 
state, this is lucrative and attractive work. The result is that the 
simplest felony case, often without a truly substantive issue, may be 
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court - a,t just 
once but 10 or 20 times through state and federal habeas corpus. 
I am sure studies are available somewhar~ possibly through 
the Administrative Office of the Federal Court. I have seen references 
to studies on the escalating flood of habeas corpus petitions, but this 
is only a part of the story. 
While the experience in felony cases is not completely analagou.s, it 
is the best indication of what is likely to be the overburdening of the 
system ... in terms of delay frivcilous defenses, petitions and appeals. 
I have one or two other ideas but we can talk about these. 





lfp/ ss lee 4/7 /72 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: April 7, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: Argersinger v. Hamlin No. 70-5015 
Here is your first draft, with a certain number of suggested 
changes and with a couple of fairly verbose riders. 
I would appreciate your developing a secood draft, which tries 
to blend together - both in substance and sty le - our respective 
contributions. Feel free, as always, to change my verbiage and 
challenge my reasoning. 
Specific points - some quite minor - which have occurred to 
me include the following: 
1. My terminology is not always consistent. I think you used 
the term "petty" offenses, and I sometimes used both petty and 
misdemeanor offenses. Perhaps it would be well - near the outset -
to define petty offenses a little more specifically than you have at 
present. This might be done in a footnote, which might also refer to 
18 U.S. C. § 1 defining petty offenses under federal law. 
Another example of inconsistent terminology is my use of 




If there are any ground rules here as to how one should refer to the 
prevailing opinion, feel free to make the necessary changes. 
2. 
2. The Douglas draft makes some use of lower federal and 
state court decisions. I am aware of a conflict (see ABA Standards 
on "providing defense services" pp. 38 and 39 ), and wonder whether 
we have anything to gain by citing any of these cases. 
I 
3. &ilould we not make some reference to the fact that a number 
of istates, by statute, have extended the right to counsel into the mis-
1" 
/ 
1demeanor categories? I aave not looked at any of these statutes. I 
wooder whether we could derive support from any of them for our view 
that it is unnecessary to create a new, arbitrary constitutional line. 
Perhaps, as a minimum, we might refer to state statutes as an example 
of one way to deal with this problem without imposing on all 50 states 
a new hard and fast rule? 
4. In discussing cost, would it not be well to note .. without 
emphasis - that paying for counsel at the first trial stage is only one 
element. Counsel will be required in all subsequent stages. In 
addition a transcript of the evidence will have to be made, preserved 
and made available to the accused. This would be quite impossible 
in many misdemeanor courts in the smaller communities across the 
country, where neither recording facilities nor stenographers are 
available. 
I 













5. I am still tempted to include, at least in a footnote, the 
SG' s suggestion that - in view of the obvious burden even his rule 
would impose oo the legal profession - the requirement could be met 
by using social workers and clergymen. If you have the time, take a 
look at the transcript of the SG's argument. It seems to me that this 
suggestion ccntradicts the basic premise that lawyers are needed. 
I think the average defendant would be better off with no lawyer than 
with the average social worker or clergyman - at least that would be 
my own decision. 
6. We have discussed Section 11 of your draft, and how you will 
restructure it. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
; 
fox/ss 1cc 4/8/72 
No. 70-5015 ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 
Mr. Justice Powell, cmcurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. s. 335 (1963), held that the 
states were required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to furnish counsel to all indigent defendants charged 
1 
with felonies. The question before us today is whether an indigent 
defendant charged with an offense carrying a maximum punishment 
of six months imprisonment or a fine of $1, 000 or both is entitled 
as a matter of Constitutional right to the assistance of appointed 
counsel. More generally, we must determine whether the Due 
Process Clause requires that an indigent charged with a state petty 
2 
offense be afforded the right to appointed counsel. 
In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Florida 
agreed that indigents charged with seriou~ misdemeanors we re 
entitled to appointed counsel, but by a vote of four to three, it 
limited that right to indigents charged with offenses punishable by 
2. 
3 
more than six months imprisonment. The state court, in drawing 
a six-month line, followed the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 45 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), 
decided shortey after the opinion below, in which we held that the 
due process right to a trial by jury in state criminal cases was limited 
to cases in which the offense charged was punishable by more than six 
. months. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be 
drawn, it must be drawn so an indigent has a right to appointed counsel 
in all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial. An 
unskilled J layman may be able to defend himself in a non-jury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together disassembled facts, 
but before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal 
the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on 
behalf of the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to counsel, 
the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the offense 


















not compel the conclusion that the indigent's right to appointed counsel 
must be similarly restricted. The Court's opinion in Duncan, Baldwin 
and District of Columbia v. Claways, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), reveal 
that the jury trial limitation has historic origins at common law. 
No such history exists to support a similar limitation on the right 
to counse; to the contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was 
4 
available in misdemeanor but no felony cases. Only as recently 
as Gideon has an indigent had a right to appointed counsel in felony 
cases. Moreover, the fundamental value protected by the right to 
jury trial - tempering the possible arbitrary and harsh exercise of 
power by judges - while important, is not as fundamental as the due 
5 
process guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that 
an indigent defendant, charged with a petty offense, may, in every 
case, be afforded a fair trial without the assistance of counsel. 
Nor can I agree with the new rule of due process, today enunciated 
an 
by the Court, thatfe,ccused indigent is entitled to have counsel provided 
' I 
4. 
by the state in all cases where ''the statute makes any imprisonment 
6 
a permissible penalty. " It seems to me that the line need not be 
drawn with such rigidity. I think a middle course, between the 
extremes of Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule as to 
imprisonable offenses, comports both Wlith the Constitution and 
with the practicalities of the administration of criminal justice. 
I. 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need 
for the assistance of counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when 
he is charged with an offense punishable by six months or less. 
7 8 
In both Powell v. Alabama and Gideon , both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen could adequately 
present their own cases, much less identify and argue legal questions 
that might inhere in their cases. Many petty offenses will also 
present complex legal and factual issues that may not be fairly tried 
if the defendant is not assisted by counsel. Even in relatively simple 
cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or some ether handicap, 
'(',~·. 
' .. ,. ' ·~. 
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will be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences of a 
misdemeanor conviction, whether they be only a brief period served 
under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or 
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of 
9 
sufficient magnitude not to be easily dismissed by the label "petty". 
As the Court notes, serious consequences also result from convictions 
not punishable by imprisonment. In the fact of such consequences, 
to deny the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of 
defending themselves, is to deny them a fair trial. 
Whereas, a flat six-month rule would result in harsh and 
unfair consequences, the rigidity of the Court's rule as to imprisonable · 
offenses is also unsatisfactory. Such rules fail to reflect many 
relevant considerations. Some petty offense cases are complex, 
others are exceedingly simple. Counsel is often essential to a 
fair trial but this is by no means a universal fact. As a justification 
for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of felonies, this Court 
na:ed, "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
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indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts 
10 
are necessities, not luxuries." Yet government often does not hire 
lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the arresting police 
officer presents the case. Nor do all defendants who have the money 
hire lawyers to defend them on all petty charges; where the possibility 
d. a jail sentence is remote and the probable magnitude of a fine 
seems small or where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the 
11 
benefits of assistance of counsel may exceed the costs. Indeed, 
it is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend the right 
of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in cases where 
the right 1K to counsel would rarely be exercised by non-indigent 
defendants. 
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are tried 
showed that procedures were often informal, presided over by lay 
' judges. Jury trials were rare, and the prosecution was not vigorous. 
It is as inaccurate to say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial 















no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the offense charged 
is only a petty one. 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be a 
prophylactic rule that would require the appointment of counsel to 
indigents in all criminal cases. The simplicity of such a rule is 
appealing because it could be applied automatically in every case, 
I 
but the price of pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in 
terms of its impact on the administration of the criminal justice 
systems of 50 states. This is apparent when one relfects on the 
wide variety of petty or misdemeanor offenses, the varying definitions 
thereof, and the diversity of penalties prescribed. The potential 
impact oft state court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their ;ju:IPElll«•A jurisdictions, ranging from 
jisttces of the peace and part time judges in the small communities 
/ 
( 
' /' to the elaborately staffed police courts which operate 24 hours a day 
I 
I 
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We should not adopt a rule with consequences of unknown 
dimensions unless it is clearly mandated by the Constitution. The 
the 
majority adopts a view of/due process clause that requires the state 
to furnish counsel to all cases where "any imprisonment (is) a 
permissible punishment. " This means that wherever a state statute 
or municipal ordinance authorizes imprisonment, even of the briefest 
duration or as a rarely used alternative to the customary fine, an 
indigent cannot be tried in any court in the land, or before any justice 
of the peace or lay judge, unless counsel is knowingly waived or 
provided. I find no basis in the Constitution for such a far-reaching 
;:1\ 
'. , ,, 
' , .. 
. . • ~ 
·,,:.'· 
new interpretation of the due process clause. Nor is there any policy •. 
or administrative justification for putting the system of 50 states .:' :· 
in such a strait jacket. 
The majority opinion cites with approval the reports of the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
13 
of Justic~ and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum 
14 
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abandonment of distinctions based on whether an offense is 
characterized as felony, misdemeanor {petty offense), or traffic 
violation, a recommendation in which I concur. Both studies also 
emphasize, as every lawyer would agree, the importance of extending 
the right to counsel beyond the arbitrary felony/misdemeanor line. 
But neither went as far as the Court goes today. The President's 
Commission recommended that: 
The objective to be met as quickly as p~sible 
is to provide counsel to every criminal defendant 
who faces a significant penalty, if he cannot afford 
to provide counsel himself .•. The immediate 
minimum, until it becomes possible pssflpla to 
provide the foregoing, is that all criminal defendants 
who are in danger of subs\,rttal loss of liberty shall 
be provided with counsel. 
The American Bar Assocld:ion Standard relates only to 
offenses punishable ''by loss of liberty", and states that "counsel 
should be provided " in all such cases except for those ''types of 
16 
offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed. " 
Both studies recommended desirable goals. Neither concluded that 
due process required the drawing of any particular Constitutional 








abandonment of the then existing line between felonies and misdemeanors 
and a recognition that the seriousness of the likely punishment is a 
critical factor. 'The President's Commission spoke of "a significant 
penalty" and a "substantial loss of liberty". The American Bar 
Association standard, addressing only imprisonable offenses, would 
not extend the right of counsel to cases where "such punsihment is 
not likely to be imposed." They do not support a new inflexible 
Constitutional rule. 
The majority opinion does not limit the right to counsel in 
petty or misdemeanor cases to those involving a possibility of jail, 
it goes on to hold that counsel also must be provided in bther classes 
of cases in which the offense is not imprisonable but the consequences 
of conviction are potentially serious. Examples mentioned incillde 
the revocation of one's driver's license, and convictions for 
"drunken driving or a hit-and-run escapade." The court then states: 
I 
J 
Thus while the right to counsel extends to the 
imprisonable class of offenses .. whatever they may 
be called by local law - the same right must extend 
also to other classes of which we have given some 
exmmples. Only experience and time can give 
shape and content to the entire class. 
}·· . ' 
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The distinction which the Court makes between imprisonable 
offenses and other "classes" of serious misdemeanors implicitly 
recognizes that the due process clause does not require an absolutist 
17 
rule with respect to any specified class of cases. The result 
of the holding today is to create three categories of petty or 
misdemeanor offenses: (1) where there is any possibility of 
a jail sentence, however remote its imposition or brief its duration; 
(11) "other classes" - of which a few examples are given - which 
"only time and experience" can define; and (iii) offenses labeled 
"de minimum" which, although not precisely defined, presumably 
include minor traffic charges. As to the first category, a lawyer 
must be provided in every case regardless of circumstances; as to 
the other two, a lawyer must sometimes be provided. I cannot find 
in the due process clause of the Constitution any justification for 
this potpourri. Admittedly, the question presented in this case 
is an extremely difficult one, involving fundamental rights which 
must be protected and the day-to-day viability of the diverse court 




, . . 
~ . ' . 
12. 
in adherence to principle - not In the drawing of inflexible lines 
which are nowhere delineated In the Constitution. The due process 
principle of :lhndamental fairness In trials should be our guide. 
I conclude that the only rule required by the Constitution 
is one of fairness hccrimtnal trials. Although this ts not a rule 
of exactitude, it is in accord with the principle of fundamental 
fairness long recognized as Inherent in the meaning of due process. 
Unless due process requires the line drawn by the majority, we have 
a duty to consider the consequences of disruption of the criminal 
justice system and seek an accommodation which abalances the 
desirability of counsel in all criminal cases with what is feasible ~ 
in the thousands of courts which must live with the rules prescribed 
by this Court. 
II. 
The majority's treatment of the practical impact of today's 
decision seems to me to be entirely inadequate. It over looks two 
very important factors. First, it ignores totally the potential impact 
' . 














on our already overcrowded local court systems of the all-too-
common tactic of exhausting every possible legal avenue without 
regard to its probable pay-off. In some cases this may be done 
19 
13. 
for purposes of delay. More often, the absence of direct economic 
impact on the client plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim motivates such a choice. It is often the case that 
young lawyers, fresh out of law school receive appointments in cases 
deemed by the courts to be of little significance. The admirable 
zeal of these men; their eagerness to make a reputatb'.>n; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permits them to devote to minor 
legal prbblems; their desire for courtroom BbpBd exposure; the 
availability in some cases of hourly fees as lucrative to the novice 
lawyer as other work; along with the recent constitutional explosion 
in procedural rights for the accused - all these factors result in 
the devotion of an inordinant amount of time to simple and insigificant 
20 
cases. Affording indigents the right to counsel in felony cases, 
(with which I am entirely in accord, has nevertheless resulted, as 
.. 
'·. 
' ; ... 
14. 
every member of this Court can testify, in even the simplest felony 
case, oftenwwithout a truly substantive issue, being litigated through 
a denial of a write of certiorari. Increasing the already serious 
21 
problem of clogged court calendars - including our own calendar, 
cannot serve the ends of justice. 
Second, the majority's interpretation of the practical con-
sequences of today's ruling focuses on the aggregrate problem 
and ignores the ability of various states and localities to furnish 
counsel. That ability varies widely. Even if it were true that the 
country as a whole could bear up under the strain of today's decision, 
some local communities could not. Many state courts have previously 
ccmsidered the question before the Court in this case. Many have 
concluded that the indigent's right to appointed counsel does not 
extend to all misdemeanor cases. In reaching this conclusion, the 
state courts have drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, 
and most have acknowledged that they were compelled to do so, 
22 








states, legislatures and courts through the enactment of laws or 
23 
rules have drawn the line short of that adopted by the majority. 
I think that these cases and statutes reflect the clear- j11t11e Judgment 
of the courts and legislatures of many states, who understand the 
tolerance of the local judicial systems far better than this Court, 
that the rule announced by the Court today has far reaching 
24 
practical drawbacks. 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
certiorari serve as an example of the severe impact today's 
ruling will have in some localities. In November, 1971, the case 
of Wri@lt v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was filed with this Court. 
The case, arising out of a South Dakota Police Magistrate Court 
for the municipal offense of public intoxication, DB raises the 
same issues before us in this case. The Court requested that the 
town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, a lawyer 
occasionally employed by the town filed with the Clerk an affidavit 
'***"* explaining why the town had not responded. He explained 
' . 
16. 
that Wood, South BDakota, has a population of 132, that it has no 
sewer or water system and is quite poor, that the office of the 
nearest lawyer is in a town forty miles away, and that the town could 
not afford to litigate the case. 
Wood is certainly not the only town in the United states with 
a small population, with no or very few lawyers, with meager financial 
resources, but with the need to have some sort of local court system 
~25 
to deal with minor offenses. Indeed, it is quite common for the 
more numerous petty offenses in such towns to be tried by local 
courts while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-wide 
26 
court located in the county seat. It is undoubtedly true that some 
injustices result from the informal procedures of these local courts 
when counsel is not furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished 
to some indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished every indigent charged with an imprisonable offense or 
every indigent who might be imprisoned, would be a practical 
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not enforce its own laws. 
Even the figures cited by the majority indicate the tremendous 
impact on the present judicial structure today's ruling will have. 
28 
The majority cites one source which estimates that fewer than 
2, 300 full-time counsel would be required to represent indigent 
misdemeanants, excluding traffic violators. In comparison to the 
steadily increaing number of attorneys, this figure is said to 
be "insignificant'". Furthermore, the majority notes that the 
Supreme Court of Oregon has estimated that the cost of providing 
counsel to indigent misdemeanants in that state will be about 
29 
$300,000 per year. Apparently the majority concludes this is 
a tolerable expense. 
At no place does the majority demonstrate that there are 
enough lawyers willing or able to do the not always rewarding work 
30 
of defending indigents in petty cases. Nor does the majority 
suggest'\lhat the total cost of such a program would be. The source 
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18. 
misdemeanants, a:xm excluding traffic offenses, to ax total between 
31 
$31. 5 million and $46 million per year. If indigent traffic offenders 
were afforded counsel, something which the majority does not 
totally reject, the cost shoots up to between $392, 920, 000 and 
$415,560,000 or between $260,120,000 and $274,620,000 if counsel 
32 
is furnished by expanding public defender offices. 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United states, urged 
the Court to adopt a new constitutional rule which would require 
33 
counsel ( or a new trial) "before any imprisonment is in fact imposed. " 
Although this is less stringent than the rule announced today by the 
Court, the Solicitor General was nevertheless concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the expense of 
compensating counsel, he noted that the mandatory requirement 
of defense counsel will "require more pretrial time of prosecutors, 
more courtroom time and this will lead to bigger backlogs with 
present personnel Court reporters will be needed as well as 
34 
counsel, and they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 








After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule should not be 
made retroactive, the Solicitor General commented on the "chaos" 
which could result from any mandatory requirement of counsel in 
misdemeanor cases: 
If ••• this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could be 
a massive pile-up 1n the state courts which do not now 
meet this standard. This would involve delays and 
frustrations which would not be a real contribution 
to the administration of justice. 3 5 
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's proper concern was 
reflected by his unique suggestion with respect to the extraordinary 
demand for counsel which would result from the new rule. Recognizing 
implicitly that, certainly in many sections of the country, there simply 
will not be lawyers available for this demand either in the short or 
long term, the Solicitor General made the unique suggestion that 
"clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persoo.s 
of that type" be used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
36 
small sentences. " Quite apart from the practical and political 












a license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion 
with the meaning of the term "assistance of cwnsel" long recognized 
in our law. 
If I believed that due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case or that the only workable method of insuring 
justice was to adopt a prophylactic rule, I wwld not hesitate to 
join the majority opinion. But I believe that the majority's rigid 
rule is a departure from due process. Although the full consequences 
of that departure are difficult to foresee, it is evident that there 
will be serious problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and 
an 
especially of intolerable delay 1n n already overburdened system. 
In my view the concept of dmdamental fairness leads to a middle way 
which will better serve the ends of justice and the practical realities 
of the judicial system. 
m. 
Under the general rubric that due process requires the 
I 
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moo.tbs and in some petty cases, I would permit trial courts to decide 
cm. a case-by-case basis whether fundamental fairness requires that 
37 
the accused be accorded the assistance of counsel. The determination 
should be made before the accused formally pleads; many petty cases 
are resolved by guilty pleas in which the assistance of counsel may 
38 
be required. Indeed, the Petitioner pled guilty in this case. If the 
trial court should determine that the assistance of counsel is not 
\ 
required in any case, it should state in some manner so that tile 
issue is preserved for review its reasons for so concluding. 'l"'he 
trial court then becomes obligated to scrutinize carefully, the 
subsequent proceedings for the protection of the defendant. When 
the unrepresented defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the 
Court should examine the case against him to insure that there is 
admissible evidence tending to support the elements of the offense. 
, If a case goes to trial without defense counsel, the court should 
intervene, when necessary, to insure that the defendant adequately 
\ 









being overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly 
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts should 
carefully scrutinize all decisions not to appoint counsel and the 
proceedings which follow. 
It is, of course, impossible to create a precise set of 
guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether the appointment 
of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three 
consider the complexity of the offense charged. Charges of exceeding 
1he posted speed limits will rarely present complex legal or factual 
questions, but charges that contain difficult intent elements or which 
\ 
often raise collateral legal questions such as search and seizur~ 
\ 
problems, may be too complex for an unassisted layman. \ I 
'\ \ ·, 
\ 
\ 
Second, the court should consider the probable senten~e 
\ 
that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious tbe 
\ 
likely consequences, the greater is the probability that a laW)e r 
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consequence the court should consider; to some indigents, a 
substantial fine or a drunk driving conviction may be more serious 
39 
than a few days in jail. The revocation of a license under certain 
circumstances could result in grave consequences. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors peculiar 
to each case. These are, of course, the most difficult to anticipate. 
One relevant factor is the competency of the individual defendant to 
present his own case. The attitude of the community toward a 
particular defendant or particular incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a particular defendant has a 
peculiar need for a lawyer which wruld compel the appointment of 
counsel in a case where the court would normally think this unnecessary. 
Obviously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges is 
crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring 
the consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
The rule I advocate is generally similar :tJa in a limited way 




(1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court 
40 
overruled in Gideon. I am aware that one of the reasons for turning 
away from that rule was the failure of state courts to live up to 
their responsibilities in determining on a case-byl-case basis whether 
counsel should be appointed. See the concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Harlan in Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350-51. But this Court should 
not assume that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue indefinitely. Certainly if the Court 
41 
continues to read prophylactic rules into the Constitution, sq that 
I 
the state cwrts will be unable to develop their own case law ap1plicable 
\ 
to their particular local situations, there is no reason to think tl~at 
\ 
insensitivity will abate. ,, 
'I 
l 
\ \ l 
The according of some discretion to the courts will not 1ob,ha-te 
I 
' all of the practical problems of expanding the indigent's right to , 
counsel in misdemeanor cases. But it will facilitate an orderly 
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type cases must recognize a duty to consider the need for counsel 
in every case where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The 
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guidelines to 
assure fairness as may be prescribed in each jw,dE.bi jurisdiction by 
legislation or rule of court, should be considered where relevant. 
The goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary 
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel 
so that no person accused of crime need stand alone if counsel is 
needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in accord 




1. While it iB true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the 
Court in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was 
quick to suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon 
did not require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to 
appointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U.S. at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In Re Gault, 387UU. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas tic& 389 U.S. 109, 114 
(1967); Loper v. Beto, __ U.S. (1972). --
2. I define "petty offense" as the Court defined it in 
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970): Any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months. I would 
include in that definition all offenses not punishable by imprisonment, 
regardless of the amount of any fine that might be authorized. To 
this extent, I would differ with the Federal statutory definition of 












for more than six months was net authorized but in which a fine in 
excess of $500 was. 18 U. S. C. § 1. 
3. 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). 
4. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932). 
5. Although we have given retroactive effect to our ruling 
in Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1953), we have 
said that, "[t ]he values implemented by the right to Jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons 
convicted in the past by procedures not consistent withthe Sixth 
Amendment right to rjury trial. " Destefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 
631, 634 (1958). 
6. The Court extends the right to counsel to certain other 
classes of misdemeanor or petty offenses depending upon the severity 
of the likely punishment. The majority opinion attempts no definition 
of these other classes of offenses. It does say, correctly, I think, 
that "the risk of imprisonment is not the exclusive test of right 
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28. 
circumstances, and cases where "stigma may attach to an offense 
such as drunk driving or hit-and-run escapade." In commenting on 
these examples, the Court states that "the same right must be extended 
also to other classes of which we have given some examples, ''but 
suggests no guidelines for identifying such classes or their limits. 
7. Supra note 4 at 68-9. (1932). 
8. 372 u. s. at 343-45. 
9. See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal 
Cases in American state Courts, 132 (1965). 
10. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 u. s. at 344. 
X 11. 11 petty offenses, there is much less plea negotiation 
than in serious offenses. See Report by the President 's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of XXXK Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967). Hereinafter 
cited as "Challenge". Thus, in cases where the evidence of guilt 
is overwhelming, the assistance of counsel is less essential to 
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29. 
12. Silverstein, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
13. Challenge, supra note 10, at 128. 
14. American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards 
for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, pp. 37-39 (1968). 
15. Challenge, supra note 10, at 150. 
16. ~ABA standards, supra note 14, at 150. 
The American Bar Association standard recommends that counsel 
"should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable 
by loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such 
punishment is not likely to be imposed • . •. " The accompanying 
commentary notes that "the standard seeks to distinguish t hos\e classes 
I 
\ \ 
of cases in which there is real likelihood that ir,lt,airc e rtaion 
\ ' 
may follow conviction from those types in which there is no s1:1c.h 




17. The Court's opinion seems to depart from its own logi\-! 
\ 
\ 
when it concludes that "losing one's driver's license may be more \' \ 
\ 













it is in many instances), why should there be a rigid ''no-lawyer 
no-jail" rule and a more flexible one with respect to driver's licenses? 
Although the majority opinion is possibly ambiguous, I do not read 
it as holding that counsel must be provided in every case - regardless 
of the circumstances - where a driver's license may be revoked. 
There aee countless traffic court cases in which revocation does 
not deprive one of a means of livelihood or do more than impose 
a certain inconvenience. A teenager, living with his parents - for 
example - may present quite a different case from the father of 
a family whose license to drive a truck is vital to his job. 
18. SeeB. James, Crisis in the Courts, ch. 11 (1967); 
Challenge supra 145-56. 
19. See, e.g., James, supra note 18, at 27-30; Schrag, 
On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New 
York City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
20. In Cook County, Illinois, a secret study revealed that 
the members of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the 
Defense of Prisoners, which represents indigent defendants, when 
appointecl as counsel, "go before a jury on 63 per cent o, their cases 
that go to trial, retained and appointed counsel on 33 f.Jer cent 
• 
t~ 
... ·, ... 









and the public defender on only 15 per cent. One possible explanation 
for this contrast is that committee counsel, who are sometimes 
serving in part to gain experience, are more willing to undertake 
a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, who is very busy 
and very conscious of the probable extra penalty accruing to a 
defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks and W. 
Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-59 (1968) 
(footnotes XXIO!ll1mJlit omitted). 
21. For example, in the term beginning in October, 1960 and 
ending June, 1961, this Court docketed 2, 291 appeals and petitions 
for certiorari. Ten years later, the total was 4, 212. 
2 2. See Irvin v. state, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 
(1967); Burrage v. Supreior Court, 105 Arz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 
(1969); Cableton v. state, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); 
\ 
, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 ( Fla. 1970); People v. 'pupree, 
42 Ill. 2d 249, 246 II E. 2d 281 (1969); MacDonnel v. Commonwea1th, 
230 N. E. 2d 821 (Mass. 1967); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 538, 






N. E. 2d 670 (1965); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 142, 456 
P. 2d 696 (196®; State ex rel. Plutshack v. state Department of Health 
and Social Services, 37 Wisc. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968). 
23. See Hawaii st. Const. , Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho 
Code Ann., § 19-852 (1969 Supp. ); Kan. Gen. stat. Ann. § 22-4503 
(1970 Supp.); Kj. Crim. Proc. Rule 8. 04; La. Rev. stat. , Title 15, 
·Art. 141 ( F); Me. R. Crim. P. 44; Md. R 719 (b)2(a); Neb. Rev. 
Stat., § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. · stat. §§ 171. 188, 193. 104 
(1969); N. M. stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp. ); Utah Code Ann., 
§ 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. state Ann., Title 13, § 6503 (1970) 
Supp. ); Va. Code Ann., § 19. 1-241. 1 (1970 Supp.). 
24. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded that 
the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. '1f no 
such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned counsel 
in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing' proposition, 




















then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds and lawyer-
manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that it be 
'nothing'." But see state v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 
(1967). 
25. See Cableton v. state, supra note 16, at 538-39; 
l'[T]here are more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are 
resident practicing lawyers and ..• there are counties in which 
there are no practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel 
·, 
in misdemeanorsJ would seriously impair the administration of justice -. 
in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." 
26. See Silverstein, supra note 7, at 125-26. 
27. The successful implementation of the majority's rule 
would require state and local governments to appropriate sonsiderable 
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three states with 
21 % of the nation's population provide more than 50% of all state 
appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense of 
an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 (1970). 
34. 
For example, in 1971 the state of Kansas spent $570,000 defending 
indigents in felony cases - up from $376,000 in 1969. Although 
the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature has 
appropriated BJ only $400, 000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, Ma 71 ... 11. "In view of American resources the funds spent 
on the legal services program can only be regarded as ~ 
trivial. " Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern 
Theme, in Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and 
Variations, 24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 379 (1972). "Although the 
American economy is over eight times the size of the British and 
the American population is almost four times as great, American 
legal aid expenditures are less than two times as high." Id., n. 210. 
28. Dollars and Sense, supra note 27, at 1260-261. 
29. Application of Stevenson, _ Ore. _, 458 P. 2d 414, 
419 (1969). 
30. The practice in many, if not most localities is to appoint 
counsel on a case-by-case basis. ¢ompensation is generally inadequate. 


























18 u. S. C. § 3006A, which provides for the most generous compensation 
of any system, the rates for appointed counsel - $10 per hour spent 
out of court, $15 per hour for court time, subject to a maximum 
total fee of $300 for a misdemeanor ease and $500 for a felony - are 
low by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons 
willing to accept appointments are the young and inexperienced. 
See Cappelletti, supra note 27, at 377-78. 
31. Dollars and Sense, supra, note 27, at 1263. 
The figures cited in this source and by the majority are, 
of course only estimates. An earlier, but more thorough study than 
the one cited by the majority estimated the annual cost of funishing 
counsel for misdemeanant defendants, excluding traffic offenses, 
at $62, 500, 000. Silverstein, supra note 9, at 125. And even then, 
the study admitted that the figures as to what proportion of misdemeanor 
defendants were indigent "are almost totally lacking. " Id. at 124. 








In fiscll 1966, the federal government appropriate $27, 000, 000 · 
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36. 
Services Program: Should the Bar Support It?, 53 ABA J. 23, 24 
n. 6 (1967). In fiscal 1971, this figure jumped to $61,849,000, and 
for fiscal 1973, the estimated financing is $71, 500, 000. The Budget 
of the United states Government, Appendix, Fiscal Year 1973, at 103 
( 1972). The expenditures of private legal aid groups are also increasing. 
For example, for the calendar year 1967, The Legal Aid Society of 
New York City spent ~ $3, 001, 976. The Legal Aid Society -
Annual Report - 1967. In 1969, the figure had increased to 
$4, 822, 254. The Legal Aid Society 1969, 94th Annual Report. 
33. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 33. 
34. Id. , at 34-5. 
35. Id., at i1bdac 36-7. 
36. Id. , at 39. 
\ 
37. It seems to me that such an individualized rule, w\llike 
a six-month rule, does not present equal protection problems m1der 
this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); 
Douglas v. California, 384UU. S. 436 (1963); and Mayer v. City of \\ 
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38. See, e. g. , Katz, Municipal Courts - Another Urban Ill, 
20 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-6 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (('A 5 1965). 
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see 
note 9 supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that 
the defendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
can make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial. 
39. Indeed, it may lead to a jail sentence if, the indigent . . 
cannot pay the fine. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971). 
40. I am not backing away from the overruling of Betts in 
Gideon with which I am in complete accord. Betts, like Gideon, 
concerned the right to counsel in a felony case. See note supra. 
Neither case controls the result in this case. 
41. E. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. s. 436 (1966); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. s. 
263 (1967). 
38. 
A similar recognition of the unwisdom - if not impracticality -
of a universal rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 
N. J, 2d 281, 295 (196 ), where the Court said: "The practicalities 
may necessitate the omission of a universal rule for the assignment 
of counsel to all indigent defendants and such omission may be 
tolerable in the multitude of petty municipal court cases which do 
not result in actual imprisonment or in other serious consequence 
such as the substantial loss of driving privileges. But, as a matter 
of cimple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a 
conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence c.,i 1 
rr_tagnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to hai;e 
I 
counsel assigned without cost. Our municipal court judges have had ' 
and continue to have broad discretion to assign free counsel to indigent 
defendants whenever justice so requires. That discretion may be 
, exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
. ) 
j;uvrmtt <qllurt llf tqt Jlniult $>!ates 
'Jll«1llp1tgtll1t, ~. <q. 2.llffe)l,~ 
April 12, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
This case seems to me peculiarly one in which a Court 
opinion is essential -- in order to give intelligible guidance to 
the countless courts in the country where the problem involved 
will arise every day. With that objective in mind, I take the 
liberty of expressing my difficulties with your opinion in its 
present form: 
(1) While I may be alone in this view, I could not join 
an opinion that says the entire Sixth Amendment is made 
applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I would hope, therefore, that you might be able to tone down 
the first sentence of the second paragraph on page 2 for my 
benefit. 
- - (2) A much more basic difficulty is that I cannot agree 
that counsel is constitutionally required "if the offense is in 
the imprisonable class -- that is to say if the statute makes any 
imprisonment a permissible penalty . . . " (page 9 of your 
opinion). There are undoubtedly a myriad of statutes and ordi-
nances that make imprisonment "a permissible penalty," but 
for whose violation imprisonment is virtually never imposed --
spitting on the sidewalk, jaywalking, smoking in the subway, 
etc. I think the correct standard is the one you quote from 
Application of Stevenson in the first quoted paragraph on page 12 
of your opinion. That is, I think that a person cannot be actual-




(3) The issue before us is whether the Florida Supreme 
Court was correct in holding that the Constitution permits a 
prison sentence of up to six months even though the defendant 
did not have a lawyer at his trial. I would confine our decision 
to resolving that issue (in the terms expressed above), which 
is difficult enough. I could not join an opinion that seems to 
decide in advance that a lawyer is also required in various other 
criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, and administrative proceed-
ings -- whether involving the loss of a driver's license, revoca-
tion of parole or probation, the attachment of 1stigma," or 
whatever. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
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,®n.pumc ~cnrt cf t~c ~ttittb' ;§taus 
'Jilltttt.dtittgfott. p. ~. 2.0gi)l,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS April 17, 1972 
..... 
I 
Re: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
I 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have received various suggestions 
from the Brethren, particularly from 
Bill Brennan and Potter Stewart, and on 
the basis of their suggestions I have rather 
drastically overhauled and rewritten the 
opinion in this case narrowing the grounds 
and limiting the reach of the new proposed 
rule. 
l ~v \ 
WilYi~.n/Y. Douglas 
' -,- ,.,_ .. , ,. ...... 
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C HAMeEAS OF" 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~UVmnt Q+oltrl of t~t ltnittb ~-
Jla..-frm¢on. ~. <If. 2.0ffe"'' 
April HJ, 1972 
70-5015, Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
.in.vrtmt <!f4ttttl of tq.e 'Jllnittb .§taus 
~rulftingttttt, ~- <q. 2llffe'!~ 
CHAMBERS 01" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. April 20, 1972 
j 
RE: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Bill: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 






j;u.p-rrtnr (!Jam:f !ff tlri- ~ttitdt ;%,tnu.o 
'J.'tl'rto!p.n~tcm, gl. <!J. 2.0~)1-~ 
CHAMee:ns OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
April 20, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. 
Hamlin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to Conference 
fox:/ss 4/21/72 lee 
Rider A, page 4 
Stigma may attach to a drunken drivint conviction on a hit and 
10 
run escapade. Losing one's driver's license is more serious for 
some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. Brown, 402 U.S. 
535, 539 (1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their 
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit 
of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus 
involves state action that adjudicates important interests 
of licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be 
taken away without that procedural due process required 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. " 
The bJI states must afford the individual due process for the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. When the deprivation of 
property rights and interests are of sufficient consequence, denying 
the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending 
1 
themselves, is a denial of due process. 
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Perhaps it will be said that I °kive m{clue , w~emifigh~ttttoo---------~ ~ - . 
the possibility of short term "chaos" and long term 
adverse effects on the system. The ~ answer may 
be given that if the Constitution requires the rule an-
nounced by the majority, the consequences are immate-
rial. If I believed that the guarantee of due process 
required the assistance of counsel in every case or t 1at ~ 1:, j t~e o~ly workable method of insuring justice was to 
a opt rule, I would not hesitate to join 
the majority opinion despite my serious misgivings as 
I 
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to its wisdom. But I believe thaJ, tbe majeiity's 1igicf-'?-.-
mle is a departure from tho requirnmeut" a£ d11e process-:0 --------~ 
Althougl,. the full consequences of that d"fl•rture are -< V ~ k~ 
-4iiffieult to foresee, it is evident 17+1:rl there will ~serious ~ r / 
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It may be that the dictates of fundamental fairness occasionally 
demand a rigid rather than a more flexible rule. But if such a rule 
is required, it should not be fashioned to ignore situations in which 
serious punishments, other than imprisonments, are imposed. I 
am unwilling at this time to join the rule the majority sets forth not 
only because we have no experience with respect to the adequacy of 
a more flexible approach, but also because of the disruption of the 
criminal justice system which the rule prescribed by the majority 
will entail. 
n. 
The majority opinion is remarkably barren in detailing how 
its rule will be implemented after establishing the rule that no 
imprisonment may be imposed unless the accused is affordtdthe 
opportunity to be represented by counsel, it merely asserts that 
state trial judges "will have a measure of the seriousness and 
gravity of the offense and therefore will lmow when to name a 
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10. 
"seriousness and gravity of the offense" charged is only a rough 
indication of the likelihood of imprisonment. Sentencing is, or 
at least should be, a personalized procedure ia'J[ tailored to fiti: 
the crime and the individual. All too often we hear the complaint 
that this nation's criminal courts result in "assembly-line justice"; 
indeed, the majority opinion makes this point. 
Since it will be virtually impassible -* for judges in the ,, 
lower criminal courts to pre-judge cases on an individual basis, 
each judge will have to create two categories of offenses - those for 
w hich he will impose sentences of imprisonment and those in which 
he will not. In creating a category of offenses which are technically 
imprisonable but for which he will not impose jail sentences, a judge 
will make a de facto overruling of the legislative determination as 
to what offenses are imprisonable. The majority notes that there 
are categories of imprisonable offenses for which imprisonment 
'• .. 
is rarely imposed, but the occasional imposition of sentences for 
these offenses may serve a valuable purpose. Sending the traffic 
11. 
offender with the unusually bad driving record to a few days in 
jail may help deter others and rehabilitate the individual. At least 
it can be said that legislatures and judges see the threat of 
imprisonment, even if rarely carried out, to serve a valid function. 
In those categories of offenses in which imprisonment is 
extremely rare, trial courts are unlikely to assign counsel. This 
will mean that a judge will be unable to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment in the rare case that so warrants he appoints counsel 
and holds another trial. But a secmd trial, even with counsel, might 
be unfair if the prosecutor can make use of evidence which came 
out at the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If the 
second trial were held before the same judge, he might no longer 
be open-minded. Finally, a second trial held for no other reason 
that to afford the judge an map: opportunity to impose a harsher 
sentence might run afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed 
in jeopardy for the same offense. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 
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certain offenses classified by legislatures as imprisonable, will 
19 
be treated by judges as unimprisonable. 
Another danger resulting from this classification will be 
12. 
unequal treatment depending on whether the individual judge ilxx has 
determined to leave open the option of imprisonment for a certain 
defense. Thus an indigent accused will be entitled in some courts 
to counsel while in another court, an indigent accused of the same 
offense will have no counsel. Since the services of counsel are 
not strictly related to sentencing, the arbitrary results will raise 
substantill equal prctection problems. 
To avoid these equal protection problems and to preserve 
the option to impose a prison sentence, most judges are likely 
to appoint counsel for indigents in all but the most minor offenses 
where jail sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the 
states possess the necessary le gal resources to meet this expansion 
of the right to counsel The Solicitor General who, on behal of the 
United states, urged the very rule the Court today adopts was 
concerned by the 
W.- One wonders what happens in those cases in which an indigent 
is sentenced to Jail-because he cannot pay a fine. Cf. Tate v. Short, 
401 u. s. 495 (1971). - -- -
'· 
"' .. 
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight to the 
possibility of short term "chaos" and long term adverse effects on 
the system. The answer may be given that if the Constitution requires 
the rule announced by the majority, the consequences are immaterial. 
If I believed that the guarantee of due process required the assistance 
of 
1counsel in every case in which a jail sentence was imposed or 
( 
that the only workable method of insuring justice was to adopt the 
majority's rule, I would not hesitate to join the majority opinion 
despite my serious misgivings as to its wisdom. But I believe that, 
in addition to the resulting serious problems of availabltiity of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay in an already 
overburdened system, the majority's rigid rule does not satisfy due 
process. For while the majority rule is undoubtedly too broad insofar 
as it furnishes assistance of counsel in some UBIIBBk where it will 
not be needed, it is also undoubtedly too narrow insofar as it will 
not guarantee the assistance of counsel in some cases where the 
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charged is either non-imprisonable or one in which the judge has 
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence. Even if one 
assumes that the slightest jail sentence is more severe than any 
other legal punishment, it is not the severity of the sentence which 
determines the requirements of due process. No punishment may 
be imposed in the absence of fundamental fairness. It would be 
ludicrous to suppose that in every non-imprisonable case, a fair 
trial will result without the assistance of counse. Due process 
requires a rule that guarantees a fair trial in all cases. Neitm r 
the Bid: six-month rule nor the majority rule achieves this 
result. In my view the concept of fundamental fairness leads to 











April 22, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Although the revision of the Court opinion (3/21/72) meets 
some of my concerns, I still intend to ccmcur in the result by a 
separate opinion which I hope to circulate next week. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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April 25, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Although the revision of the Court's opinion (3/19/72) meets 
some of my concerns, I still intend to concur in the result by a 
separate opinion which I hope to circulate after my return from the 
Fifth Circuit Conference. 
t 'ff 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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SUPUEME COURT O.F THE UNITED STATES 
No. 70-5015 
Jon Richard Argersinger, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
Raymond Hamlin, Sheriff, 
Leon County, Florida. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Florida. 
[April -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that 
the States "·ere required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to 
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, we 
must determine whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires that an indigent charged with a state petty of-
fense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel. 
1 While it i,; true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to 
8uggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 3 7 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
3 9 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); 
Loper v. Beto, -- U.S. - (1V72). 
~ As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors wore entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~ 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which 
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in 
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the 
offense charged was punishable by more than six months. 
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel lino is to 
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a 
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is 
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a j uclge experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying dght to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointee! counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Du11cn11, Baldwin, 
and District of Columbfrt v. Gia.wans, 300 U. S. 617 
( 1937), reveal that tho jury trial limitation has historic 
not punishnble by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any 
fine that might be nuthorizrd. To this extent, the definition used 
herein diffrrR from the federal stntutor)' definition of "petty of-
fense" which includes offenses for which imprisonment for more 
thnn six months is not :rnthorizccl but in which a fine in excess of 
$500 is. 18 U. S. C. § 1. 
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origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.• Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-tempering the possible arbi-
trary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while im-
portant, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a 
fair trial as is the right to counsel." 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the 
new rule of due process. today enunciated by the Court, 
that an accused indigent is entitled to have counsel pro-
vided by the States in every case "·here "the statute 
makes any imprisonment a permissible penalty." G It 
4 See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45. 60-61 (1932). 
r. Although we lia.vc given retroactive effect to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. lVainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have 
8nicl that, "[t]he values implementrcl by the right to jury trinl would 
not mcni"urnbly be serncl b~r requiring retrial of nil persons con-
victed in the pnst by prorednres not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefa110 v. Woods, 392 U. S. 
681, 68..J. (1068). 
0 The Conrt extends the right to counsel to certnin other claf"ses 
of misdem0nnor or J1<'tty offonses depending upon the severity of the 
likely punishment. The mnjority opinion attempts no definition of 
the,e other rlas~<'~ of ofkn~<'6. It clo0, i":1~·, rorrrdl~·. 1 lhink , that 
"the risk of imprisomn0nt is not the exrluf'ive test of right to coun..1 
sci," and cites-as examples of c:1scs \\'here rounsd should be re-
quired-the revocation of a drin•r's lirensc under certain cirrum-
Rtanccs, and cases where "stigma may attach to an offense surh as 
drunk dri1·ing or a hit-ancl-mn escapade." In commenting on thcl'e 
examples, the Court stnt0s that "the same right must be extended 
also to other classes of which we have given some examples," but 
suggests no guidelines for identifying such classes or their limits. 
4 
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seems to me that the line should not be drawn with 
such rigidity. I think a middle course, between the 
extremes of Florida's six-month rule and the Court's 
rule as to imprisonable offenses, comports "·ith the 
Constitution. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 7 and Gideon ,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be only a 
brief period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be easily dismissed by the label "petty." 9 
As the Court notes, serious consequences also may result 
from convictions not punishable by imprisonment. In 
the face of such consequences, to deny the assistance of 
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending 
themselves, is to deny them a fair trial. 
Whereas a flat six-month rule would rernlt in harsh 
and unfair consequences, the rigidity of the Court's rule 
7 Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932). 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
9 See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
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as to imprisonable offenses is also unsatisfactory. Coun-
sel is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no 
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases arc 
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a justifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." 10 Yet government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
them on all petty charges. Where the possibility of a 
jail sentence is remote and the probable fine seems small 
or where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.11 It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases ·where the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified who are in low income groups where the 
engaging of counsel in a minor petty offense case would 
be a luxury the family could not afford. It is common 
knowledge that the line between indigency and assumed 
capacity to pay for counsel is an arbitrary one, drawn 
differently from State to State and often resulting in 
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 344. 
11 In petty offenses, there is much lc,;s plea negotiation than in 
serious offenses. Sec Rrport by the Prc~idrnt's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of ,fo8ticc, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, 1:34 (1967) (hereinafter cited ns "Chal-
lenge"). Thus, in cases where t.!1c cviclc•nre of guilt is overwhelming, 
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serious inequities to accused persons on both sides of 
the line. The Court's new rule will tend to accent the 
disadvantage in our society of being barely self-sufficient 
economically. 
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were often informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous.12 It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the 
offense charged is only a petty one. 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its impact on the administration of the criminal jus-
tice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one 
reflerts on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor of-
fenses, the va.rying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
\Ve should not adopt a rule with consequences of 
unknown clirn.ensions unless it is clearly mandated to 
protect a constitutional right. The majority adopts a 
view of the Due Process Clause that requires the State 
to furnish counsel in all cases whern "any imprisonment 
12 Silverstein, supra, n. 9, nt 125-126. 
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[is] a permissible punishment." This means that wher-
ever a state statute or municipal ordinance authorizes 
imprisonment, even of the briefest duration or as a rarely 
used alternative to the customary fine, an indigent can-
not be tried in any court in the land, or before any 
justice of the peace or lay judge, unless counsel is pro-
vided or knowingly waived. I find no basis in the Con-
stitution for such a far-reaching new interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause. 
The majority opinion cites with approval the reports 
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice "' and the American Bar Asso-
ciation Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice.'' Both of these studies recommended aban-
donment of distinctions based on whether an offense is 
characterized as felony, misdemeanor (petty offense), 
or traffic violation-a recommendation in which I con-
cur. Both studies also emphasize, as every lawyer would 
agree, the desirability of extending the right to counsel 
beyond the arbitrary felony/misdemeanor line. But 
neither \\'ent as far as the Court goes today. The Presi-
dent's Commission recommended that: 
"The objective to be met as quickly as possible is 
to provide counsel to every criminal defendant who 
faces a significant penalty, if he cannot afford to 
provide counsel himself . . . . The immediate 
m.inimum, until it becomes possible to provide the 
foregoing, is that all criminal defendants who are 
in danger of substantial loss of liberty shall be pro-
vided with counsel.'" 
The American Bar Association Sta.ndard relates only 
to offenses punishable "by loss of liberty," and states that 
1~ Chnllrnge, supra, n. 10, nt 128. 
14 American l3ar As~oria1ion Projrrt on Minimum Standards for 
Criminnl J ustire, Providing Defense Services, pp. 37-30 (1968). 
rn Chnllcnge, supra, 11. 10, at 150. 
8 
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"counsel should be provided" in all such cases except for 
those "types of offenses for which such punishment is 
not likely to be imposed." 1 6 Both studies recommended 
desirab]c goals. Neither concluded that due process re-
quired the drawing of any particular constitutional line. 
Indeed, a central thrust of both recommendations was 
the abandonment of the then-existing line bet\\·een fel-
onies and misdemeanors and a recognition that the seri-
ousness of the likely punishment is a critical factor. The 
President's Commission spoke of "a significant penalty" 
and a "substantial loss of liberty." The American Bar 
Association Standard, addressing only imprisonable of-
fenses, would not extend the right of counsel to cases 
where "such punishment is not likely to be imposed." 
Neither supports a new inflexible constitutional rule. 
The Court's opinion today does not limit the right to 
counsel in petty or misdemeanor cases to those involving 
a possibility of jail; it goes on to hold that counsel a]so 
must be provided in other classes of cases in which the 
offense is not imprisonable but the consequences of con-
viction are potentially serious. Examples mentioned in-
clude the revocation of one's driver's license, and convic-
tions for "drunken driving or a hit-and-run escapade." 
The Court then states: 
"Thus while the right to counsel extends to the im-
prisonable class of offenses-whatever they may be 
called by local law-the same right must extend also 
to other classes of which we have given some exam-
ples. Only experience and time can give shape and 
content to the entire class." 
rn ABA Standards, supra, n . 14, at 150. Tho accompanying com-
mentary notes that "tho Si:mrford socks 1o distinguish those classes 
of cases in which there is rral likelihood that incarceration may 
follow conviction from 1 hose types in which there is no such likeli-
hood." Id ., a1 37. 
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The distinction which the Court makes between irn-
prisonable offenses and other "classes" of serious mis-
demeanors implicitly recognizes that the Due Process 
Clause does not require an absolutist rule with respect 
to any specified class of cases.11 The result of the hold-
ing today is to create three categories of petty or mis-
demeanor offenses: (i) where there is any possibility of 
a jail sentence, however remote its imposition or brief 
its duration; (ii) "other classes"-of which a few exam-
ples are given-which "only time and experience" can 
define; and (iii) offenses labeled "de rnininius" which, 
although not precisely defined, presumably include minor 
traffic charges. As to the first category, a lawyer must 
be provided in every case regardless of circumstances; as 
to the other two, a lawyer must sometimes be provided. 
I cannot find in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment any justification for such esoteric dis-
tinctions. Admittedly, the question presented in this 
case is an extremely difficult one, involving fundamental 
rights which must be protected. But it seems to me that 
the solution lies in adherence to principle-not in tlrn 
drawing of inflexible lines which are nowhere delineated 
in the Constitution. The due process principle of funda-
mental fairness in trials should be our guide. 
17 The Court's opinion seems to depart from its own logic when 
it concludes that "losing one's driver's license may be more serious 
than spending a day in jail." If this be true (and certainly it is 
in many instances), why should there be a rigid "no-lawyer no-jail" 
rule and a more flexible one with respect to driver's licenses? Al-
though the majority opinion is possibly ambiguous, I do not read 
it as holding that counsel must be provided in every casc--regard-· 
less of the circumstances-where a driver's liernse may be revoked. 
There are count less traffic court cases in which rerncation doe.' not 
deprive one of a mean:; of livelihood or do more than impose a 
certain inconvenience. A teenager, living with his parents-for ex-
amplc--may present quite a different case from the father of a 
family whose license to drive a truck is vital to his job. 
10 
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It may be that the dictates of fundamental fairness 
occasionally demand a broad, prophylactic rule rather 
than a more narrow, flexible rule. The Court should 
fashion a prophylactic rule only when experience teaches 
that such an overbroad approach is the only feasible way 
of protecting due process. I am unwilling at this time 
to join the rule the majority sets forth not only because 
we have no experience with respect to the adequacy of 
a more flexible approach, but also because of the dis-
ruption of the criminal justice system which the rule 
prescribed by the majority will entail. 
II 
The majority opinion docs not adequately address the 
effect of today's decision on the administration of .i t1stice 
at the petty offense level. There are significant and well-
knom1 benefits from the participation of counsel in ap-
propriate cases. But it docs not follow that benefits 
flow either to the defendant or the system in a11 cases. 
It seems to me that the Court overlooks the potential 
impact of its holding on our already over-burdened local 
courts.18 The single greatest problem is "assembly line" 
justice resulting primarily from a volume of cases far 
in excess of the capacity of the system to handle. The 
Court's ab~olutist rule may well exacerbate this situation 
in terms of delay and congestion. We are familiar with 
the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay.1 0 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
18 Sre generally H . .Tamrs, Crisis in the Courts, c. 11 (1967); 
Chnllcnge, supra, 145- 156. 
rn Sec, e. g., James, suvra, n. 18, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protrrting the Consumer in New York 
City, 80 Yale L . .T. 1529 (1971) . 
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client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently motivates a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
cases of petty offenses. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice lawyer; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors a.re likely to result in the stretch-
ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public, added delay and congestion in the courts, 
and with no assurance that the defendant will benefit."0 
Affording indigents the right to counsel in felony cases, 
with "·hich I am entirely in accord, often results in 
even the simplest felony case being litigated through 
denial of a writ of certiorari. It is not unreasonable to 
believe that there will be a similar experience with 
many petty cases which do not merit such exhaustive 
examination. 
The majority's consideration of the practical conse-
quences of today's ruling focuses on the aggregate prob-
lem and largely ignores the ability of various States and 
20 In Cook County, 1llinois, a recent study revealed that the mem-
bers of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners, who arc appointed to represent indigent defendants, 
go before a jury on 63% of their trinl cnses while retained nnd ap-' 
pointed coun~cl do so on 33% nnd the publir defender on only 15%. 
"One po~ ·ible cxpl:mat ion for this contrast is that committee counsel, 
who are sometimes serving in part to gain expcriencr, arc more 
willing to undertnkc a jury trial than i~ nn assistnnt public defender, 
who is Yery busy and very con~cious of the probable extra penalty 
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks 
:md W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-
159 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
12 
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localities to furnish counsel. The ability varies widely. 
Even if there were adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misderneanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places. and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.n 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority. 22 These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, who understand the capabilities of the 
local judicial systems far better than this Court, that 
21 See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42 
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); MacDonnel v. Commonwealth, 
230 N. E. 2d 821 (Mass. 1967); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 538, 
147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); People v. Lettorio, 16 N. Y. 2d 307, 213 
N. E. 2d 670 (1965); Ilendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 142, 456 
P. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Department of 
Health and Social Services, 37 Wisc. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 549 
(1968). 
22 See Hawaii St . Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 19-852 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-.J5o:3 (1970 
Supp.); K~,. Crim. Proc. Ruic 8.04; La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 15, 
Art. 141 (F); i\Ic. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 (b) 2 (a); 
Neb. Rev. Sta t. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stnt. §§ 171.188, 
193.104 (1969); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah 
Code Ann . § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503 
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax these capabilities. 23 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
certiorari serve as an example of what today's rulillg 
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
could not afford to litigate the case. 
Though perhaps smaller than most, Wood is not dis-
similar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses. 21 It is 
23 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minne ota: 
Somo Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observa1ions, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded 
that tho right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing lino can be drawn, if the question of as:oigncd 
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing' 
proposition, then, tho thrust of their views was that limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" nut sec State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 
2d 888 (1967). 
2 '1 Sec Cableton Y. State, supra, n. 16, a1 5:3S-5:39: '·[Tlhcre arc 
more justice::; of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat. 25 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished every indigent charged with an imprisonable 
offense would be a practical impossibility for many small-
town courts. The community could simply not enforce 
its own laws/0 
The majority opinion does contain some fragmentary 
estimates as to the need for lawyers, assuming-one 
must suppose-that they are utilized full time and are 
available exactly when and where needed. One source 
practicing lawyers. The impart of r right to counsel in misdeme:rn-
ors] \YOnld serious!~, impair the admini~tration of justice in Arkansas 
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." 
25 Sec Silverstein, supra, n. 7, at 125-126. 
~0 The ~uccessful implcmcntat ion of 1 he majority's rule would 
require state and ]oral governments to appropriate considerable 
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigent dcfrnse. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Hight to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kan.·as spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376 ,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1072 was $612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds 
spent on the legal sen-if'cs progr:1m can only be regarded as triYial." 
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in 
C'npprllrt1i :rnd Gordie~- , Lc•gnl Aid: }Iodcrn Themes and Ynrintions, 
24 Stanford L. Re,·. :347, 379 (1972). "Although the Amerif'an 
economy i~ 01·cr eight times the size of the Brit.ish and the Amerir:m 
J)opulatio11 i~ nlmo~1 four time, :i, gre11t . . \mrri('afl legal aid ex-
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is cited "1 which estimates that fewer than 2,300 counsel 
would be required to represent indigent misdemeanants, 
excluding traffic violators. In comparison to the steadily 
increasing number of lawyers, this figure is said to be 
"insignificant." But however one may characterize 
these estimates, the essence of the problem- certainly in 
terms of the day-to-day functioning of the system-is 
whether lawyers willing to accept assignment will in 
fact be available throughout the various communities 
of our country.28 
The majority opinion also touches lightly on the esti-
mated cost. It cites one source to the effect that the 
cost of defending all indigent misdemeanants, excluding 
traffic offense"', will cost between $31.5 million and $46 
million per year. 2n If indigent traffic offenders were af-
forded counsel, something which the majority does not 
totally reject, the cost soars to between $392.920,000 and 
$415,560,000 or between $260,120,000 and $274,620,000 
27 Dollar~ and Sense, SUJ)ra, n. 27, at 1260-1261. 
28 The prnct ice in mnny, if not most localities i. · to nppoint counsel 
on :1 casc-by-rnsc ba8is. Compen~ation is gcncrnlly inadequate. 
Evrn in the fc,deral courts undrr thr Criminnl Justice Act of 1964, 
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which proYides for rrlatively generous compen-
sation, the rates for appointed counsel-$10 per hour spent out of 
court, $15 per hour for court 1 ime, subject to :1 maximum total fee 
of $300 for :1 misdcmr:111or rnse and $500 for a felony-are low by 
rontcmporar~' Amcrirnn standnrds. Consequently, the mnjority of 
persons willing to arrrpt appointments arc the young nnd inrx-
perienred. Sre Cnpprlletti, su])ra, n. 27, at 377-378. 
2n Dollars and Sense, SUJ)ra, n. 27, at 1263. 
The figures citrd in this somcc and by the majority are, of course, 
only estimates. An earlier, but more thorough study than the one 
citrd by the majority e~timatrd the mrnual co~t of furnishing counsel 
for misdemeanant dcfrndant8, excluding traffic offenses, at $62,500,-
000. Silver~tein, SUJ)1'a, 11. 9, nt 125. And even then, the study 
:1dmitted that. the figures as to what proportion of misdemeanor 
defendants were indigrnt "nrc almost toally lacking." Id., at 124. 
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if counsel is furnished by expanding public defender 
offices. :rn 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, 
urged the Court to adopt a new constitutional rule which 
would require counsel ( or a new trial) "before any im-
prisonment is in fact imposed." 31 Although this is less 
stringent than the rule announced today by the Court, 
the Solicitor General nevertheless was concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 32 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"If . . . this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
30 Dollars and Sense, supra, n. 27, at 1264. 
In fiscal 1966, the Federal Govemment appropriated $27,000,000 
to tho OEO legal services program. Voorhees, The OEO Legal 
Services Program: Should tho Bar Support It?, 53 ABA J. 23, 24 
n. 6 (1967). In fiscal 1971, this figure jumped to $61,849,000, and 
the fiscal 1973, the estimated financing is $71,500,000. Tho Budget 
of the United States Government, Appendix, Fiscal Year 1973, at 
103 (1972). The expenditures of private legal aid group arc also 
increasing. For example, for the calendar year 1967, Tho Legal 
Aid Society of Now York City spent $3,001,976. The Legal Aid 
Society-Annual Report-1967. In 1969, expenditures had increased 
to $4,822,254. The Legal Aid Society 1969, 94th Annual Report. 
31 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 33. 
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delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.:i 3 
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's concern 
was reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion with 
respect to the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be 
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
small sentences." 3• Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
term "assistance of counsel" long required in our law. 
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight to 
the possibility of short term "chaos" and long term 
adverse effects on the system. The short answer may 
be given that if the Constitution requires the rule an-
nounced by the majority, the consequences are immate-
rial. If I believed that the guarantee of due process 
required the assistance of counsel in every case or that 
the only workable method of insuring justice was to 
adopt a prophylactic rule, I would not hesitate to join 
the majority opinion despite my serious misgivings as 
to its wisdom. But I believe that the majority's rigid 
rule is a departure from the requirements of due process. 
Although the full consequences of that departure are 
difficult to foresee, it is evident that there " ·ill be serious 
problems of availability of counsel, of costs, and espe-
cially of intolerable delay in an already overburdened 
33 ld., at 36-37. 
34 Jd., at 39. 
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system. In my view the concept of fu11clarnental fair-
ness leads to a middle way which will better serve the 
ends of justice. 
III 
I would hold that indigents have a right to appointed 
counsel in all cases punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment, and in some petty cases as determined by 
the trial courts on a case-by-case basis.a" The determi-
nation should be made before the accused formally 
pleads; many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in 
which the assitance of counsel may be required.:w If 
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved 
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to 
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented 
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court 
should examine the case against him to insure that there 
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements 
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense 
counsel, the court should intervene, when necessary, to 
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the 
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being 
:ir, It seems to me thal such an individualized nile, unlike a six-
month rule, does not pre~enl c(J11nl proteC'tion proble1m under this 
Court's decisions in Gri!Jin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas 
v. California, 384 U.S. 436 (1963); :rnd Mayer v. City of Chicaoo, 
- U.S. - (1971). 
:<G Soc, e. g., Katz, M1111icip:1l Comts-Another Urban Ill, 20 Ca8e 
Western Hesor\'C' L. Hev. 87. 92-96 (1968). Cf. Ifamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Jlarvey v. Mississippi. 3-W F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although there i~ ks~ pica negotiating in petty rasos, sec n. 11, 
suvm, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the de-
fendant who is not faced with overwhelming eYidonce of guilt, ran 
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overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied 
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, ap-
pellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions 
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
J t is, of course, impossible to create a precise set of 
guidelines for judges to follow in determining whether 
the appointment of counsel is necessary to assure a fair 
trial. Certainly three general factors should be weighed. 
First, the court should consider the complexity of the 
offense charged. For example, charges of traffic law in-
fractions will rarely present complex legal or factual 
questions, but charges that contain difficult intent ele-
ments or which raise collateral legal questions, such as 
search and sei:rnre problems, will usually be too complex 
for an unassisted layman. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follo\\· if a conviction is obtained. The 
more serious the likely consequences. the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. Im-
prisomnent is not the only serious consequence the court 
should consider; to some indigents, a substantial fine may 
be more serious than a few days in jail.'" The revocation 
of a license or a drunk driving conviction under certain 
circumstances also could result in grave consequences. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most 
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the com-
petency of the individual defendant to present his own 
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular 
defendant or particubr incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a 
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the ap-
pointment of counsel in a case where the court ,vould 
~. Indeed, it may !rad to a jail sentence if, the indigent cannot pay 
the fine. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 495 (1971). 
,. 
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normally think this unnecessary. Obviously. the sensi-
tivity and diligence of individual judges is crucial to the 
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the 
consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
The rule I advocate is similar in certain respects to 
the special circumstances rule with respect to felony cases 
of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. 
Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 ( 1948), which this Court over-
ruled in Gideon. 38 Ono of the reasons for turning away 
from that rule was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-caso basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon,, 
372 U.S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume 
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue indefinitely. Cer-
tainly if the Court follows the course of reading pro-
phylactic rules into the Constitution, so that the state 
courts will be unable to develop their own case law ap-
plicable to their particular local situations, there is less 
reason to think that insensitivity will abate. 3n 
38 I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts in Gideon with 
which I am in complete accord. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the 
right to counsel in a felony case. See n. 1, supra. N eithC'r case 
controls today's result. 
3 n A similar recognition of the unwisdom-if not impracticality-of 
a universal rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J. 
2d 281, 295 (1957), where the Court said: "The practicalities may 
necessitate the omission of a universal rule for the assignment, of 
counsel to all indigent defendants and such omis~ion may be toler-
able in the multitude of petty municipal court cases which do not 
result in actual imprisonment or in other serious consequences such 
as the substantial loss of driying privileges. But, as n matter of 
simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to n con-" 
viction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magni-
tude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have 
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The according of some discretion to the courts will not 
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the· 
indigent's right to counsel in petty offense cases. But it 
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider avail-
ability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts 
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize 
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case 
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The 
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guide-
lines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each 
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be con-
sidered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord 
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as 
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that 
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel 
is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of today's holding. 
and continue to have broad discretion to assign free coum;el to indi-
gent defendants whenever ju,;tice so requires. That discretion may 
be exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the 
feared inundations." 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to 
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, ,rn 
must determine whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires that an indigent charged with a state petty of-
fense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justire Harlan was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigcnt's right to ap-
pointed counsel should e:--i;end to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has noi yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Tex(UJ, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); 
Loper v. Beto, - U.S. - (1972). 
2 As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonmC"nt.=• 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in Baldwin Y. New York, 399 U. S. 66 
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which 
we held that the clue process right to a trial by jury in 
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the 
offense charged was punishable by more than six months. 
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is t(} 
be drawn, it must be clra"·n so that an indigent has a 
right to appointed counsel in all C'ases in ·which there is 
a clue process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself in a 1101ij ury trial 
before a j udg<' experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence i11to a coher-
ent whole consistent with the bC"st case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offpnse chargC'd is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment docs not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Bald'win, 
and Di.strict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 
{U)37), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic 
11ot punis1111ble by im11risonmr11t, rrgar<llr;:s of the amount of any 
fine th:it mighi be authorizPd. To this extent, the definition used 
herrin ·d-iffers from tl,e frdprn] statutory definition of "petty of-
fen,c," which i11ch1dt•" off Pn."r~ puni,lwblc b)· not morr th:m six 
mon.i'hH' iirnp:ri,onmc-111 -or hy a finr not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C. 
§L 
3 236 'Sm .. :M. -442 \(['970). 
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origins at common law. X o such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.4 Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counf'el in felony caf'es. Moreover. 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-tempering the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while 
important, is 11ot as fundamental to the guarantee of a 
fair trial as is the right to counsel. 5 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged "·ith a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree "·ith the 
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court, 
that "a person may not be imprisoned ... unless he 
\\·as represented by counsel at the trial." G It seems 
to me that the line should not be drawn with surh 
rigidity. 
There is a middle course, between the extremes of 
Florida's six-months' rule and the Court's rule. which 
comports with the Fourteenth Amendment. I ,\'Ould 
adhere to the principle of due process that requires 
fundamental fairness in criminal trials, and extend this 
principle to encompass the right to counsel in petty 
1 Sec Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. 8. 45, 60-61 (1932). 
5 Although we have giYen retroactive effect 1o our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. TVaimcright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), \\'C haYe 
said that, "[t]he rnluPs implemrntpc[ b)· the right to jury trial would 
not mcasumbly be srn·ed b)· requiring retrial of all persons con-· 
Yiclcd in 1hc pa~t by proredures not conHi,tent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jmy trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. 8 .. 
(l:ll , o:~4 (HloR). 
0 It is as~umcd that the Court mean~ no indiµ:cnt may be im-
pri~onecl if he waR not represented pro,·iclcd lh::tt he did not waive-
his right to coun,el. 
4 
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cases whenever the presence of counsel is necessary to-
assure fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 1 and Gideon,8 both of \Yhich involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that fe\v laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they Le only a 
brief period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." n 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Nor arc the, 
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious be-
cause the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
Y. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
7 Supra, n. 4, at GS-69 (1932). 
372 U. S., at 343-345. 
9 See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
American State Courts, 132 ( 19G5). 
i 0 see James v. Ileadlry, 410 F. 2d 325, 334--335 (CA5 1969). 
• 
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates 
important interests of licensees. In such cases the· 
licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
The States must afford the individual due process for 
the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. When the 
deprivation of property rights and interests are of suffi-
cient consequence, n denying the assistance of counsel 
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves, 
may be a denial of due process. 
This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-months' rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible rule of the majority opinion do apply to all 
cases within their defined areas regardless of circum-
stances. It is precisely for this reason that I find these 
alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, perhaps the 
most fundamental concept in our law, embodies princi-
ples of fairness rather than immutable line drawing· 
as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel 
is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor 
convictions, such a~ forfriture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro-
fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); 
N. C. Gen. Stat. §93 A-4 (1965) (real es1ale brokers)), and loss of 
pension rights (Fla. Stal. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension 
denied when injury is result of participation in fights, riots, civil in-
surrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514 
(1948) (teacher com·icled of misdemeanor resulting in imprison-
ment); Pa. Sta1. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 ( 1957) ( conviction 
of crime or misdemeanor)). Ser generally Project, Collateral Conse-
quences of a Criminal Conviction, 2:3 Vane!. L. Rev. 929 (1970). 
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are 
complex, others arc exceedinl!lY simple. As a j ustifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend arc the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries."' " Yet government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote a11d the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.' " It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases " ·here the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonincligent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling "·ill be to 
favor defendants cla8sificd as indigents over those not 
so classified who are in low income groups where the 
engaging of counsel in a minor petty offense case ,mule! 
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line be-
tween incligcncy and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is an arbitrary one. drawn differently from State to State 
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused per-
sons on both sides of the line. The Court's new rule· 
"·ill tend to accent the disadvantage in our society of 
being barely self-sufficient economically. 
1 ~ Gideon v. lraimcrioht, :372 C. R., :it 344. 
'" In prtty offm~r~. thrrr i~ muC'h lr~~ plra nrgotiation than in 
srrious offensr~. Rrr Re-port by thr Pre~ident's Commi~sion on Law 
Enforrc-mr nt and thr Administration of Just irr. Thr Ch:illrngr of 
Crime in 11 Frer Soriet~·, 134 (1967) (hrrcinaftrr rited a8 "Chal-
kngo"). Thus, in case:, whrro lhe CYiclcnc-r of p;uilt j,, overwhelming, 
the assistance of r01111Rel i8 less c8~ential to obtain a lighter sentrnce. 
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors arc 
tried showed that procedures \\·ere often informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials ,Ycre rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous.'' It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the 
offense charged is only a petty one.'" 
Despite its overbrcadth, the easiest solution ,rnuld be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appeali11g because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
purc::uing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its impact on the administration of the criminal jus-
tice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one 
reflects on the ,ride variety of petty or misdemeanor of-
fcn:-es. the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace ancl part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a clay in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
14 Siln•rstrin. supra, n. 9, nt 125-1'..?G. 
1 " Nrilhrr thr Report b~· Prr~idrnt'~ Commi,~ion on La\\' Enforr<'-
mrnt nm! 1hr Admini~trntion of .T11~tirr, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the 
Americnn Bnr A,~oriation Project on :\1inimum Standards for Crim-
innl .Ju~t ire. Pro,·idiu~ Defcll,e Srn·icr,. 37--W (1968). went the 
route thr Court t:i kc~ toda~·- The Prl'Ridcnt 's Commi~~ion rrcom-
mrnclc•d that roun~cl be proYided to criminal defendant:; who face 
"n Ri~nifirnnt prn:11t~-" ;1nd ;1t 11':tRI to thoRc \\'ho arc in dnn~er of 
"R11h~t;1ntial lo~s of lihcrt)·." The American Bar ARSOC'intion stnncl-
:,rcl would not rxtrnd the ri1d1l to C'Onnscl 011]~- lo ca~r:; where "lo~:; 
of librrt:v" iH not ''likl'I)· 1o be irnpm;ed." Neither supports a nrw, 
inflexible constilutionnl rule. 
8 
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The rule adopted today does not go all the ,my. It 
is limited to petty offC'nse cases in \Yhich the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The logic of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for counsel if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must 
assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical-and ,Yithout dis-
cernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisomne11 t category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even 
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
upon the criminal justice system. We should not adopt 
a rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, 
especially since it is supported neither by history nor 
precedent. 
II 
The majority opm10n concludes "that a person may 
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless 
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In sim-
plest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly-unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
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There arc thousands of statutes and ordinances which 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. Those offenses include some· 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors (ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses). They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
This is the broad spectrum of petty offense cases which 
daily flood into the lower criminal courts. The rule 
laid down today will confront the judge of each of these· 
courts with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not 
appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of impris-
onment of any duration may be imposed. The judge 
·will therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial-
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some 
sentence of imprisonment. His alternatives, assuming 
the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to 
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without 
counsel. 
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and tho 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tail-
ored to fit the crime and tho individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new 
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be gi vcn regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be 
overruling de f aclo the legislative determination as to 
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lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
arc some classes of imprisonablc offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be 
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today 
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonment-
even when rarely carried out--as serving a legitimate 
social function. 
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae, 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointrd, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If 
the second trial were held before the same judge, he 
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offensc.' 0 In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses clasified by 
legislatures as irnprisonable, will be treated by judges 
as unimprisonablc. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 
equal protection problems. There may will be an un-
fair and unequal application of criminal statutes and 
ordinances depending on whether the individual judge 
10 See Callon v. H'ilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888): North Carolina v .. 
Pearce, ;39.5 U.S. 711 (1960). 
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has determined in advance to leave open the option 
of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be 
entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts 
in the same j uriscliction an indigent accused of the same 
offense would have no counsel. Since the services of 
counsel are not related solely to the sentences that may 
be imposed. the results of this type of pretrial judg-
ment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents." 
To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
law, most judges arc likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offe11scs where ja.il 
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this 
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
17 The type of prn:dty diRr11Rsrd aboYe (i1woh-ing the discretionary 
alternat.i1·e of "j:1il or fine") prrRrnts srrious problems of fairness-
both to indigenlH and nonindigcnts :1ncl to 1he administration of 
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971). No adequate 
resolution of these inherently diffirult problrm~ lrns yrt been found. 
The rule adopted by the Court tocby, depriving the lower courts of 
all discretion in 81tch cm,rs unle,;8 counsel is ayailnble and is appointed, 
could aggrarnte the problem. 
12 
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged 
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our ,vorst bottlenecks." 18 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.10 
Finally, the degree of the Solicitor General's concern 
was reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion with 
respect to the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be 
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
1 0 Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 34-35. 
10 Id., at 36-37. 
20 Id ., at 39. 
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States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority does not address the consequences of 
its new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General. 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts. 21 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
Court's rule may well exacerbate this situation in 
terms of delay and congestion. We are familiar with 
the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos--
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay. 22 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently motivates a decision to litigate-
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
cases of petty offenses. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice lawyer; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
21 See generally H. ,Jame;:;, Cri~i8 in the Courts, c. 11 (1967); 
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156. 
22 See, e. g., ,fomes, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Iler 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
Ci Ly, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public, added delay and congestion in the courts.~~ 
There is an additional prnblem. The ability of va.ri-
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there were adrquate rcsourrc>s on a national 
basis, the unernn distributiou of these resources-of la\\'-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case, 
and haYe been comprllecl to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.~• 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
~" In Cook Count~·. Illinoi~, a rrrrnt stud~· rc,·ralrd thflt the mrm-
bcrs of the Chicago Bar As~oriation's Committee on thr Defense 
of PrisonNs, who arc appointrd to repre,ent indigrnt defendants, 
go before a jury 011 63% of thrir trinl ra8e8 while retninrd and ap-
pointed roun~cl do so on 33% and the public clrfrnclcr on only 15%. 
"One possible explanation for thi,;, contrnst is that committee counsel, 
who :1re sometimes scn·ing in part to gain experience, :1re more 
willing to unclrrl:1ke a jury trinl thnn is an assi8tnnt public defrndcr, 
who is very busy and vrry ronscious of the probablr extra pemlty 
accruing to a drfcnd:mt who losrs hi~ case brfore a jury." D. Oaks 
and W. Lrhmnn, A Crimin:1! Justice System nnd the Indigrnt, 158-
159 (1968) (footnote., omitted). 
~
4 See ln•in "· State, 44 Ah. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (19o7); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. ;151, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. Ilamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42· 
Ill. 2d 249, 2-!G K. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory, 2i8 l\firh. 
538, l+i N. W. 2d 66 (196i); lfrndrix \'. City of Seattle, i(l \Va~h. 
142, 456 P. 2d o9G (19<l9); State ex rel. Plutshark v. State Depart-
ment of Ilea/th and Sotial Scn•ices, 37 WiH. 2d i13, 155 N. W. 2d 
549 (1968). 
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actrnent of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority."'' These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, who understand the capabilities of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax these capabilities."(; 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling 
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71- 5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication , raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the tO\\"ll of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the tom1 had not 
rcsponclccl. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no se"·er or water 
~~ See Hawaii St. Con~t.. Art. I. § 11 (l9f\S); Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 19-S.'52 (Hlf\!) S11pp.); K:111. C.rn. , tat .. \1111. § 22-4503 (Hl70 
~11pp.): R\. Crim. Pror. H11lr ts.04: L:t. Hr\·. Stat., Tit. ];j, 
!\rt. 141 (F); :\fr. Hulr Crim. Proe. 44; :\Id. H. 719 (b) 2 (:1): 
Nl'b. Hr\·. Stat. § 29-1803 (l9fi7): N(',·. HrY. Stat. §§ 171.lSS, 
Hl3.104 (1969); K. :\Irx. Sbt. An11. § 40-2017 (1970 S11pp.); Ptnh 
Code Ann. § 77-G4-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § G503 
(1970 Supp.); Vn. Code Ann. § 19.1-2-H.l (1970 Supp.). 
~G Sre Knmisnr & Choper, Thr Hight to Coun~cl in Minnesota: 
Some Field Finding~ and Lrgnl-Poliry Obsrrvations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, GS (1963). Locnl judges intrn·irwrd by the author:,; concluded 
that the right to roun;;cl should not be rxtendrd to petty cases. 
"If no such di\·iding Jinr cnn br drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdemeanor case., resoh·es itself into an 'all or nothing' 
proposition, then, the thrust of their virws wn8 that limited funds 
nnd lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial eeonom_\· dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" But 8ee State v. Bor$t, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 
2d 888 (1967). 
. . 
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the ncarC'st 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an un \\'ise 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though uncloubteclly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses."1 It is 
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat."8 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts ·when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many smalltown courts. The community could simply 
not enforce its own la,Ys.20 
27 Src Cableton "· State, supra. n. 24, at 538-539: "[T]hrre arc 
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
ticing lawyers and ... thrrc arc rountics in which there arc no 
practicing lawyers. The impart of r right to counsel in misdemean-
ors] would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas 
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." 
2R Src Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
2n Thr surcr,sful implrmrntnt ion of the majority's rule would 
require state and local governments to appropriate considrrnble 
funds, something they have not bren willing to do. Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, .55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony casrs-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although tho budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" allcl to 
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-
quences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. For while the 
majority rule is too broad insofar as it requires the 
appointment of counsel in many cases where this is 
not necessary, the rule could operate to impinge upon 
the right to a fair trial where the offense charged is 
either nonimprisonable or one in " ·hich the judge has 
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence. 
Although the Court's opinion does not deal explicitly 
with any sentence other than deprivation of liberty 
however brief, the according of special constitutional 
status to cases where such a sentence is imposed may-
unless the Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic 
rule-derogate the need for counsel in other types of 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of Americnn resources the funds 
spent on the legal sen ·ices progmm cnn only be regarded as trivial." 
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emrrgcnrc of a Modern Theme, in 
Cappelletti and Gorcllry, Legnl Aid: Modern ThemP~ and YnrintiOllH, 
24 Stanford L. Re,·. 347, 379 (1972) . "Although the American 
economy is oYer eight times the size of the British and the American 
population i::l almost four timr~ n~ grr:1 t , Amrriean legal a id ex-
penditure:, arc le~::l than two times as high." Id ., n. 210. 
,, 
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casC's. Due process rcqmrcs a fair trial m all cases. 
XC'ithC'r the six-month ru]e approved below nor the 
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achicvC' 
th is result. 
III 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense casC's is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts C'xercising a judicial dis-
cretion on a case-by-case basis.:'° The determination 
shoulr be made before the accused forma1ly pleads; 
many pC'tty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m 
which the a ~istance of counsel may bC' requirecl. 3 ' If 
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved 
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to 
scrutinize carefu1ly the subsequent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented 
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court 
should examine the case against him to insure that there 
is admissible evidence tending to support the clements 
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense 
counsel. the court should intervene, when necessary, to 
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the 
:w It serms to mr th:1t S\H'h an indi1·idw1lizcd rule, unlike' n Rix-
month rnlr nnd thr mn,iorit~·'s rulr, dors not prr~cnl rqnnl protrr-
t ion prohlrmR nnclrr this Comt ',, drri~ion~ in Griffin Y. lllinois, 351 
U. R. 12 (1950); Dour;las \'. California. 384 U. 8. 430 (19fl3); nnd 
Mayer\'. City of C'hirago, - U.S. - (1971). 
:n Src, e. g., Kntz, l\foniripnl C'omi8-Anothcr Urbin Ill, 20 Cn~e 
Wr~tcrn Rcserye L. Re\·. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Jlamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Ilan•ey v. Mississippi, 3·-10 F. 2d 2G3 (CA,5 1965). 
Althongh lhrrr i~ lr~~ plm nrgoli:lling in prtt~- r:1~r~. srr n. 13, 
supra, the assistanre of ronn~rl may still be neeclrd ~o thnt the de-
fendant who is not farrd with O\'Prwhelming e1·iclcnce of guilt, can 
make nn intelligent dcri~ion whcthrr 1o go to trial. 
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facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being 
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied 
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, ap-
pellatr courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions 
not to appoint counsel am! the proceedings ,Yhich follow. 
It is impossible. as well as unwise. to create a precise 
and detailed set of guiclclinrs for judges to follow in de-
termining ,Yhrther the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions "·ill rarely present complex legal 
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or ,Yhich raise collateral legal questions, 
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too 
complex for an uuassistcd layman. If the offense is one 
where the State is represented by counsel and where 
most dcfrnclants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs 
the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The 
more serious the likely consequences. the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. Im-
prisonrn011t is not the only serious consequence the court 
should consider; to some indigents, a substantial fine may 
be more srrious than a few clays in jail. The revocation 
of a license or a drunk driving conviction under certain 
circumstances also could result in grave consequences. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These arc, of course, the most 
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the com-
petency of the individual defendant to present his own 
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular 
defendant or particular incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a 
20 
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peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the ap-
pointment of counsel in a case where the court "·ould 
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensi-
tivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the 
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the 
consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
v. Brady, 31G r. S. 455 (1942), and Bute Y. Illinois, 333 
U.S. 640 (1948), ,Yhich this Court overruled in Gideon. 3 ~ 
One of the reasons for Eeeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases ,ms the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
tho concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon, 
372 U. S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume 
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts ,vill be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness as this concept of due process has evolvC'd, 
there is less reason to think that insensitivity ·will abate.33 
3 t I do not di~ngrre wi1h thr ovrrruling of Betts in Gideon with 
which I am in complete nccorcl. Betts, like Gideon, concrrned the 
right to counsel in a felony cnsc. Sec n. 1, supra. N rither cnse 
controls today's result. 
33 A similnr rrcognition of thr unwisdom-if not impractirnli1y-of 
a univer"al rule is recognized in Rodridguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N. J. 
2d 281, 295 (1967), where tho CourL snid: "The prnctirnlities mny 
necessitate the omission of a uni,·er8nl rule for the as::;ignmenl of 
counsrl to all indigent defendants nnd such omi~sion may be toler-
able in the multitude of petty muniripnl court cnscs which do not 
result in actual impri"onment or in other serious consequences such 
as the substantial loss of driYing privileges. But, as a matter of 
simple justice, no indigent clefendnnt should be subjected to a con-
viction entailing impri::;onmrnt in fact or other consequence of magni-
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The according of some discretion to the courts will not 
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the 
indigent's right to counsel in petty offense cases.34 But it 
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider avail-
ability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts 
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize 
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case 
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The 
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guide-
lines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each 
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be con-
sidered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord 
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as 
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that 
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel 
is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the· 
result of today's holding. 
tudc without fir8t having had due and fair opportunity to have 
counsel assigned without cost. Our municipal court judges have had 
and continue to have broad discretion to assign free counsel to indi-
gent defendants whenever justice so requires. That discretion may 
be exercised liberally under general guidelines without entailing the 
feared inundations." 
:H Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in 
this opinion will result from any rni~ing of the st andard8 as to the-
requiremrnt of romwel. Is is my view that the rule of judicial 
discretion to assurr foir trial of petty offense,; not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise 
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the 
courts whiC'h already are under the most severe strain. 
'Y /- 1, 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
charged with an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to 
the assistance of appointed counsel. More generally, we 
must determine whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires that an indigent charged with a state petty of-
fense 2 be afforded the right to appointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not na.rrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was · quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U. S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); 
Loper v. Beto, - U. S. - (1972). 
2 As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Bal,dwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) . It also includes all offenses 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six mouths' imprisonment.~ 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, follo\\·cd 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 6G 
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which 
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in 
state criminal cases was limited to cases in ,Yhich the 
offense charged was punishable by more than six months. 
It is clea.r that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to 
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a 
right to appointed counsC'l in all cases in which there is 
a clue process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to-
rounsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting thC' right to jury trial to cases in ,vhich the 
offense chargC'cl is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment doC's uot compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Bald,win, 
and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic 
not punishable by imprisonment, rrgardh:>Rs of the amount of any 
fine that might be aulhorizrd. To this Pxtent, the definition used 
herein differd from the frdpral 8tatutory drfinition of "petty of-
fcn~c" whirh imlndrs off Pn,,es puni~hable by not more t hnn six 
months' imJ)ri~onm('nt or b~, a fine not pxrccdin~ $500. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1. 
3 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). 
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origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation on the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases:' Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-tempering . the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of judicial power-while 
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a 
fair trial as is the right to counsel." 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the/ 
new rule of clue process, today enunciated by the Cou -t, 
C
hat '''a--i~~R-flttl,¥-,l~berimprisoned ... Ul11CSS he 
ms represented by counsel at the trial." a It seems 
to me that the line should not be dram, with such 
rigidity. 
There is a middle course, between the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports with t 1e Fourteenth Amendment. I would 
adhere to the prillciple of due process that requires 
L.Lly ;~~~ fundamental fairness in criminal trials~a.JJ.cl xtond th· 
~~ ~ princ~ eneom·pa;s""""the right to taunsel in petty 
4 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. -1:5, 60-61 (1032). 
"Although we have gi,·en retroacti,·e efTeC't to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have 
said that, "rt]he values implrrnrntrd by the right to jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring rrtrial of ::di persons con-
Yictrd in the pa~t b:v proredurrs not ron~istent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 
631, 5:34 (1968). 
6 It is as~umrd that the Court mr:111~ no indi!);ent mn.y be im-
prisonrd ii' he was not represrntcd provided that he did not waive 
his right to roun~e\. 
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~ sure A fair tria 1. 
I 
necessary to 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 1 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The conseque!1~ 
Cof a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be e.uzy.) a -brief period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." 0 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Kor are the 
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious be-
cause the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
v. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 ( 1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
7 Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932). 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
0 See L. Silverstein, Dcfrnsc of the Poor in Criminal Cases rn 
American State Courts, 132 (1965). 
10 See James v. Tleaclley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334--335 (CA.5 1969). 
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates 
important interests of licensees. In such cases the 
licenses arc not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
The States must afford the individual due process -for- "--
the- deprivationAof life, liberty, or property. When the ~ 
deprivation of property rights and interests t¥'e 1of suffi-
cient consequence,11 denying the assistance of counsel 
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves., 
~ 1t,y -be~ a denial of due process. 
This 1s not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-month/' rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible ru~ of the majority opinio1~ apply to all 
cases within their defined areas regardless of circum-
stances. It is precisely j~i ~,r,bat I find these 
alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, perhaps the 
most fundamental concept in our law, embodies princi-
ples of fairness rather than immutable line drawing 
as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel 
- is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil di~abilities may result from misdemeanor 
convictions, such a~ forfei1 ure of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919)), disqualification for a licensed pro-
fession (Cal. Bu:, . & Prof. Code§ 3094 (West 1962) (optometrist8); 
N. C. Gen. Stat . § 93 A-4 (1965) (real estate broker::,)), and loss of 
pension rip;h1 8 (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension 
denied when injury is re:ouli of participa1 ion in fight:, , riots, civil in-
surrections, or while committing crime); Incl. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514 
(194 ) (teacher convicted of mi~demeanor re:,ulting in imprison-
ment) ; Pa . Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction 
of crime or mi~demeanor)). Sec genrrally Project, Collateral Conse-
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases arc 
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a justifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
,viclespreacl belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." '" Y ct government often docs 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. \.Yhere the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.'" It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to cou 11sel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonincligen t clefenclan ts. 
Indcecl, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
~/. favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so cln,ssified~,Yho are in low income groups ,\·here th 
engagin~ counsel in a minor petty offense case would 
be a luxury the family could not aff orcl. The line be-
tween indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is an arbitrary one. drawn differently from State to State 
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused per-
[
sons, @ .. n.-botlrsidm;-1,f-thQ fo~0'!' The Court's new rule 
wil~nd to accent the disadvantage i.11 o~r see~ of 
being barely self-sufficient economically. e_ 
1 ~ Gid<'O?l v. ll'aimcright, 372 U. 8., at 344. 
1
=
1 In petty offen~es, thrrr i~ m11rh le~s plea negot1at1on than in 
scriouR offen~es. 8rr Report br t hr Prr~ident's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challrnge of 
Crime in a Free Soricty, 134 (19o7) (hereinafter cited as "Chal-
lrnge"). Thus, in cnscs where the r,·idenrc ol' guilt is overwhelming, 
the as~i~tance of counsel is less esscntinl to obtnin a lighter sentcnre .. 
L~L 
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were often informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to 
say that 110 defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the 
offense charged is only a petty one.'" 
Despite its overbrcadth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
oT~impact on the administration of the criminal jus-
tice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when one 
reflects on the \Yide variety of petty or misdenwanor of-
fenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions. ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
14 Silver:,;tein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
1 " Neither the Report b~· Prc~ident's Commi~sion on Lnw Enforce-
ment and the AclminiRtration of Justice, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the 
American Bar ARsociation Project on Minimum Standards for Crim-
inal Justice, PrO\·iding Defen,e SetTiceR, 37-40 (1968), went the 
route thr Comt ta krs today. The President's Cornrni~sion rccom-
mrndecl that coun~cl be prO\·iclccl to crimin;il clef Pncl:ints who face 
"n, Rignificant penalty" and at lrast to those who arc in clanger of 
"substantial loss of liberty." The Amrrican Bar Assorintion stnnd- _.--, 
arcl "·ould not extrnd thr right to coun:,;cl ~ - to case;; where "]oRs ~ 
of liberty" is not ''likrly to be imposed.'~Ncither supports a new, 
inflexible constitutional rule. 
8 
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The rule adopted today does not go an the ,my. It 
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The logic of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be 1nade, the rule will be extended to all petty offeuse 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for counsel if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must 
assume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical- and " ·ithout dis-
cernible support in the Constitution- to hold that no 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even 
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
upon the criminal justice system. We should not adopt 
a rule with consequences of such unknown dimensions, 
especially since it is supported neither by history nor 
precedent. 
II 
The majority op1111on concludes "that a person may 
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless 
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In sim-
plest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly- unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
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There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors [ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain tra'ffic offenses]. They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors~ 
This i~ broad spectrum of petty offense cases ~
daily floo~ ~ the lower criminal courts. The rule 
laid down today will confront the judge;of each of these 
courts with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not 
\.tr.., I"" ) appointed or knowingly waived, no sentence of impris-
~ / onm~ er- any duration may be imposed. The judge ~ o-&~ ~ 
~ ill therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial- j ~~~;l,z ~ 
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will  ~ -f dJ. 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some ~ c/ p.,--,..,...,,. J~ 
Centence of imprisonment His alternatives, assuming ~~4-/..#.J. + :t)t_ the availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel I , ~,hr,..(. 
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to ~ · 
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without 
counsel. 
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tail-
ored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new 
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge ,vould be _ 
overruling de Jaclo the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
10 
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lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be 
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today 
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonment-
even when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate 
social function. 
In the brief for the United States as arnicus curiae, 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If 
the second trial were held before the same judge, he 
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the gua.rantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.rn In all likelihood, therf;l. -@ 
will be no second trial and certain offenses cla~ed by 
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges 
_ ~ as unimprisonable. 
j --;li ~ +, _ The new rule announced today also could result in 
~~ e ual protection problems. There may will be an un-
( . fair and unequal irpplioation of-crimi11a:l,,t~t,es a11d --'-
c6f-ordi1Htnecfl' dependrng on whether the individual judge 
iG See Callon v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
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I has determined in advance to leave open the option of imprisonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts 
-----......... in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same 
--~------~ 
offense v,:ould have no counsel. Since the services of 
counsel a-re net re1atee-selel¥ -t9 the -:eut.e.1:;H~e.1, .. tha~ 
~e in'lposed, the results of this type of pretrial judg-
ment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will of ten 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so. will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.11 
To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offenses where jail 
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this 
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
17 The type of penalty di8cu~scd aboYe (invoh·ing the discretionary 
alternatfre of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness-
both to indigent~ and nonindigent~ and to 1he administration of 
jnRtice. Cf. Tate v. Shni-t, 401 U. S. 495 (1971). No adequate 
resolution of these inherently diffirull problrms has yet been found. 
The rule adopted by the Court today, depri,·ing the lower comts of 
all discretion in sneh casrs unless counsel i8 available and is appointed, 
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged 
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 18 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.19 
t i< ) (5 Fi:11al~ the degree of the Solicitor General's concern 
\.!:..!-- -~eflected by his admittedly unique suggestion~ 
""4.respe'"lt -4;o the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be 
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
1 8 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35. 
10 Id., at 36-37. 
20 Id., at 39. 
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States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority does not address the consequences of 
its new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General. 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts. 21 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
b' ~ G(court's rule may well exacerbate th-is 5itaa:tion in C2. 
,.,,,. ~rms of delay and congesti~~ We are familiar with 
1----t ... he common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay. 22 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assista11ee oi 1.ef'.Ji'-t t .... / 
counsel claim, frequently iva~ecision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school will receive most of the appointments in 
cas~ JI petty offensesl The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice_~; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in ;rBcedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
21 See generally II. James, Crisis in the Courts, c. 11 (1967); 
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156. 
22 Sec, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her· 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the pub]~ added delay and congestion in the courts. 2~ 
There is an additional problem. The ability of vari-
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there ,vere adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the C'ourt in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the incligent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they ,rere moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 2• 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
2" In Cook County, Illinoi~, a recent stud)' rc,·ealcd that the mem-
bers of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners~ who are :rr,pointcd to repreRcnt indigent defcndnnts ~ 
~~ hclore- e, .iury flf1 G3% of heir tria 1 cases while retained and ap- L · __ / 
pointed coun:;;c co SO'jH½ 33% and thr public defender~[only 15%. - "'::::J 
"One possible cxplana ion for this contra8t is that committee c01mscl 1 
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, are more 
willing to undert:1 kc a jury trial than is :111 assistant public defender, 
who is very busy and vrry ronsrious of the probablr cxtm penalty 
accruing to a drfendant who loses hi,; casr before a jury." D. Oaks 
and W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-
159 ( 1968) (footnotes omitted). 
24 Sec Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (19G7); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (19G7); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42 
Ill. 2d 249, 24G N. E. 2d 281 (19G9); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 
538, 1-!7 N. W. 2d G6 (19G7); IIcndrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 
142, 45G P. 2d 696 (19G9); State ex rel. Phitshack v. State Depart-
ment of IIealth and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 
549 (19GS). 
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actrnent of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority." 3 These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, who understand the capabilities of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax these capabilities.~" 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling 
will mean in some localities. In November 1!)71 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a la.vyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
20 See Hawaii St. ConRI ., Ari. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 19-852 (19G9 Supp.); K:in. <7rn. St:it. A1111. § 22--t-.5m (Hl70 
Supp.); E\. Crim. Pror. Hulr 1-.04; L:1. Hr,·. Stnt., Tit. 1.5, 
Art. 141 (F); ~fr. Huie Crim. Pror. 4-1-; Md. H. 719 (b) 2 (n); 
~ob. Rev. Rtnt. § 29-180:~ (l!)G7): Nrv. Hr,·. Sl:il. §§ 171.188, 
1!)3.104 (1969); N. Mex. S1at. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.): Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 650S 
(1970 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.}. 
2n Sec Knmi~ar & Chopcr, The Right to Counsel in MimieRota: 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Polir)' Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges intrrviewed by the author:,; concluded 
I h:1t the right to roun:,;cl shou Id not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such didding line can be drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdeme:mor cases rrsolves itself into :m 'a 11 or nothing' 
proposition , then , the thrust of their views wns th:1t limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial rconomy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" But sec State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise-
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses.~7 It is. 
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat. 28 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many smalltown courts. The community could simply 
not enforce its own laws.29 
27 See Cableton V. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "rTJhcrc arc-
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
ticing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which there are no 
practicing lawyers. The impact of [ right to counsel in misdemean-
ors] would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas 
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." 
28 Sec Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
29 The succe,,sful implementation of the majority's rule would 
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable 
funds , something they have not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21% of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigrnt defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to 
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-
quences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolve..§. }For while th 
majority rule is too broad insofar as it requires the _o 
appointment of coullsel in many cases where t!y,s is l-\-... 
not necessary, the rule could operate to impinge"" upon 
the right to a fair trial where the offense charged is 
either nonimprisonable or one in which the judge has 
determined that he will not impose a jail sentence. 
Although the Court's opinion does not deal explicitly 
with any sentence other than deprivation of liberty 
however brief, the according of special constitutional 
status to cases where such a sentence is imposed may-
--unless the Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic 
rule-derogate the need for counsel in other types of 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds 
spent on tho legal services program can only be regarded as trivial.". 
Cappelletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in 
Cappelletti and Gordley,. Legal Aid: Modern Them<:~ and Variations, 
24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 379 (1972). "Although the American 
economy is over eight times the size of the Brilish and the American 
populatiou is almost four times as grent, American legal aid ex-
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cases. Due process requires a fair trial in all cases. 
Keither the six-month rule approved below nor the 
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve 
this result. 
III 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
creti, on a case-by-case basis.''° The determination 
shou be made before the accused formally pleads; 
man petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m 
which the assistance of counsel may be required.:i' If 
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved 
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to 
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented 
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court 
should examine the case against him to insure that there 
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements 
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense-
counsel. the court should intervene, when necessary, to 
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the 
:io It seems to me th:.t sneh an incliYidufllized rnlc, unlike a six-
month rule and the majority's rule, docs not pre8ent equal protec-
t ion problems under this Comt '~ deeision~ in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12 (1956); Douolas v. California, 384 U.S. 436 (1063); and 
Mayer v. City of Chir-ago, - U. 8. - (197n. 
:n See, e. g., Kntz, l\Tuni<"ipfll Courts-Another Urbin Ill, 20 Case 
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-9fi (1968). Cf. Ilamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. l\Jarylcmd, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Ilarvey v. Missi.ssi])pi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although there is Jrss 11lca negotiating in petty raseR, sec n. 13, 
su])ra, the assistanrc of r01111sel mny still be needed so that the de-. 
fondant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guil~ can 
make an intelligent deri~ion whether to go to trial. fV 
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facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being 
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied 
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, ap-
pellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions 
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is impossible. as well as unwise, to create a precise 
and detailed S('t of guidelines for judges to follow in dc-
termini ng "·hcther the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions will rarely present complex legal 
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or "·hich raise collateral legal questions, 
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one 
where the State' is represented by counsel and where 
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs 
the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that "·ill follow if a conviction is obtained. The 
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the .,,-
c)robability that a lawyer should be appointed. m-prisonment is not the only serious consequence the court should consid~' to sonw i, igents, a substantial may ) 
/ be mor~rious than . cw clays in jail. revocation 
~ of ~. Hccnse or a.... runk driving con · 1011 under certain l:~:.:i-~t,i,~f-4-':> 
tf' ~curnstances also could result in grave consequences. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most 
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the com-
petency of the individual defendant to present his own 
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular 
defendant or particular incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a 
20 
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peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the ap-
pointment of counsel in a case where the <'Ourt ,rould 
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensi-
tivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the _ 
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the 
consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
Y. Brady, 316 "C. S. 455 (1942), and Bute Y. Illinois, 333 
U. S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 32 
One of the reasous for seeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon; 
372 U. 8., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume 
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness as this concept of due process has evolved, 
there is less reason to think that insensitivity will abate~ 
32 I do not di,mgrrc with thr overruling of Bettsr+r+ Oi.1e0n with ~ 
~·hidrl am in complete accorc\A Betts, like Gided1i, conrrrned the 
right to counsel in a felony case. Sec n. 1, supra. Neither case 
eontr~ls today's result. 
•n: similat tet"O',.,"fflli<ID.~,ullwi:>dom-if.no.L impracticality-of 
a universal rule is rec gnized in Rodridguez v. osenblatt, 58 N. J. 
/ 2d 281, 295 (1967), here tho Court said: " ie practicalities ma 
necessitate the o ssion of a univer~al n for the assignmen of 
counsel to all · aigent defcndnnts and · ch omission mny be oler-
able in tho ultiludc of petty mun· pal court cases whir do noy 
result in ctual impri8onment or . other seriou8 con~eq1 ces suer 
as th substantial loss of driv · g privileges. But, as , matter of 
sim e justice, no indigent .9 fendnnt should be subj led to a con1 
viction entailing imprisonn<cnt in fact or other con~uencc o~u.i 
) 
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The according of some discretion to the courts will no~ 
obviate all of the practical problems of expanding the 
indigent's right to cou11sel in petty offense cases ..... ~But it 
will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider avail-
ability of defense counsel. In this process, the courts 
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize 
a duty to consider tho need for counsel in every case 
where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The 
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guide-
lines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each 
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be con-
sidered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord 
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as 
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that 
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel 
is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of teday's fl0lEl.¼1~ .xh> d..A<~ ~ :,J....,, ,tJA-1 , 
tude withoj .fir::;t having had ue and fair opportunity to have 
counsel as ·gned without cost. ,Gur municipal c,purt judges ha e had 
-~r and co mue to have broad .discretion to a · n free counseJ:' to indi-
ge defendants whene;JM"'justice so re ires. That discretion may 
e exercised liberally }lnder general g idelines without entailing th 
---faa.red- iuundaJjons "J 
3 3, IN Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in 
this opinion will result from any rnising of the standard;; as to the 
reqmremenL of counsel.AM i · my view thn0ae 1o¼e o.f judicial -
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which othcrwi::;e 
C-?'~ could affect adversely the aclminist ration of criminal justice in the 
'-.:::::-:-::/- 7\courts which already arc under the most severe strain. 
' • t .... i ' 
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MR. J US'l'ICE PowELL, concurri11g in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendrnrnt to furnish counsel to all 
_ indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 Tho ques-
o-/ ';- tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
~ ) an offense carrying a maximum punish-
• I t, //t't.4 , / rnent of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
.,J1 ~ 1- I or botl1 is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to 
the ass1s ance of appointed counsel. More generally, we 
;:;:;-i-- nlll:s~ €19.tcrmine )whether the Due Process Clause re-
- I quires that an mdigent charged with a state petty of-
fense~ be afforded the right to appointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
tll.'lt the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); 
Loper v. Beto, - U.S. - (1972). 
~ As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonmmt does not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~ 
The state court, in drmving a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan Y. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 
( 1970), decided shortly after the opinion below, in which 
we held that the due process right to a trial by jury in 
state criminal cases ,vas limited to cases in which the 
offense charged was punishable by more than six mouths. 
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to 
be drava1, it must be dra"·n so that an indigent has a 
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is 
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in pieci11g together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guidi11g hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment docs not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin, 
and District of Columbfo Y. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic 
not punishable by imprisonmrnt, reµ:artlbs of the amount of any 
fine that miµ:ht be m1lhorizecl. To thi8 extent, the definition used 
herein differs from the frtlernl 8latutory definition of "petty of-
fense" which inrlndc,.; offcnsc8 pnni,,hable by not more thnn six 
months' imprisomnrnt or b)· a fine not cxrceding $500. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1. 
3 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). 
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origi11s at common la,\'. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation 011 the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases:' Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a .i ury-tempering the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of j uclicial power-while 
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a 
fair trial as is the right to counsel." 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree ,Yith the 
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court, 
that under no circumstances may a person "be impris-
oned ... unless he was represented by counsel at the 
trial."" It seems to me that the line should not be 
dra,rn with such rigidity. 
There is a middle course. between the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports ,vith the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of clue 
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
trials, a principle ,Yhich I believe encompasses the right 
1 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, G0-61 (1932). 
"Although we haYc gi,·en retroactirn effect to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer \'. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we ham 
said that, "[t]hc nlues implemented by the right to jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring rctri/1 l of all persons con-
Yicted in the past by prorcclurrs not ron~istent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 3!)'.l U. S. 
(tn , 63-l (1968). 
6 It is n~~umrcl that the Court nmrns no indigent may br im-
11riso11ed if he wns not rrpresrntccl pro1·iclecl that he did not waive-
his right to cournrl. 
4 
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of 
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 1 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief 
period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be dismissed by the label "petty." 0 
Serious consequences a.lso may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Nor are the 
consequences of conviction necessarily more serious be-
cause the sentence is one of imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
v. Brown, 402 U. S. 535, 539 ( 1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
7 Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932). 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
0 Sec L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965). 
10 See James v. Ifeadley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969). 
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that acljudicatC's 
important interests of licensees. In such cases the 
licenses arc not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'' 
The States must afford the individual due process be-
fore depriving him of life, liberty, or property. When 
the deprivation of property rights and interests is of suf-
ficient consequence,11 denying the assistance of counsel 
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves 
is a denial of due process. 
This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole test as to the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases 
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. 
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that 
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, 
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, em-
bodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line 
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. Counsel 
is often essential to a fair trial, but this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor· 
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro-
fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (oplometrists); 
N. C. Gen. Stat. § 93 A-4 (1965) (real e;:;tatr brokers)), and loss of 
pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension 
denied when injur~· i · resull of participation in fights, riots, civil in-
surrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514 
(1948) (teacher com·ictcd of misdemeanor rc:sulling in impriHon-
ment); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction 
of crime or misdemeanor)). Sec grnerally Project, Collateral ConRe-
quenccs of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970). 
70-5015-CONCUR 
G ARGERSIKGER v. HA1fLIN 
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases a.re 
complex, others are exceedingly simple. As a j ustifica.-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend arc the ~trongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." -'~ Y rt government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
prtty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benrfits. '~ It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to counsel would ra.rely be cxer-
ci~cd by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified yet "·ho arc in low income groups "·here 
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case "·ould 
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line be-
tween incligency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is an arbitrary one, drawn differently from State to State 
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused per-
sons. The Court's new rule will accent the disadvantage 
of being barely self-sufficient economically. 
1 ~ Gideon Y. lraimrright, :-372 U. 8., nt 344. 
1
~ In petty offense~. thcrr i~ murh Jr~.- pll':1 nrgoti:1tion th:111 in 
serious offenses. Srr Report by the President's Commi~~ion on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, 13-4 (19G7) (hrreinafter cited ns "Chal-
lenge"). Thus, in cnses where the e,·idrncr of guilt is overwhelming, 
the assi.,tanco of coun~el is lc~s essential to obt:-iin n light er sentence. 
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A survey of state courts i11 which misdemeanors arc 
tried sho\\'C'd that procedures "·ere of ten informal, pre-
sickcl over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution "·as not vigorous.'" It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial "·ithout 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel, if the 
offen"e charged is only a petty one.'" 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that ,rnuld require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its ad verse impact on the administration of the crimi-
nal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when 
one reflects 011 the ,\·ide variety of petty or misdemeanor 
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in vi<'\\' of the variations 
in types of courts and their j urisclictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a cby in the f!reat metropolitan 
centers. 
1 ' 8iln•rstrin, supra, n. 9, at 125-12fi. 
10 Nrithrr thr Rrport b~· Prrsidrnt',; Comrni~~ion on Law Enforrr-
mc•nt and the Admini~tr:ttion of .Tttstirr. supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the 
Amrrican Bar .\~~oriation Projret on :\Iinimum Standards for Crim-
inal .Tu~t ire, Prcn·iding; Drfrn~r Service~. 37--10 (1968), went the 
routr the Court takrs today. Thr Prrsidrnt's Commission reeom-
mrnded that rounsrl be proYiclrd to criminal drfrnd:mts who face 
"a sig;nifirant prnalt~·" and at lrnst to tho~r \Yho nrr in danii;rr of 
"::;ubstantial lo~s of librrt~·." Thr Arnrri<'nn Hnr A~~orialion stnnd-
nrcl \l'Ottld uot Pxtrud 1hr rig;ht to rottn~rl to ca~r~ whrrr "loss 
of liberty" iH not '']ikrl~· to br impo~cd." ~eithrr supports a nrw, 
inflexible consl itutional rule. .. 
' 
8 ARGERSINGER v. 
The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It 
is limited to petty offense cas s in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule " ·ill be extended to all petty offense 
t'es except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If 1e Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
tocla the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for cou "el if a jail sentence is to be imposed, one must 
assume a "milar rejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without dis-
cernible suppor in the Constitution-to hold that no 
discretion may eve be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contempla l and at the same time endorse 
I the legitimacy of discret1 1 in "non-jail" petty offense 
.LiJn~ cases which may result in fa ore serious consrquences 
~., · 1. ~\ than a few hours or days of in ceration. 
( p. / J-7 Thus, although the new rule is tended today only / to the imprisonment category of c ,s, the Court's 
-- o )inion foreshado,\·s the adoption of a oad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. But even 
today's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
upon the criminal justice system. We should not~ 
~ with consequences of such unknown dimensions, 
especially since it is supported neither by history nor 
precedent. 
II 
The majority oprn10n concludes "that a person may 
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless 
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In sim-
plest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly-unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
5/17/72 
No. 70-5015, Argensinger v. Hamlin, Rider p~ 8. 
is unwilling to go all the way and adopt,·, a 
prophylactic rule even though the logic of its position would 
seem to call for such a result. With no apparent constitution 1 
only to irtdigents who are actually sentenced to imprisonment 
for petty offenses. There are serious questions whether such 
-~:..J.he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that 
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken from 
a person without affording him due process of law. The majority 
~ 7' . . 1 ..e,.. ... ,;,, f 1ct· . . h" &.iKlAsuggest no constitutiona FAai8R1~g or istinguis ing 
~ 0 
between deprivations of liberty and property , f9r trdeeg ~a.ere 
i~ ~- In fact, the majority suggests no reason at all for 
drawing this distinction, The logic it advances for extending 
the right to counsel to all cases in which the penalty of~ 
imprisonment is imposed applies equally well to cases in which 
other penalties may be imposed® xxitxxxxltl!'§lfXXHSX Nor does the 
majority deny that some "non-jail" penalties are more serious 
than brtef jail sentences, 
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There are thousands of statutes and ordinances ,Yhich 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods 
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today 
will confront the judges of each of these courts 
·with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed 
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment 
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will 
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial-
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some 
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility 
to consider the full range of punishments established 
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the 
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him by la,v, or to 
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without 
counsel. 
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the· 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tail-
ored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new 
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
·which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonablc but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be 
10 
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overruling de facto the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
arc some classes of imprisonablc offenses for v,1hich im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable purpose. The mere possibility of jail may be 
a deterrent. At least the legislatures, and until today 
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonment-
even when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate 
social function. 
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae, 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence ·which came out at 
the first trial when the accused ,rn.s uncounselled. If 
the second trial were held before the same judge, he 
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impoi:,c a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.1 a In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by 
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges 
as unimprisonable. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 
equal protection problems. There may will be an un-
fair and unequal treatment of individual defendants 
ia Sec Callon v. 1Vilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v .. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). 
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depending on "·hethcr the individual judge has de-
termined in advance to leave open the option of impris-
sonment. Thus. an accused indigent would be entitled 
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the 
same jurisdiction an indigrnt accused of the same offensr 
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel 
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which 
no jail sentc11cc is imposrd, the results of this type of 
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case "·here judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example\ "five days in jail or 
$100 fine." If a .i udgc has predcterm incd that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with resprct to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will oftrn 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and clors so, will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent "·ho commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor ,vould there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents." 
To avoid thcsr equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
law, most judges arc likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offenses where jail 
sentences arc extremly rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this 
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
17 The lrpe of prnalt>· diHrussrd aboYr (inrnh-ing the discretionary 
alternative of "jail or fine") prrsrnt:; Hrriou:; problems of fairness-
both to indigrnl:; and nonindigrnts and to the administration of 
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 lT. S. 495 (1971). No adequate 
rrsolution of these inherent]>· clitrirult problems ha~ yet bren found. 
The rule adopted by the Court toda>·, drpriving 1 he lower courts of 
all di:;cretion in ~ueh case~ unlc~~ cotmscl is :l\·:1ilablr and is appointrcl, 
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General who, on behalf of the United States, urged 
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 1 8 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.in 
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is 
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regard-
ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
\vould result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be 
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
small sentences." w Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of a.mending the laws of each of the 50 
1 8 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35. 
10 Id., at 36- 37. 
20 Id., at 39. 
.. Rider A, p. 13 (Argersinger) 5/18/72 
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the new 
rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is net' reassuring. 
In a footnote, it is said that there are presently 355, 200 attorneys 
and that the number will increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This 
is asserted to be sufficient to provide the number of full-time 
counsel, estimated by one source at between 1, 575 and 2,300, 
to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic 
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335, 200 lawyers 
are potentially available. Thousands of these are not in practice, 
and many of those who do practice work for governments, corporate 
legal departments, the Armed Services and are unavailable for 
criminal representation. Of those in general practice, we have 
no indication how many are qualified for or willing to accept 
prove ~ He•·"- 21 
assignments which may~y lucrative for most. 
It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementation 
of the Court's new rule will require no more than 1, 575 to 2, 300 
2. 
"full-time" lawyers. In:a few communities are there full-time 
public defenders available for or private lawyers specializing 
in petty cases. Thus, if it were possible at all, it would be 
necessary to coordinate the schedules of those lawyers who are 
willing to take an occasional misdemeanor appointment with the 
c rowded calendars of lower courts in which cases are not 
schedule weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the 
day after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate 
figures ignores the heart of the problem which is the distribution 
and availability of lawyers especially in the hundreds of small 
) 
localities ac r oss the country. 
' • 
.. ... ,. ~ 
.f 
(~-s/1T/,°lj 
21. The custom in many, if not most, ~ localities 
is to appoint counsel on a case-by-case basis. Compensation 
is generally inadequate. Even in the Federal courts under the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S. C. §3006A, which provides 
one of the most generous compensation plans, the rates for 
appointed counsel - $10 per hour spent out of court, $15 per hour 
of court time, subject to a maximum total fee of $300 for a 
misdemeanor case and $500 for a felony - are low by American 
standards. Consequently, the majority of persons willing to 
accept appointments are the young and inexperienced. See 
Cappelletti, Part One:; The Emergenc'f of a Modern Theme, ~-.. . , 
in Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and 
Variations, 24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 377-78 (1972). Mr. 
Justice Brennan suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law 
l _; 
students might provide an important source of legal representa-
tion. He presents no figures, however, as to how many students 
' ,. 
2. 
would be qualified and wilhi.g to undertake the responsibilities 
of defending indigent misdemeanants. Although welcome 
progress is being made with programs, supported by the American 
Bar Association, to enlist the involvement of law students in 
indigent representation, the problems of meeting state require-
ments and of assuring the requisite control and supervision, 
are far from insubstantial. Moreover, the impact of student 
participation would be limited primarily to the 140 or less 
communities where these law schools are located. 
,1 
~ .. 
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States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of tlrn 
'term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
_1:::.,,.--;--. Th~ majority: clQBi -BQ~~ ~ 
(i t.kne.w- rw~~oliei t0!."--Geil eral.) 
f/~aps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts.j~he primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the 9apacity 
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
· Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and con-
gestion in these courts. We are familiar with the 
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay.1~J The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time· 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
:n.. 
:.i.rsee generally H. James, Crisis in the Comts, c. 11 (1967); 
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156. 
;:iJ ,i'!'Sec, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York_ 
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public and added delay and congestion in the 
courts.""'~'t 
There is an additional problem. The ability of vari-
ous States and localities to fnrnish counsel varies widely. 
:Even if there ,yere adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the C'ourt in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so. 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further.1-s 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the 0n-
.;:J1n Cook Count>·, Illinoi~, a re<·ent Hhtd>· re,·mled that the mem-
bers of the Chirago Bar A,soriation'~ Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigrnt dcfenct:rnts, 
c>IPet a jur.,· t ri:tl in (l;{% of t lwir t rinl ea~C'~. while' retninpd and np-
poi11tc>d ro11n~rl do ~o in 33r; and 1he p11blir ddender in 011I>· 1/io/c. 
"One po,;siblc cxplmwtion for thi8 conlr:1sL is that committee cotmsel, 
who :uc sometimes scrYing in part to gnin experiencr, arc more 
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant publir clefendrr, 
who is nry busy nnd nr>· consrions of the probable rxlrn prmt!ty 
accruing to a defendant who Josr,; his ra~c before a jury." D. Oaks 
:ind W. Lehman, A Criminal Ju lice System and the Indigent, 158-
159. (1968) (footnotes omitted) . 
.,:A- Sec Irvin "· State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
Bia-rage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. llamlin. 23G So. 2d 4-+2 (Fla. 1970); People v. DupreP, 42" 
Ill. 2d 2-!9, 2-+fi "X. K 2d 281 (HlG9): l'eople "· Mallory, 27S Mirli. 
53S, 147 N. W. 2d GG (1907); llendrix \'. City of Seattle, 7fl 1Yash. 
142, 45G J>. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshac/.- v. State Depa.rl-
menl of lien/th and Social Srrvices, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 
549 (1968). 
70-5015-CONCUR 
ARGEHSIKOl~R v. IIAl\IL1N 15 
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority __ ;i., These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, "·ho understand the capabilities of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that/ 
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax these capabilities_..,.~,., 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
certiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling 
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, Xo. 71-5722, wa 
filPd with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed "·ith 
the clerk an a.ffidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no smYer or ,rnter 
!JRrr Hawaii Rt. Const.. Art. I. § 11 (HlflR); Idaho Codr Ann. 
§ 19-R,32 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gc•11. Stat. . \1111. § :22-450:~ (1970 
Supp.); K~·. Crim. Proc. Hulr 8.04; La. Hr,·. Rtat. , Tit. 15, 
Art. HI (F): ".\fr. Hulr Crim. Proc·. 44; Md. H. 719 (b) 2 (a): 
'\"rb. Hr,·. Rt:11. § 29-rnm (1007); Nrv. HPv. Rt:1t. §§ 171.188, 
19:U04 (1909): N. ".\kx. Stat. Alln. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); 1Ttah 
Code Ann. § 77-04-2 (19fl9 Supp.); Vt. Stal. Ann., Tit . 13, § 650J 
(1970 Snpp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.). 
-i81See Kami~ar & Choprr. The Rig;hl to Coun~el in Mi11110.•ota.: 
Rome Field Finding:; and Lrgal-Polie~· Ob~crrntionR, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1. 68 (1903). Loral juclgrs intrn·icwrd by thr authors concluded 
that the right to counsel should not be rxtcndecl to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing line ran be drawn , if thr quc,,lion of assigned 
coun~el in misdemranor case~ rn;ol\'C's itsrlf into an 'all or nothing' 
propo~ition, thrn, the thrust of thrir views was that limited funds 
and lawyrr-manpower and thr need for judici1il economy dictate that 
iL be 'nothing;.'" But see State v. Borst, 27 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 
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system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though uudoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses.'1 ;).! It is~ 
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrate~' 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat.'t ~~ It is uncloubt-
1 
edly true that some injustices result from the informal' 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many srnalltown courts. The community could simplY. 
not enforce its own laws.lM,JP • 
~« 
-?' See Cableton V. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "rT]here are 
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
ticing lawyers and ... there are counties in which there are no 
practicing lawyers. The impact of [ right to counsel in misdeme::m-
or:;J would seriously impair the administration of justice in Arkansas 
and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal profession." 
, See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
'/- The successful implementation of the majority's rule would 
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable 
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, tho legislature 
\ 
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Perhaps it \\·ill be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to-
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule annouuced by the majority, the conse-
quences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice· 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the 
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any 
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however 
brief, the according of special constitutional status, 
----rto=-c=-=ases where such a sentence is imposed may!fu'nless) 
the Court embraces an ever broader prophylacti'd 
ru derogate the need for counsel in other types of 
cases Due process requires a fair trial in all cases. 
Nenier the six-month rule approved below nor the 
rule today enunciated by the Court is likely to achieve 
this result. 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds 
spent on the lrgal services program can only be regarded as trivial ,, . 
appelletti,).l['?ryOnC': Yhe Emergen9 of a Mode~hemg,., i~) e 
~'lct'ti7r1Jil"Uorclly~LC'gal Aid: :M'odern ThC'ITIC'i:i flncl Vflriflfions, 
lu.,.. __ . ... -·~ ,,_to..._nf,.._a~ni L. n,ev. 347 f 379 ~. rA though the American 
economy is oYer eight times the size of the British and the American 
population is almost four time.,, as great, Amcricau legal aid ex~ 
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1 would hole! that the right to counsel in petty 
offe11 ·e cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
crrtio11 011 a casr-by-ca~r hasis . .,.,.,3 1 The determination 
should be made before thr accused formally pkacls; 
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in 
which the assistance of counsel may be required.'j 1• If 
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved 
for review. The trial court then becomes obligated to 
scrutinize carefully the sub~rquent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented 
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court 
should examine the case against him to insure that there· 
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements 
of the offense. If a case goes to trial ,Yithout defense 
counsel, the court should intrrvene, "·hen necessary, to 
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the 
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being· 
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied 
ll 
...wt It ~eems to mC' thnt ~11ch nn indi,·idualizrd rule, unlike n six-
mon1 h rule and the m:ijorit ~-'s ru IC', doC'H not present erprn I prolrr-
t ion prohlrms nndrr 1hiH Court·~ cleci~iorn in Griffin Y. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12 (1956): Doualas v. Cnlifornin, 384 U.S. 436 (1!)63); and 
Mayer Y. City of Chirago, - U.S. - (1971). 
3~ SrC', e. g., Eatz, :i\IuniC"ipal Comts-Another Urbin Ill, 20 Case 
Western Re~cn·C' L. ReY. 87, 92-90 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1968); 
11 arvey v. Missi.~sippi, 340 F. 2d 263 ( CA.5 1965) . 
Although there' is IC'~~ plC'ii negotiating in pC'tt~· ca~r~. ~C'P n. 13, 
supra, the assistanrC' of counsPl mny still be necdrd so that the dr-
i'C'ndant who i~ 110I f:trC'd with ovNwhC'lming c•,·idC'llC'C' of g11ilt (':lll 
make an intelligrnt der.i~ion whC'thrr to go to trial. 
70-5015-CO~CUR 
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strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, ap-
pellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decision 
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is impossible, as ,Yell as unwise, to create a precise 
and cletailecl set of guidelines for judges to follow in de-
termining "·hether the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First. the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traflic la,Y infractions will rarely present complex legal 
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or ,Yhich raise collateral legal questions, 
. uch as search and seizure problems, will usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one 
where the State is represented by counsel and where 
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs 
the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follm,· if a conviction is obtained. The 
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted 
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious 
consequence the court should consider. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most 
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the com-
petency of the individual defendant to present his own 
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular 
defendant or particular incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a 
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the ap-
pointment of counsel in a case where the court would 
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensi-
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operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the 
consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
Y. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 ( 1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 
U.S. 640 (1948), "·hich this Court overruled in Gideon!" 3 3 
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon, 
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assurne 
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness as this concept of due process has evolved, 
there is less reason to think that insensitivity will abate. 
· g e ·~ 1 o e courts w1Tl noy 
viate all of theiractical proplems of expanding the . 
indigent's right to ounsel in pet~ff~ffl3ut it 
will facilitate an or erly transition to a far wjder _a ·1 
abilit· of defense counsel. In this process, the courts 
of first instance which decide these cases must recognize 
a duty to consider the need for counsel in every case 
3j 
...?" I do not disagree with thr overrnliug of !3etts; I am in romplel e 
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to 
rot1nsrl in a felony casr. Srr n. 1, s11pra. Neithrr ca~r controls 
1 oda y's re.;;ult. 
~ a+l rnclerd , it is rrcognized 1 ha I m:rny of the problrms idrnl ificd in 
--ihis opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the 
requirement of counsel. II is m~· Yirw that rcl~·ing t1po11 judicial 
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problem which otherwise 
could affect advrr~ely the administration of criminal justice in the 
yery courts which already arc under the mo,t ~eycrc ~train . 
Rider A, p. 20 (Argersinger) 5/18/72 
In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction that 
the adversary system functions best and most fairly only when 
all parties are represented by competent counsel. Before:,tire 
becoming a member of this Court, I participated in efforts to 
3fl 
enlarge and extend the availability of counsel. The correct 
dispo~ition of this case,~ heen a matter of the 
~WU... H...e_ ~ 
grea.tA4t concern to me - as it has to~ l members of the Court. 
We are all strongly ~ to the ide! of extending the right 
" 
.J 
to counsel, bu~ differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what the 
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities and HuL-
thousands of police, municipal and justice of the peace courts 
across the country. 
The view I have expressed in imB this opinion will 
~ 
accord ~ discretion to the courts, and will allow the 
" 
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems so 
necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the lowest 
3 aw and Poverty, National Conference on Law and Poverty 




level of courts of 50 states. Although this view will not 
4 ~ ~,j_, ~AAP~ 
precipitate the "chaos" predictedAas the probable result of 
the Court's absolutist rule, there will remain serious practical 
l 
problems F ~ It from the expanding of indigents' 
~i4S-) 
rights to counsel in petty offense cases. But the according of 
~ 
discretion to the Courts in determining when counsel is necessary 
I\ 
for a fair trial, rather than mandating a completely inflexible 
rule, will facilitate an orderly transition to a far wider 
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where the defendant faces a significant penalty. The 
factors mentioned above, and such standards or guide-
lines to assure fairness as may be prescribed in each 
jurisdiction by legislation or rule of court, should be con-
sidered where relevant. The goal should be, in accord 
with the essence of the adversary system, to expand as 
rapidly as practicable the availability of counsel so that 
no person accused of crime must stand alone if counsel 
is needed. 
s the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of the decision in this case. 
.st~ 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL~_concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ( 1963), held that 
the States were required by the .J)ue Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies.' The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both, and sentended to 90 days in jail, is entitled as 
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel. More generally, we face the question 
whether the Due Process Clause requires that an indigent 
charged with a state petty offense 2 be ~orded the right 
to appointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U.S. 12, 34 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967); 
Loper v. Beto, - U. S. - (1972). 
2 As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment." 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S._,_:zk_ .... ~--~..::_ _  ~_~_ ........ _, 
145 (1968), and i1{Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 
(1970)~decided shortly after the opinion below, in which 
we held'that the due process right to a trial by jury in 
state criminal cases was limited to cases in which the 
offense charged was punishable by more than six months. 
It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to 
be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a 
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there 1s 
a due process right to a jury trial. An miskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin, 
and D-istrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 
( 1937), revea.l that the jury trial limitation has historic 
not punishable by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any 
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used 
herein differs from the federal statutory definition of "petty of-· 
fcnse" which includes offenses punishable by not more than six 
months' imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1. 
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origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar )imi at10nA61't the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases. 4 Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-tempering the Q9f3sih1Y 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of { .iudicial power.,.. while 
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a 
fair trial as is the right to counsel.\ 6 
am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the 
new rule of due process, today e1~mcjated by the C~ourt 
that under tt0 eiPm-unstam,ei-ffiEW a. µ~be im~ J .!_~ 
oned . . . unless he was represented by counsel at 
trial.'J It seems to me that the line should not be 
drawn with such rigidity. 
There is a middle course, between the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due· 
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right 
( 
"HI ll,S. I '1'S; JS-6 
_____ __.c...---,..4 See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932) . 
..§./• Although we have giYen retroactive effect to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have 
said that, "f t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would 
not mP.asurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons con-
victed in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S .. 
u:n 634 (1968). 
6 It is ·sume that ~'- Court means no indigent may 1,,1 im- 1 
risone if he as not / presented pr 1ded that e did n t waive ) 
~ · ht to unscl. C 
4 
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to counsel in petty cases ,vhenever the assistance of 
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 1 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief 
period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be){Jismissed by the label "petty." 0 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonmentJ Nor are fee} ~ 
conse~uences 0f convigjitm necessar'ily mg.re serioifs be-
ca se the sentenceJS"one of imprisonment. f Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.1° Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
~~, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
7 Supra, n. 4, at 68-69 (1932). 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
9 See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965). 
10 See James v. Ileadley, 410 F . 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969). 
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the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates 
important interests of licensees. In such cases the 
licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
The States must afford the individual due process be-
fore depriving him of life, liberty, or property. When 
the deprivation of property rights and interests is of suf-
ficient consequence,11 denying the assistance of counsel 
to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves 
is a denial of due process. 
This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole te~~ the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases 
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. 
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that 
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, 
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, em-
bodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line- /\ _ L ?1' ~ f 
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. )Jlcmnsel 
is often essential to a fair trial, 7"' this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor 
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kreeger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro-
fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); 
N. C. Gen. Stat. §93 A-4 (1965) (real estate brokers)), and loss of 
pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (police disability pension 
denied when injury is result of participation in fights, riots, civil in-
surrections, or while committing crime); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-4514 
(1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor resulting in imprison-
ment); Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction 
of crime or misdemeanor)). Sec generally Project, Collateral Conse-
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are 
cornple1 others are exceedingly simple. As a j ustifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor do all 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.13 It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified yet who are in low income groups where 
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case would 
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line be-
tween indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is an arbitrary one, drawn differently from State to State 
and of ten resulting in serious inequities to accused per-
sons. The Court's new rule will accent the disadvantage 
of being barely self-sufficient economically. 
12 Gideon v. lraimcright, 372 U.S., at 344. 
rn In petty offenses, thrrc i~ much le~s plra negotiation than in 
serious offenses. See Report by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and tho Administration of ,Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967) (hereinafter cited as "Chal-
lenge"). Thus, in cases whrre the cvidrnce of guilt is overwhelming, 
the assistance of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence. 
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were of ten informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel/ if the L 
offense charged is only a petty one.rn (' { 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its adverse impact on the administration of the crimi-
nal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when 
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor 
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
11 Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
15 Neither the Report by Prrsident's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, supra, n. 13, at 150, nor the 
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Crim-
inal Justice, Providing Defense SerYicc~, 37-40 (1968), went the 
route the Court takes today. The President's Commission recom-
mended that counsel be prO\·ided to criminal defendants who face 
"a significant penalty" and at lenst to those who are in danger of 
"substantial loss of liberty." The American Bar Association stand-
ard would not extend thP right to eoHnsel to ra,.:es whrrr "loss 
of liberty" is not ''likrly to be imposed." Neither supports a new, 
inflexible constitutional rule. 
8 
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The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It 
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
I\ for counsel if a jail sentence is ~ imposed, one must 
assume a similar i:ejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without 1s-
cernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that 
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken 
from a person without affording him due process of law. 
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis 
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and 
property. In fact , the majority suggests no reason at 
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances 
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which 
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies 
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be 
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-
jail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can 
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of 
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day's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
upon the criminal justice system. We should not fashion 
a new constitutional rule with consequences of such un-
known dimensions, especialy since it is supported neither 
by history nor precedent. 
II 
The majority opinion concludes "that a person may 
not be imprisoned even for . . . lesser offenses unless 
he was represented by counsel at the trial." In sim-
plest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly-unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some· 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods 
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today 
will confront the judges of each of these courts 
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed 
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment 
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will 
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial-
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some 
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility 
to consider the full range of punishments established 
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the 
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to 
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If the la.tter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tai-
lored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the new 
rule, judges would be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are irnprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge would be 
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
ccasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valua~rpose. ~:mere possibi1it:l'- o j.ail rn 
~ ~t At least the legislatures, and until today 
the courts, have viewed the threat of imprisonment-
even when rarely carried out-as serving a legitimate 
social function. 
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae, 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova· 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If 
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.16 In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by 
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges 
as unimprisonable. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 14V' ~ 
equal protection problems. There may~.,,(?e an un-
fair and unequal treatment of individual aefendants 
depending on whether the individual judge has de-
termined in advance to leave open the option of impris-
sonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled 
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the 
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense 
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel 
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which 
no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of 
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who ~ 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so. will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.17 
10 See Callon v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 557 (1888); North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
11 The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary 
alternatirn of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness-
12 
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-· 
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offenses where jail 
sentences are extremly rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary legal resources to meet this 
sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor-
General who, on behalf of the United States, urged 
the rule the Court today adopts was concerned by the 
consequences of what he proposed. In addition to the· 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pretrial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 1 8 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"If ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pile-up in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.10 
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is 
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regard-
both to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of 
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 495 (1971) . No adequate 
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found. 
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of 
all discretion in such cases unle8s counsel is available and is appointed, 
could aggravate the problem. 
1 8 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35. 
10 Id., at 36-37. 
•, 
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ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be 
used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving 
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the· 
'term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the 
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is 
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are 
presently 355,200 attorneys and that the number will 
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to 
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel, 
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to 
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic 
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335,200 
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of these 
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice 
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the 
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal repre-
__ s_ n_tation. Of those in general practice, we have no 
indication how many are qualified ~~or willing to accept 
assignments which may prove less than lucrative for· 
most.21 
20 Id., at 39. 
" 1 The cu8lom in many, if not most, localitie8 is to appoint counsel 
on a case-by-ra~e ba:si:s. Compensation is generally inadequate. 
Even in the federal court::; under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which provide:, one of the most generous com-
11en:salion pl::ins, the rates for appointed counscl-$10 per hour spent 
14 
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It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementa-
tion of the Court's new rule will require no more than 
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities 
are there full-time public defenders available for or pri-
vate lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus, if it were 
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the 
schedules of those lawyers who arc willing to take an 
occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded 
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not schedule 
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day 
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate 
figures ignores the heart of the problem which is the 
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the 
hundreds of small localities across the country. 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts. 22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
out of romt, S15 prr hour of court time, l'11bjrct 1 o a maximum total 
fee of $300 for a mi~drmranor ea c and $500 for a frlony-are low 
b:v American standards. Consequently, 1he majority of per~ons 
willing to aecrpt appointments ar€' the young and inrxprrieneed. 
Rec Capprllrtti, Part One: Tlw Emergencr of a l\Iodrrn Thrmr, in 
Cappelletti and Gordle~·. Lrgal Aid: Modrrn Themes and Varia1 ions, 
24 Stai1ford L. Rev. 347, 37i-378 (1972). l\lH . .Tm,TrCE BRENNAN 
H11gg€'sts, in his roncmTing opinion, that law s1ndent · might provide 
an importan1 sourer of legal rrpm,entation. He presrnts no fignres, 
however, as to how many Rtudrnts would br qualifird nncl willing 
to undertake the rrspon8ibilitir:,; of dd'rncling indigrn1 rnisdrrnran-
ants. Although welcome progre:,;:,; i;; bring made with programs, 
suppor1€'d by thr Arnrrican Bar A~~ociation, to enli~t the i1wolve-
men1 of law Rtnclrnts in indigrnt reprn,rll1ation , the problems of 
meeting stn1r requirrment:,; and of as;uring the requi::; ite control 
and ~11prrvision, arr far from i11sub1:,tnntia I. l\Iorrover, the impact 
of student part icipa1ion would be limited primarily to the 140 or-
less communities where thc:,;r lnw schools are !orated. 
22 Sec generally H. James, Crisis in the Courts, e. 11 (1967) ~ 
Challenge, supra, 11. 13, 145-156. 
,. 
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and con-
gestion in these courts. We are familiar with the 
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay. 2~ The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public and added delay and congestion in the 
courts.2·1 
23 See, e. ff ., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30: Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
24 In Cook County, Illinois , fl reeent study revealed that the mem-
bers of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigent defendants, 
rleet fl jury trial in 63% of thrir trial ca1'eH . while retained and ap-
pointed conn~rl do ~o in :t~ o/,- nnd the public drfrndrr in on!~· 15% . 
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel, 
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, arc more 
willing to undrrtakc a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, 
who is very busy and very con, cious of the probable e:-..i,ra penalty 
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks 
rmd W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-
159 (1968) (footnote-; omitted). 
16 
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari--
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there were adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case,. 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-· 
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 25 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority. 26 These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, who understand the .. ~~{of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
2 ~ Seo Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42" 
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory, 278 Mich. 
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 
142, 456 P. 2d 696 (1969); State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis. 2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 
549 (1968). 
" 6 See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (196 ) ; Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 19-852 (1969 Supp.); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503 (1970 
Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Rule 8.04; La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 15, 
Art. 141 (F); l\Ie. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 (b) 2 (a); 
~ob. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.1 , 
193.104 (1969); N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1969 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503 
(1970 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1970 Supp.). 
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax ~ capabilities.21 • 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for 
;ertiorari serve as an example of what today's ruling: 
will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, as 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise· 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses.28 It is 
27 Sec Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded 
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'· 
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" But see State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 
2d 888 (1967). 
28 See Cableton v. State, supra, n. 24, at 538-539: "[T]lwrc arc 
more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
ticing lawyers and ... there arc counties in which there are no, 
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat.w It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many smalltown courts. The community could simply 
not enforce its own la,Ys. 'i0 
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to 
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-
prncticing lawyers. The impart of [right to counsel in misdem~rn-
ors] would scriou~l.v impair the administration of justice in Arkansas 
and impose an intolerable burden upon Uw legal profession." 
29 Sec Silver;;tein, supra, n. 9, nt 12!"-126. 
:,o The suece,8ful implementation of the majorit~·'s rule would 
require state and lorn! governmrnt;; to appropriate considerable 
funds, something they have not been willing to do . Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropria1 ions for indigent defrnse. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel. 55 Iown L. Rev. 1249, 1261> 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislaturn 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of American re;;ources the funds 
spent on the legal services program ran onl? be rrgarded as trivial." 
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at :~79. "Although thr Amrrir:111 eron-
omy is over cigth times the size of the Briti~h and the American 
population i~ aJmo~t four time~ a~ great, .:-\mcriran legal aid ex-
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quences arc immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the 
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any 
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however 
brief, the according of special constitutional status 
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate 
the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless the 
Court embraces an ever broader prophylactic rule. Due 
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the 
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enun-
ciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result. 
III 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
cretion on a case-by-case basis."' The determination 
should be made before the accused formally pleads; 
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m 
v,·hich the assistance of counsel may be requirecl." 2 If 
31 It scrms to me that such nn individualized rnlc, urilike a six-
month rule and the majority's rule, docs not present equal protec-
tion problems under this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 384 U. S. 436 (1963); and 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, - U.S. - (1971) . 
32 See, e. g., Kaiz , Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill, 20 Caso 
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala-
20 
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the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons for so concluding so that the issue is preserved 
for review. The trial court then becomes oblig~tecl to 
scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. When the unrepresented 
defendant seeks to enter a plea of guilty, the Court 
should examine the case against him to insure that there 
is admissible evidence tending to support the elements 
of the offense. If a case goes to trial without defense 
counsel, the court should intervene, when necessary, to 
insure that the defendant adequately brings out the 
facts in his favor and to prevent legal issues from being 
overlooked. Formal trial rules should not be applied 
strictly against unrepresented defendants. Finally, ap-
pellate courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions 
not to appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise 
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in de-
termining whether the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions will rarely present complex legal 
or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions, 
such as search and seizure problems, will usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense is one 
where the State is represented by counsel and where 
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although there is le::;s plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13, 
supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the de-
fendant who is not faced with overwhelming c-vidc-nre of guilt ean 
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial. 
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there is a strong indication that the indigent also needs. 
the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The· 
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted 
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious 
consequence the court should consider. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These are, of course, the most 
difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor is the com-
petency of the individual defendant to present his own 
case. The attitude of the community toward a particular 
defendant or particular incident is another consideration. 
But there may be other reasons why a defendant has a. 
peculiar need for a lawyer which would compel the ap-
pointment of counsel in a case where the court would 
normally think this unnecessary. Obviously, the sensi-
tivity and diligence of individual judges are crucial to the 
operation of a rule of fundamental fairness requiring the 
consideration of the varying factors in each case. 
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 
U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon.33 
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon, 
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assume 
33 I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts; I am in complete 
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to 
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness a,s thifl em,eer,il e,f dttei,rocess-has-evolved, 
there i~~ re~son to think that insensitivity will abate. 
In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction 
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly 
only when all parties arc represented by competent 
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I 
"--\----p_a_rticipated j_n efforts to enlarge and exten 1e avail-
d ability of counseP-t The correct disposition of this case, 
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to 
me--as it has to the other members of the Court. We 
arc all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right 
to counsel. but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what 
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the 
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities 
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the 
peace courts across the country. l.-L-UO•I...P.t~ / 
The view I have expressed in this opinion W½+l. accord A .Q. / 
. l bl 1· . ] d . ,-;...--,.h J I ..-t-v-rr •'- lj cons1c era e c 1scret1011 to t 1e courts, an ~ a ow e ,_ ____ __. 
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment w uch seems 
so necessary when ,ve arc imposing new doctrine on the 
L,wcrJ.e l ) lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view 
~not precipitate the ''chaos" predicted by the Solicitor l 
I . -iM -~btO. [ General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist ·;:!t- rule, there )win remain serious practical problems result- '-*""'7N"""'<IJ-""" 
ing frorn the oxp1tn€lifl'g[of indigents' rights to counsc1 in 
petty offense cases... But the according of reviewable 
cll, Law · id PoYerty, Nat19nal Confcr.911ce on Law and) 
· · · · C. 51 ABA Journal 3 · 
CV~ Inde~cl, it _is rerognizrd that ma_n~ of 1hr problems idcntifircl in tins opunon will result from any ra1~mg of the standards as to the n'quircment of counsel. It is my Yiew that rrlying upon judicial 
.; 
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discretion to the courts in determining when counsel is 
necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a com-
pletely inflexible rule, acilitate an orderly transition 
to a far wider availab1 ity and use of defense counsel. 
In this process, the courts of first instance which de-----cide these cases ~~ recognize a duty to consider the 
need for counsel in every case where the defendant faces 
a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, and 
such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as -1mtY,(5e 
prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or rule of 
court, should be considered where relevant. The goal 
hould be, in accord with the essence of the adversary 
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the avail-
ability of counsel so that no person accused of crime 
must stand alone if counsel is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of the decision in this case. 
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise 
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the 
very courts which already arc under the most severe strain. 
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on page 12. 
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TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: May 14, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Argersinger 
As this ease may well be ready for final decision at Friday's 
Conference, please make such suggested changes as you think 
appropriate to meet recent changes in Justice'sDouglas' opinion. 
Perhaps the main point is to state explicitly, and more strongly 
than we have, that the Fifth Amendment itself draws no distinction 
between "life, liberty and property"; and that therefore there is no 
coostitutional justification for drawing a line differently from the Fifth 
Amendment. 
We should respond - perhaps in a note - to note 7 added on p. 
12 of Justice Douglas' 11th draft. We may find some helpful language 
in the first draft of our dissent. Points which may merit mentioning 
include: (1) it is misleading to suggest that 335,200 lawyers are 
potentially available. This is the total number licensed in the United 
states. I cannot cite the source, but the highest estimate I have ever 
seen of those engaged in the ''practice" in any form was about 250,000. 
This included tens of thousands of lawyers who are not in the general 




practice and hence not available. They work for governments at all 
levels, for corporate legal departments, in the Armed Services, and 
the like. ( ii) Expressing the availability of lawyers in terms of 
"2300 full-time counsel" also misapprec:lates the problem. No one 
is talking about "full-time lawyers" except in the relatively rare city 
which will finance a full-time public defender. We are talking, rather, 
about the difficulty of having lawyers available in the several thousand 
police, municipal and justice of the peace courts in large, medium and 
small sized communities across the country - having them when and 
where they are ndeded. The problem with respect to misdemeanors 
is not comparable to that with respect to felonies, where cases normally 
are set down for trial several weeks in advance. The typical police 
court. ts confronted every morning with scores of cases involving . 
arrests made the night before. If each and every one of these cases, 
where there la IIIIY possibility of a jail sentence, requires the appoint-
ment of crunsel - the backup and log-jam in the system can only be 
imagined. The result, obviously, will be a judicial rewriting of 
statutes and ordinances across the country - eliminating de facto jail 
sentences. 
My language may be a little extreme. It 1s intended merely 
to be suggestive. , 
L. F. P., Jr. 
j , , 
T'.: 
CHAMBERS OF 
,:%;n.µuntt C!Jcurl cf Utt ~ttittb ~tat.cs 
~as}rituJfott. ,. C!J. 2rlffeJJ,_;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 18, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
I have had difficulty in coming to a conclusion 
in this case, primarily because I have been concerned 
about retrospectivity and the Loper v. Beto aspect. 
Both are necessarily present here and I assume that 
all members of the Court are aware of this. On the 
other hand, the nature of these lesser offenses perhaps 
minimizes the problem. I am still somewhat uncom-
fortable, but the result you propose is perhaps the 
practical one. 
Sincerely, 
I tt- if. -
Mr. Justice Douglas 





j;uvreme <!):curt t1f tire :tlnitch .§tHtcg 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 18, 1972 
No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Bill, 
I should appreciate your adding my 
name to your concurring opinion in this case. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 










TO: Mr. Hamilton Fox DATE: May 21, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-5015 Argersinger v. Hamlin 
On sec ood thought, it seems a little nervy for a rookie justice 
to be citing himself. Accordingly, when you put Argersinger in its 
final draft, please make the changes indicated in page 22 of the 
attached copy of draft No. 4. 
I have not reread the entire opinion in this draft. As 
-r Argersinger will probably come down on Tuesday, May 30, I will 
. ' . 
leave it in your hande to see that all cites and quctes are correct and 
that we haven't dropped a line or fouled up our syntax too badly. 
I do appreciate your "sweating" this one out with me. From 
my viewpoint, the choice has been between the "lesser " of various 
unattractive solutions. I still believe that ours is measurably the 
best. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
_ju.p-rtutt ~o-u:rt cf t4t ~tti:tth _jtzdtg 
-bfyiltghm, ~- ~- 20ffe~, 
May 23, 1972 
Re: No. 70-5015 - Argersinger v. Hamlin 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion in this 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS or 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u:pr.cmt <!Jonrt of tltt ~nittlt ~tattg 
~asqingtcn. 10. <!J. 2!lb1'~~ 
May 31, 1972 
No. 70-3015--Argersingerv. Hamlin 
Dear Bill: 
I enclose some concurring observations in 
the above. I have sent it to the printer. Should 
anyone join me, I can add them later. 
Regards, 
I>-
Mr. Justice Douglas 



















JUSTICE WILLIAM O . DOUGLAS 
June 9, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The following cases have been held for Argersinger v. Hamlin: 
70-50 City of Jacksonville v. Wooley 
70-5052 Kammerer v. Washington 
70-5053 Fox v. City of Bellevue 
71-5722 Wright v. Town of Wood 
71-5723 McAllister v. Virginia 
Nos. 70-50, 71-5722, and 71-5723 are clear reversals on 
Argersinger, as all involved indigent misdemeanants sentenced to a jail term 
w/o counsel. There is an additional claim in No. 71-5723 that Virginia's 
statute making non-support a crime is an invidious discrimination based on 
sex, as it applies only to husbands who don't support their wives, not to 
wives who don't support their husbands. But this claim need not be reached. 
In No. 71-5052, the indigent misdemeanant has been convicted 
of possession of dangerous drugs, but apparently has not yet been sentenced. 
The Clerk's office is checking, but it appears that the trial proceedings were 
halted pending the outcome of petitioner's writ of prohibition in Washington 
Supreme Court and were not completed pending disposition of the cert. In 
No. 71-5053, petitioner is charged with three misdemeanors punishable by jail 
sentences, but his trial has been stayed pending outcome of the cert • 
.. ... . .. .., 
- 2 -
Inasmuch as the Washington Supreme Court ruled that neither 
of the petitioners in No. 71-5052 or 71-5053 had any right to counsel at 
all, these cases should be vacated and remanded for proceedings not in-
consistent with the Court's opinion in Argersinger. 
l ,vli) . 
W. O. D. 
, r"'"·', "' ,.... 
' I 
( 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 70-5015 
Jon Richard Argersinger, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
Raymond Hamlin, Sheriff, 
Leon County, Florida. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Florida: 
[June 12, 1972] 
MR. JUSTICE PowELL, with ,vhom Mn. JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST joins, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both, and senten ed to 90 days in jail, is entitled as 
a matter of constitu ional right to the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel. The broader question is whether the 
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged 
with a state petty offense~ be afforded the right to ap-
pointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114 
(1967); Loper v. Beto, - U.S. - (1972). 
2 As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment docs not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
13,) I' 1. ,i ~ 'L-I , , 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonmcnt.3 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in the subsequent case of Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided 
\ shortly after the opi11ion below, in which we held that 
\ the due process right to a trial by jury in state crim-
inal cases was limited to cases in which the off nse ~~,---...,:= 
charged was punishable by more than six month . It 
is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is o be 
drawn, it must be dra,vn so that an indigent has 
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is 
a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled la -
man may be able to defend himself in a nonj ury rial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin, 
not punishable by imprisonment, regnrdlrss of the nmount of any 
fine that might be authorized. To this extent., tho definition used 
herein differs from tho fcdcrnl statutory definition of "petty of-
.--r-..,--:,--'"":':'I 
fonse" which includes offcn,;cs punishable by not more than six 
months' imprisonment or by n fine not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1. 
3 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). 
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and D-islrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 
( 1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic 
origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.4 Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-tempering the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial 
power 5- while important, is not as fundamental to the 
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.G 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agree with the 
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court, 
·that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person 
may be imprisoned ... unless he was represented by 
counsel at his trial." A nle, at 12. It seems to me that 
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity. 
There is a middle course, bet,veen the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due 
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right 
4 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932). 
5 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (196 ). 
0 Although we have giYen rctroartiYe effect to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have 
said that, "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons con-
victed in the past by procedures not consistent with the Si:\'lh 
Amendment, right to jury trial." De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 
631, 634 (1968). 
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of 
counsel is necessary to assure ·a fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's lleed for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama 7 and Gideon ,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own case~, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. · Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
n6t be fairly tried if the defe11dant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend- ', 
apts, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 1 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief . 
period served under the sometimes deplorable con- . 
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, arc frequently of sufficient mag:-
nitucle not to be casually dismissed by the- label "petty." 0-, 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
es9apade.10 Losing one's ddverts license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
7 Suvra, n. 4, at 68- 69. 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
0 Sec L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965). 
10 See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 ( CA5 1969). 
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licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates 
important interests of the licensees. In such cases 
the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id., at 539. 
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is 
of sufficient consequence,11 denying the assistance of 
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending them-
selves is a denial of due .process. 
This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
· sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-month rule qf the Florida court and the equally 
·inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases 
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. 
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that 
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, 
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, em-
bodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line-
dra wing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While 
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil disabilit ies may rosult from misdemeanor 
convictions, such a,; forfeiture of public office (State v. Kruger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro-
'fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); 
N. C . Gen. Stat.§ 93 A-4 (b) (1965) (real estate brokers)) , and loss 
of pension rights, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (West 1966) (police 
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in 
fights, riots, civil in8urrcctions, or while committ ing crime); Burns 
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28- 5414 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor 
resulting in imprisonment); 53 Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 39323, 65599 
(1957) ( conviction of crime or misdemeanor)). See generally Proj-
ect, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. 





ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are 
complex; others are exceedingly simple. As a justifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
l;:i,wyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries.'~ 12 Y ct government often does 
not hire lawyers to. prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor docs every 
defendant who can a..fford to do so hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed· tho beuefits.1 3 It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend. 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified yet who are in low inc01ne groups where 
e'i.1gaging counsel in a minor petty offcnPe case would 
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line be-
tween indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from 
State to State and often resulti11g in seriouP inequities to 
accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent the 
disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically. 
12 Gideon v. Wainwright , 3i2 U. S., at 344. 
13 In petty offon~es, there i~ much Jr~~ plra nrp;otia tion than in 
serious offrnses. SC'r Report by the Pre~i<lent',; Commis~ion on Law 
Enforcement and the Admini8tration of Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society, 134 (1967) (hereinafter cited as "Chal-
lenge"). Thus, in ca He~ where ( he e\'idcnce of guilt i~ O\Crwhrlming, 
the assistance of coun8cl i8 lC8s e8sentinl to obtain a lighter sentence. 
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were often informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous. 14 It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel if the 
,offense charged is only a petty one.15 
Despite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its adverse impact on the administration of the crimi-
nal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when 
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor 
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part~time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
· which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
H Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
15 Neither the Report y President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice nor the American Bar Associ-
ation went the route the Court takes today. The President's Com-
mission recommended that counsel be provided to criminal defendants 
who face "a significant penalty" and at least to those who arc in 
danger of "substantial loss of liberty." Challenge, supra, n. 13.,....at....,_ 
150. The American Bar Association standard would not extend the 
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not ''likely to be 
imposed." American Bar As~ociation Project on Minimum Standards 
for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, 37-40 (1968). 
Neither supports a new, infiexible constitutional rule. 
8 
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The rule adopted today does not go all the way. It 
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must as-
sume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without dis~ 
cernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that 
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken 
from a person without affording him due process of law. 
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis 
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and 
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at 
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances 
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which 
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies 
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be 
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-· 
jail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can 
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of 
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even to-
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upon the day to day functioning of the criminal justice 
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitu-
tional rule with consequences of such unknown dimen-
sions, especially since it is supported neither by history 
nor precedent. 
II 
The majority opm1on concludes that, absent a valid 
waiver, a )erson ma not be imprisoned even for lesser 
offenses unless .he was rep ented by counsel at the trial. 
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly-unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
-pf details as to how this rule wijl be implemented. 
· There are thousands of statu~es and ordinances which 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some 
·of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They 
·also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
'This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods 
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today 
will confront the judges of each of these courts 
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed 
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment 
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will 
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial-
and without hearing the evidence- whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some 
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility 
to consider the full range of punishments established 
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the 
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him. by law, or to 
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If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tai-
lored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the 
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be 
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures, 
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of 
imprisonment-even \\ hen rarely carried out-as serving 
a legitimate social function. 
In the brief for the United States as amicus curiae, 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de nova 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial when the accused was uncounselled. If 
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.rn In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by 
legislatures as imprisonable, will be' treated by judges 
·as unimprisonable. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 
equal protection problems. There may well be an un-
fair and unequal treatment of individual defendantr· 
,depending on whether the individual judge has de-
termined in advance to leave open the option of impri -
· sonment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled 
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the 
: same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense 
would have no counsel. Since 'the services of counsel 
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which 
no jail sentence is imposed, tho results of this type of 
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five clays in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.11 
16 See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1880); North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). 
17 The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary 
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
law, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offenses where jail 
sentences are extre~ rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sud-
den expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States 
the rule- the Court today adopts, recognized that the 
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the· man-
• datory reqt1ir,ement of defense counsel will "require more 
·pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
,Court reporters will be nMded as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 18 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"[I] f ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice.''"10 
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is 
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regard-
both to indigents and · nonindigC'nts and to tho admini::;traiion of 
justice. CL Tate v. Short , 401 U. S. 395 (1971). No adequate 
resolution of these inherently difficult problems ha s yet been found . 
The rnle adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of 
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is aniilable and is appointed, 
could aggravate the problem. 
18 Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 34-35. 
10 Id., at 36-37. 
I • 
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ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be used 
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively 
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the· 
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is 
not reassuring. In a footnote, it i~ said that there are· 
present y 3 ,200 attorneys and that the number will 
in~reasc rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to 
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel, 
estimated by one source at Lctween 1,575 and 2,300, to 
represent all indigent mi clemcanants cxclucli11g traffic 
offenders. It is totally unrea 1st1c to imply t 1at 33-5, Q 
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of'i'i.rnse 
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice 
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the 
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal repre-
sentation. Of those in general practice, we have no 
indication how many arc qualified to defend criminal 
cases or willing to accept assig11ments which may prove 
less than lucrative for most. 21 
20 Id., at 39. 
21 The custom in many, if not most , loealitics is to appoint counsel 
on a case-by-case basi~. Compensation is gcnrrally inadequate. 
Even in the federal courts unclrr the Criminal Ju~tiee Act of 19G4, 
18 U. S. C. § 300GA, whieh proYidc~ one of the mo~t gc1wrous com-





ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 
It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementa-
tion of the Court's new rule will require no more than 
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities 
are there full-time public defenders available for or pri-
vate lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus, if it were, 
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the 
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take aa 
9ccasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded(c3}: 
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not schedul _ J. 
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day, 
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate. 
figures ignores the heart of the problem~ 
· distribution and av,ailabilit~ of lawyers, especially in the 
J O rt 4 hundreds of small loca 1ties across the courrtr . , 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local. 
courts. 22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
out of court, $30 per hour of court time, subject to a maximum total 
fee of $400 for a misdrmeanor case and $1,000 for a felony-are low 
by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons 
willing to accept appointments arc the young and inexperienced. 
,Sec Cappelletti, Part One: ;r11e Emrrgencc of a Modern Theme, in 
Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 
24 Stanford L. Rev. 347, 377-378 (1972). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 
suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law students might provide 
an im11ortant source of legal representation. He presents no figures, 
however, as to how mnny s_tudents would be qualified and willing 
to undertake the respon;ibilitics of defending indigent misdemean-, 
ants. Although welcome progress is being made with programs,-
supported by the American Bar Association, to enlist the involve-
ment of law studcntti in indigent rcpretirntation, the problems of' 
meeting state requirements and of atisuring the requisite control ~ 
and supervision,_ ~re (ar from insub~tantial. l\for~over, the impact. 
of student part1c1pat1on would be hm1tccl pnmanly to the 140 or 
less communiticti where' these law schools arc located. ______ _ 
, 
22 Sec. gt>nerally II. i1me::;, Crisis in the Courts, €)2 (1967); ~ 
Challenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156. 
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and con-
gestion in these courts. We are familiar with the 
-common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
·delay.23 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
·CUsed-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public and added delay and congestion in the 
-courts. 2•1 
23 See, e. g., James, supra, n. 21, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
21 In Cook County, Illinois, a recent study revealed that the mem-
bers of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners, who are appointed to represent indigent defendants, 
elect a. jury trial in G3% of their trial casc,;, while retained and ap-
pointed connsel do so in 33% and the public defender in only 15%. 
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel, 
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, arc more 
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, 
who is very busy and very conscious of tho probable extra. penalty 
accruing to a defendant who loses bis case before a jury." D. Oaks 
and W. Lrhman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158 
(1968) (footnote omitted). 
16 
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari~ 
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there were adequate resources on a natio11al 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding- presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 25 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority. 26 These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
pf many States, who understand the problems of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
25 See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
S ·urrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
(]ableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 4-20 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42 
Ill. 2d 240, 2,JG N. E. 2d 281 (19<3\:l); People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 
2d 142, 456 P. 2d 69<3, cert. denied, 397 U. S. 948 (1969); Sta.te ex 
rel. Plutshack v. Department of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis. 
2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968). 
26 See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. 
§§ 19-851, 19-852 (1971 Supp); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503 
(1970 Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Ruic 8.04; La. Rev. Stal., 15-
141 (F) (West 1967); Mr. Ruic Crim. Proc. 44; l\Id. R. 719 §b2 
(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188, 
193.140 (1969) ; N. Mex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1971 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503 
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax capabilities."' 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a 
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's rul-
ing will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with minor offenses. 28 It is 
27 See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota : 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded 
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing' 
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But sec State v. Borst, 278 
Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967). 
28 Sec Cableton v. State, supra, 11. 24, at 358: "[T]here are more 
justices of the peace in Arkansas than there are resident prac-
ticing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which there are no 
18 
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat. 20 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many small town courts. -The community could simply 
n'ot enforce its own laws.30 
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the lik~lihood of short term "chaos" and to 
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system .. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the m;ajority, the conse-
practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to. counsel in misdemean° 
,._ _______ o..,r"- would s~ri~usly impair the administration of justice in Arkansas 
an impo8~ a11 intolerable burden upon the legal profession." · (Fo -
note omitted.) 
29 See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
30 The successful implementation of the majority's rule would · 
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable 
funds , something they have not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In view of American resources the funds 
spent on the legal services program can only be regarded as trivial." 
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at 379. "Although the American econ-
omy is over 8 times the size of the British :111d the American popu-
lation is almost 4 times as great, American legal aid expenditures 
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qucnces are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the 
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any 
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however 
brief, the according of special constitutional status 
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate 
the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless the 
Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. Due 
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the 
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enun-
ciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result. 
III 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
cretion on a case-by-case basis.31 The determination 
should be made before the accused formally pleads; 
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas m 
which the assistance of counsel may be required. 32 If 
31 It seems to me that Ruch an individualized rule, unlike a six-
month rule and the majority's rule, does not present equal protec-
tion problems under this Court's deci8ions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12 (195G); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963); and 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
32 See, e. g., Katz, Municipal Court~-Another Urban Ill, 20 Case 
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the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review. 
Tho trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize 
carefully tho subsequent proceedings for the protection 
of tho defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought 
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine 
the case against him to insure that there is admissible 
evidence tending to support the elements of the of-
fense. If a case went to trial without defense counsel, 
the court should intervene, when necessary, to insure 
that the defendant adequately brings out the facts in 
his favor and to prevent legal issues from being over-
looked. :Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly 
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appel¼,te 
courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to 
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise 
and detailed set of g,uidelines for judges to follow in de-
termining whether the, appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial, Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense,charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex 
legal or factual questions, but. charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions, 
such as search and seizure problems, would usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were 
one where the State is represented by counsel and where -
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (196q); 
Harvey v. Mi,ssissippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. •13, 
supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the de-
fendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt can 
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial. 
./,· 
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there would be a strong indication that the indigent also 
needs the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The 
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted 
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious 
conseq~ence the court should consider. 
· Third: the court should, consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the 
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be 
the competency of the individual defendant to present hie 
o~n case. The attitude ·of the community toward a par-
ticular defendaut or particular incident would be another 
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a 
d.efendant would have a peculiar· need for a lawyer which 
w'ould compel the' appointment of counsel in a case where 
the court would_ nor~nall:y think this unnecessary. Ob-
viously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges 
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental 
fairne_ss requiring the consideration of the varying factors 
in each case. 
· Such a ~ule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cas(;ls ~n Betts -y. 
v._ .Brady, 316. U. S. 455 (194~), and B?!,te v. Illinois, 333 
U'.. S. 640 ( 1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon. 33 
Qne of tJ:ie reas(?ns f \ll' seeking a more definitive standard 
~n felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-:case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon, 
372 U. S., at 350- 351. But this Court should not assume 
33 I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts ; I am in complete 
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to 
counsel in a felony case. Sec n. 1, supra. N ciLher case controls 
today's result. 
,, . 
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness, there is little reason to think that in-
sensitivity will abate. 
In concluding, I emphasize my long held conviction 
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly 
only when all parties are represented by competent 
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I 
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the avail-
ability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case, 
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to 
me-as it has to the other members of the Court. We 
are all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right 
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what 
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the 
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities 
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the 
peace courts across the country. 
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord 
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the 
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems 
so necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the 
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view 
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solici-
tor General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist 
rule, there would still remain serio~ractical problems 
r.esulting from the expansion of indigfents' rights to coun-
----sel in petty offense cases. 3•1 But the according of review-
34 Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in 
this opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the 
requirement of counsel. It is my view that relying upon judicial 
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise 
.. 
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able discretion to the courts in determining when counsel 
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a com-
pletely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transi-
tion to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel. 
In this process, the courts of first instance which de-
cide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider 
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant 
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, 
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as 
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or 
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The 
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary 
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the avail-
ability of counsel so that no person accused of crime 
must stand alone if counsel is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of the decision in this case. 
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in the 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST joins, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies. 1 The ques-
tion before us today is whether an indigent def end ant 
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 
or both, and sentenced to 90 days in jail, is entitled as 
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel. The broader question is whether the 
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged 
with a state petty offense 2 be afforded the right to ap-
pointed counsel. 
1 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
in Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice Harlan was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 U. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114 
(1967); Loper v. Beto, - V. S. - (1972). 
2 As used herein, the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
2 
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In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious mio:de-
mcanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.~ 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Lou-isiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in the subsequent ca~e of Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided 
shortly after the opinion below, in which the Court held 
that the due process right to a trial by jury in state crim-
inal cases was limitC:'cl to cases in ,vhich the offense 
charged was punishable by more than six months' impris-
onment. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel 
line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent 
has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there 
is a due process right. to a jury trial. An unskilled lay-
man may be able to defend himself i11 a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together disas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the· 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed com1sel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin, 
not punishable by impr.isonmont, rrgardlrss of the am0tmt of any· 
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used' 
herein differs from the federal statutory definition of "petty of-· 
fcnse." whirh inrl11c!Ps offrn,r~ punishable b~· not more than six 
months' imprisomnrn1 or b.,· a fine not exrecding $500. 18 U. S. C .. 
§ 1. 
3 236 So. 2d 442 ( 1970). 
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and D1strict of Columbia v. Clawa11s, 300 U. S. 617 
(1937), reveal that the jury trial limitation has historic 
origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felony cases.~ Only as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury-te1npering the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial 
power "-·while important, is not as fundamental to the 
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counscl.6 
I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty 
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor can I agrw with the-
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court, 
that "absent a knowinp.; and intelligent waiver, no person 
may be imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by 
counsel at his trial." Ante, at 12. It seems to me that 
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity. 
There is a middle course, between the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due 
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right 
4 See Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932). 
G Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 14,5, 156 (1968). 
6 Although we huYc giYcn retro:wtirn effect to our ruling in 
Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have 
said that, "[t]hc values implemented by the right to jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons con-
victed in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment ri11:ht to jmy trial." De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 
631, 634 (1968). 
4 
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to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of 
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys--
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense· 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala--
bama 7 and Gideon,8 both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre--
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counsel. Even in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicap, will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief 
period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
record on employability, are frequently of sufficient mag-
nitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty." 9' 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, 
their continued possession may become essential in 
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
7 Supra, n. 4, at 68-69. 
8 372 U. S., at 343-345. 
9 See L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in. 
American State Courts, 132 ( 1965). 
10 See James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969). 
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licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates 
important interests of the licensees. In such cases: 
the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id., at 539. 
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is· 
of sufficient consequence, 11 denying the assistance of 
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending them-
selves is a denial of due process. 
This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. The-
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases 
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances~ 
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that 
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process,. 
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, em-
bodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line-· 
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While 
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no 
11 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor 
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State v. Kruger, 280 
Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919) ), disqualification for a licensed pro--
fession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); 
N. C. Gen. Stat.§ 93 A-4 (b) (1965) (real estate brokers)), and loss 
of pension rights, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (West 1966) (police 
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in 
fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Burns 
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 28-5414 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor 
resulting in imprisonment); 53 Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 39323, 65599 
(1957) ( conviction of crime or misdemeanor)). See generally Proj-
ect, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand .. 
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means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are 
complex; others arc exceedingly simple. As a justifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend a.re the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the case. Nor does every 
defendant who can afford to do so hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
of assistance of counsel may exceed the benefits.13 It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified yet who arc in low income groups where 
engaging counsel in a minor petty offense case would 
be a luxury the family could not afford. The line be-
tween indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from 
State to State and often resulting in serious inequities to 
accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent the-
disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically. 
1 ~ Gideon Y. Wainwright, 372 U. S., nt 344. 
13 In petty offenses, there is mt1l'h Jes~ plea negotiation than in 
serious offenses. Sec Report by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Soriety, 134 (1967) (hereinafter rited as "Chal-
lenge"). Thus, in rases where the eYidcnce of guilt is oYerwhelming,. 
the assistance of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence. 
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A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were of ten informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous.14 It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant nreds the assistance of counsel if the 
offense charged is only a petty one.1 " 
Despite its overbreaclth, the easiest solution would be 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its adverse impact on the administration of the crimi-
nal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when 
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor 
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
14 Silverstein, supra , n . 9, at 125-126. 
1 5 Neithrr the Report by the Prrsidrnt '::< Commis~ion on Law En-
forr emen t and the Administration of .lustier nor thr Ameriran Bnr 
A8soriation went the route thr Court tn krs today. Thr President's 
Commission recommended that ro1msrl be provided to criminal de-
fend ants who fare " [L signifir11nt prnnlt:v" nnd 11t lrn st to those who are 
in danger of "suhst:mtial lo~s of liberty." Challenge. supra, n . 13, at 
150. The American Bar A~sorintion standnrd would no t extend the 
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not "likely to be 
impo 'ed." Americnn Bar Association Project on :'.\Iinimum Rtandards 
for Criminal .Justice, ProYiding Defense Sen ·ires, 37-40 (1968) . 
Neither supports a new, inflexible constitutional rule. 
8 
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The rule adopted today docs not go all the way. It 
is limited to petty offense cases in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule will be extended to all petty offense 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must as-
sume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty 
offense cases. It would be illogical-and without dis-
cernible support in the Constitution-to hold that no· 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that 
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken 
from a person without affording him due process of law. 
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis 
for distinguishing between deprivations of liberty and 
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at 
all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances 
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which 
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies 
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be 
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-
jail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can 
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of 
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even to-
day's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
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upon the day to day functioning of the criminal justice· 
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitu--
tional rule with consequences of such unknown dimen-
sions, especially since it is supported neither by history 
nor precedent. 
II 
The majority opm10n concludes that, absent a valid 
waiver, a person may not be imprisoned even for lesser 
offenses unless he was represented by counsel at the trial. 
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances,. 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned-
however briefly-unless he was represented by or waived 
his right to counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances which 
authorize imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some· 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain traffic offenses. They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
This broad spectrum of petty offense cases daily floods 
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today 
will confront the judges of each of these courts 
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed· 
or knowingly waived, no sentence of imprisonment 
for any duration may be imposed. The judge will 
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial-
and without hearing the evidence-whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some· 
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility 
to consider the full range of punishments established 
by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the· 
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to 
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If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tai-
lored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the 
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories-those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be 
overruling de f aclo the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
lar offense. It is true, as the majority notes, that there 
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures, 
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of 
imprisonment-even "hen rarely carried out-as serving 
a legitimate social function. 
In the brief for the United States as arnicus curiae,. 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo 
if the evidence-contrary to pretrial assumptions-jus-
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a second 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial ,vhen the accused was uncounselled. If 
the second trial were held before the same judge, he 
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might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might run 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.16 In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by 
legislatures as imprisonable, will be treated by judges 
as unimprisonable. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 
equal protection problems. There may well be an un-
fair and unequal treatment of individual defendants 
depending on whether the individual judge has <le-
tennined in advance to leave open the option of impris-
onment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled 
in some courts to counsrl while in other courts in the 
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense 
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel 
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which 
110 jail sentence is i1nposecl, the results of this type of 
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five clays in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so, will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.11 
16 Se<.> ('al/an "· ll'ilson. 127 r. S. 540 (IS.SO); l'v·orth Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). 
17 The type of pennlty diH<'llssed nboYe (im·olving the discretionary 
alternatiYe of "jnil or fine") presents serious problems of fairness--
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To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
la\Y, most judges are likely to appoint counsel for indi-
gents in all but the most minor offenses where jail 
sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sud-
den expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States 
the rule the Court today adopts, recognized that the· 
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks." 18 
After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule· 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"[I] f ... this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice." 19 
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is 
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regard-
both to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of 
juHlice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971). Ko adequate 
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found. 
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of 
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is available and is appointed, 
could aggravate the problem. 
18 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 34-35. 
19 Id., at 36-37. 
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rng the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated v,·hether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be used 
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively 
small sentences." 20 Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
'term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the· 
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is 
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are· 
presently 335,200 attorneys and that the number will 
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to· 
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel, 
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to 
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic 
offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 335,200· 
lawyers are potentially available. Thousands of these 
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice 
work for governments, corporate legal departments, the· 
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal repre-
sentation. Of those in general practice, we have no 
indication how many are qualified to defend criminal 
cases or willing to accept assignments which may prove 
less than lucrative for most. 21 
20 Id., at 39. 
21 The custom in man~·, if not most, localities is to appoint counsel 
on a case-by-case basi::;. Compensation is grnerally inadequate. 
Even in the federal courts under the Criminal ,Justice Act of 1964, 
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which pro\·ide::; one of the most generous com-
pensation plans, the rates for appointed counsel-$20 per hour spent 
14 
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It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementa-
tion of the Court's new rule will require no more than 
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few conununities 
are there full-time public defenders available for or pri-
vate lawyers specializing in petty cases. Thus. if it were 
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the 
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take an 
occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded 
calendars of lmver courts in which cases are not scheduled 
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day 
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate 
figures ignores the heart of the problem, which is the 
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the 
hundreds of small localities across the country. 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts.22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
out of rourt. $30 prr hour of court time, subject to a maximum totat 
fee of $400 for a misdemeanor rnsc and $1,000 for a felony-arc low 
b)' Amerirnn stnndarcls. C'on~<"qu<"ntly, the majorit)· of persons 
willing to arrept appointments are the )·oung nm! inexpcrienred. 
Sec Cappelletti. Part One: Thf' Emergence of a Modern Thf'mc, in 
C'nppellctti :md Gordley. Legal Aid: Modnn Themes and Vnriations, 
24 Stanford L. RcY. 347. 377-378 (1972). Mn. JmnTCE R1rnNNAN 
suggests, in his ronrmring opinion, that law students might proYide 
nn important sourrr of leg:il rcpre"entntion. He pre:-ents no figures, 
however, as to how mall)' . tudf'nt:; would be qualified and willing 
io undertake the respon~ihili(ies of defending indigent mi,:demc-an-
nnts. Although welcome progress is being made with progrnms, 
s11pported by the Amcric:m Bar Assoriation , to enlist tlw im·oh"e-
ment of law students in indigent reprCilC'nta tion, the problems of 
IDC'C'ling state requirement~ and of :1ssuring the requi~ite control 
and ~upcrvi~ion , arc far from i11~uh;;:t:111tial. ::'lfon'<l\"t'r, tlw imp:tct 
of stndf'nt partiripation would be limited primarily to the HO or 
less communities where these law schools are lor::i tcd. 
"" See generally H. J:,mC'~. Crisis in the Court,;, r. 2 (1!)67); 
Ch::tllenge, supra, n. 13, 145-156. 
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of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
Court's rule may ,Yell exacerbate delay and con-
gestion in these courts. We are familiar with the 
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
cl uty; in other cases it will be clone for purposes of 
clelay.23 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
petty offense cases. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their 11ot-yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused-all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public and added delay and congestion in the 
courts.2• 
2 ~ Sre, <'. g., James. supra. n. 21, ::it 27-30; Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
2 •
1 In Cook County, Illinois. a rC'rent study rC'Yra.lrd that the mcm-
bC'rs of the Chicago B::ir Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners, who are appointrd to represent indigent defendants, 
clrct, a jnr~· trial ill 6~1 % of thPir tri,11 <·:1~r,. whilr rrtaillrd am! ap-
pointrd rounRrl do so in 33' ~ and the puhlir defrnder in on!~- 1:i%. 
"One posdible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel, 
who arc sometimes serving in part to gain cxperienre, are more 
willin11: to undertn kc a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, 
who is Ycry busy and very conscious of the probable extra penalty 
accruing to a defendant who loses his rase before a jury." D. Oaks 
:rnd W. Lrhman , A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent, 158-
(1968) (footnote omitted). 
16 
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There is an additional problem. The ability of vari--
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there were adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources-of law-
yers, of facilities and available funding-presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities .. 
Many have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places. and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further. 25· 
In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority.26 These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, who understand the problems of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
25 See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 535 (1967); Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. Dupree, 42 
Ill. 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mallory. 378 Mich. 
538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Ilendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 
2d 142, 456 P. 2d 696, cert. denied, 397 U. S. 9-!8 (1969); State ex 
rel. Plutshack v. Department of Health and Social Services, 37 Wis. 
2d 713, 155 N. W. 2d 540 (1968). 
26 See Hawaii St. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. 
§§ 19-851, 19-852 (1971 Supp); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-4503 
(1970 Supp.); Ky. Crim. Proc. Rule 8.04; La. Rrv. Stat., 15-
141 (F) (West 1967); Me. Rule Crim. Proc. 44; Md. R. 719 §b2 
(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1803 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188, 
193.140 (1969); N. l\Iex. Stat. Ann. § 40-2017 (1970 Supp.); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1971 Supp.); Vt. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 13, § 6503 
(1971 Supp.); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-241.1 (1971 Supp). 
'• ., . 
'· 
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the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax capabilities."7 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a 
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's rul-
ing will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the-
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar from hundreds of communities in the United· 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court systern to deal ·with minor offenses.28 It is, 
27 Sec Kamisar & Chopcr, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded' 
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing'· 
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But sec State v. Borst, 278 
l\1inn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967). 
28 See Cableton v. State, supra, n. 24, at 358: "[T]here are more 
justice:, of the peace in Arkansas than there arc resident prac-
ticing lawyers and . . . there are coU11ties in which there are no , 
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quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat.~9 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonab]e offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many small town courts. The community could simply 
not enforce its own la\,·s."0 
Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short term "chaos" and to 
the possibility of long term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-
practicing l::iwycrs. Tile' irnpnct of [right to rounr-rl in mir-drmcnnor 
cases] would srriousl~· impnir thr admini8tration of justice in Arlrnnsas 
and impose an intolnable bnrdm upon the legal profrr-r-ion." (Foot-
note omittrd.) 
~n See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-12G. 
:,o The surcesr-ful implcmcntntion of the m11jorit~1's rule would 
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable 
fonds, something they hnve not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21 % of the Nation's popnlation provide more than 50% of all 
stnte appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of nn Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1265 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansns spent $570,000 
defending indigents in felony cases-up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was $612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11. "In Yiew of American resources the funds 
spent on the legal services progrnm ran only be rrgarded as trivial." 
Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at :~79. "Although the Arneriran econ-
omy i~ O\'er 8 time~ 1hr 8i1.e of the British :me! the American popu-
htion is almost 4 times as grral, American legal aid expenditures 
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qucnces arc immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the 
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any 
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however 
brief, the according of special constitutional status 
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate 
the need for counsel in other types of cases. unle~s the 
Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. Due 
process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the 
six-month rule approved below nor the rule today enun-
ciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result. 
III 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
cretion on a case-by-case basis.:IJ The determination 
should be made before the accused formally pleads; 
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas 111 
which the assistance of counsel may be required. 32 If 
3 1 H seems to me tlrnt surh :m indiYidnalized rule, unlike a six-
month rule and the majorit?'s rule. does not present equal protec-
tion problems under this Court's derisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
lT. S. 12 (19.5G); Douglas Y. California, 372 U. S. 353 (19G3); and 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40-1- U. S. 189 (1971). 
32 Sec, e. g., Ka11,, 1foniripal Courts-Anotlwr Urban Ill, 20 Case 
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala-
20 
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the trial court should conclude that the assistauce of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review. 
The trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize 
carefully the subsequent proceedings for the protection 
of the defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought 
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine 
the case against him to insure that there is admissible 
evidence tending to support the elements of the of-
fense. If a case went to trial without defense counsel, 
the court should intervene, when necessary, to insure· 
that the defendant adequately brings out the facts in 
his favor and to prevent legal issues from being over-
looked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly 
against unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate 
courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to 
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is impossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise 
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in de-
termining whether the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex 
legal or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions, 
such as search and seizure problems, would usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were 
one where the State is represented by counsel and \Vhere 
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); 
Ilarvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although there is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13, 
supra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the de-
fencbu t who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt c-an 
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial. 
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there would be a strong indication that the indigent also, 
needs the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follow if a conviction is 9btained. The 
more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the· 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted 
in Part I above, imprisonment is not the only serious 
consequence the court should consider. 
Third, the court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the 
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be· 
the competency of the individual defendant to present his 
own case. The attitude of the community toward a par-
ticular defendant or particular incident would be another 
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a 
defendant would have a peculiar need for a lawyer which 
would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where 
the court would normally think this unnecessary. Ob-
viously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges 
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental 
fairness requiring the consideration of the varying factors 
in each case. 
Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special 
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
v. Brady, 316 U. S. 45,5 ( 1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333. 
U.S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon.33 
One of the reasons for seeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
live up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should be appointed. See· 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Gideon, 
372 U. S., at 350--351. But this Court should not assume 
33 I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts; I am in complete 
accord with Gideon. B etts, like Gideon, co11 e('l'llC<l lhc righ1 to 
counsd in a felony case. Sec n. 1, sup ra. Neither case ront rnls 
t oday's result. 
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that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness, there is little reason to think that in-
sensitivity will abate. 
In concluding. I emphasize my long held conviction 
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly 
only when all parties are r<'presented by competent 
counsel. Before becoming a member of this Court, I 
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the avail-
ability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case, 
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to 
me-as it has to the other members of the Court. We 
arc all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right 
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what 
the Constitution reqilires, and (ii) the effect upon the 
criminal justice system, especially in the smaller cities 
and the thousands of police, municipal and justice of the 
peare courts across the country. 
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord 
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the 
fkxibility aml opportunity for adjustment which seems 
so necessary when we arc imposing new doctrine on the 
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view 
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solici-
tor General as the probable result of the Court's absolutist 
rule, there would still remain serious practical problems 
resulting from the expansion of indigents' rights to coun-
sel in petty offense cases."·1 But the according of review-
3
~ Indeed, it is recognized that rnnny or the problems identified in 
this opinion will rr,11lt from auy raiHing of the standards a8 to the 
rrquirrmenL of counsel. It is my view that rel.\·in~ upon judicial 
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise 
'. 
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able discretion to the courts in determining when counsel 
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a com-
pletely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transi-
tion to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel. 
In this process, the courts of first instance which de-
cide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider 
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant 
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, 
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as 
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or 
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The 
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary 
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the avail-
ability of counsel so that no person accused of crime 
must stand alone if counsel is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of the decision in this case. 
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice in th~ 
very courts which already are under the most severe strain. 
I-
1-,. 
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free Lawyer Rulirug Stirs Concern 
William Wright has had his 
passing moment of fame in 
the nation's affairs, but there 
are observers here who will 
remain curious to know what 
happens to him ultimately. 
His story may tell whether 
"small town America" can 
adjL1st to the G~nstitution. 
1'be minor drama revolving 
around Wright i;wolves a ma-
jor qnestion in the law: Does 
the Constitution guarantee a 
lawyer even to a person ac-
cused of a petty crime? The 
Supreme Court gave a modi-
fied "yes" to that question re-
cently, and the reverberations 
are continuing across the 
country. 
In hundreds of municipal 
courts, scaaered through as 
many villages and towns, the 
word is just getting around 
that free lawyers may have to 
be provided in scores of pelly 
cases for offenders who want 
an attorney but can't afford 
to hire their own. 
The Supreme Court has de-
creed that the right to a law-
yer, and a free one if neces-
sary, c1pplies to any case in 
which the sentence could be a 
jail term, however brief. The 
town fathers in many commu-
nities are wondering .if that 
is beyond local capacity. 
* 
Willia,n Wright's story, so 
far, suggests that it may be a 
luxury in many towns. 13ut his 
story also indicates that 1t 
could often be a necessity, 
too. IIis is an interesting case 
study: 
On Oct. 27 , 19G9, Wright had 
had too much to drink. lfe was 
pickc'<l up as a drunk, and 
jailed al While Hiver, S.D. 
The next d:1 v, he was taken 
15 miles to tlie t'.lwn of Wood, 
to be tried before the police 
mag-islratc, llow:ml Piper. 
All hough Wright said ne 
would like to have a lawver 
for the c:1se, none \\"1S riro-
vidc<l bec,1use Wright could 
not afford his own. The town 
of \\'nod made no pro\'liiion for 
free l:nvyrrs in such cases. 
So Wr:°gitt pleadt•d g1tilly. llc 
was gi\'rn a scntent'L'-n f:iirly 
typical one for small con1111L;-
11itic;;-w111ch gave him the op-
tion of -.1·oddn1-: off his ''<kht to 
society." l\!:1g1,;lrale Pi1,cr 
gavC' him a ch<liC'c of 10 dnys' 
labor on the ~trccts of Wood, 
By LYLE DENNISTON 
followed by 60 days on proba-
tion, or else a 30-day jail term 
plus $100 fine . 
He chose the street labor. 
Wright might have served out 
his time, and remained for-
ever unknown in hislory. But 
it snowed heavily in Wood on 
the fourth day· of Wright's 
street work, and the town m::ir-
shal told him he could not 
finish serving his "time" un-
til the spring thaw had come. 
Four months later, Wright 
was arrested by lhc town mar-
shal, and appeared again be-
fore Magistrate Piper-this 
time at the local filling sta-
tion. 
* Because he had not com-
pleted his 10 days on the 
streets, Wright was ordered 
to begin foe 30-day sentence, 
and pay the $100 tine. 
His case was then taken up 
by an antipoverty program 
lawyer from nearby Hosebud, 
S.D., and appealed to the state 
supreme court. Wrigl1t's de-
mand for a new trial, on the 
ground he had been deprived 
of a trial lawyer unconstitu-
tionally, was rejected by the 
state tribumd. 
"It is a malter of common 
knowledge,·• the state justices 
said, '·that the number of 
cases in which appointed 
counsel c1ppear for indigents 
charged with crime in our 
trial coul'ls and 0·1 ::ppcal or 
review has mus!J1'•:i0mcd in 
late yea.rs. 
''Thoughtful students of the 
situation arc be~inning to 
wonder if we in South Dakota 
arc going to ha1·c enough law-
yers to serve them and how 
long our rounlies will be able 
to p3y their eompcns.ition. 
Addimi lo this burden the 
municipal ordinance offenders 
would, we t.hink. be more than 
we could provide for." 
When Wrighl's case reach-
ed the U.S. Supreme Court, 
it attracted the .:itlcntion of 
al lea:,t srmc of the just.ices. 
And so. when the court rnlcd 
(in another nwn's case) that 
the rit\ht lo a lawyer e:---tcnd-
ed lo pl'lty tl'i:lls in municipal 
c,)urt.~. Wr ight's c,1sc w;1s pol'-
lrn:,-ed by I.he disscnli11g jus-
tic,._•s J'., an exhibit of the folly 
of tire 1ww court ruling. 
It \I :1s pointed oul Lhat the 
town of Wood had only 1;:2 
people, that the m•nrc:,t law-
yer came from a town 40 
miles away, and that the town 
had so little money it would 
not even pay a lawyer to de· 
fend the case in the Supreme 
Court. (The lawyer from the 
nearby town, Ruben G. Mau-
lis, had handled the town's 
legal chores for about three 
years, but in all that time had 
been paid only $224.62.) 
But no attention was paid, 
by those who thought Wright's 
case proved the error of the 
court's way, to a very signifi-
cant facet of his case. 
The town magistrate had 
given Wright a sentence which 
includod 60 days on probation, 
but SouU1 Dakota law forbade 
that in a case like Wright's, 
since he was obliged to serve 
time as a street laborer. And 
the $100 fine imposed as part 
of the alternative sentence was 
twice as high as the S50 maxi-
mum for the crime of intoxi-
cation. 
* 
It would be a fair assump-
tion that a lawyer represent-· 
ing Wright (or even a law stu-
dent) would have been able 
to protect his client from such 
errors. At the least, the mag-· 
istrate might have been im-
pelled to cite chaptcr-and-
verse for the punishment he 
was meting out. 
Now Wright's case has been 
sent back to South Dakota's 
courts. No doubt, it could pose 
a dilemma for them, just as 
thousands of similar cases 
right now arc troubling hun-
d1 eds of other local courts. 
It seems possible that some 
towns will choose lo avoid lhe 
dilemma by simply refusing to 
enforce some of their petty 
crime laws. If lhc offenses 
really an• minor, it could be 
that it w:.is extravagant for the 
town to treat them ,is crimes, 
bringing in the full panoply of 
constilPI 1onal rights. 
But towns may ct1oose, in-
strnd, lo keep their laws, and 
resort only to fines as puni5h- · 
ment. That would seem io 
s:1lisfy lhe Supreme Courl, at 
least for the time being. And, 
concciv:1bly, it · could make 
municipal courts :wmewhat 
sclf-sus!:iining. 
Bul some new way will have 
to be found to keep 'the slrcets 
repaired in towns like Wood, 
S.D. 
